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INTRODUCTION
1

In The Unitary Executive During the First Half-Century, we
surveyed the first seven presidencies under the Constitution to
determine the view of presidential power held by the incumbents
during that period. We found that from 1789 to 1837, American
presidents from Washington to Jackson strongly believed in a unitary
executive of the kind defended by many scholars in recent years,
2
including Professor Calabresi. In particular, we established that the
first seven presidents vigorously defended the president’s unitary
authority over the execution of federal law. We also concluded that
many of these presidents believed the Vesting Clause of Article II
was a direct grant of power to the president, as Professor Calabresi
has previously argued in a debate with Professors Lawrence Lessig
3
and Cass Sunstein.
We now pick up our survey where we left off in the prior article
and examine the presidencies during the second half-century of our
nation’s history to see what view these men held on the scope of the
president’s power to execute the law. In so doing, we focus primarily
on three mechanisms generally viewed as essential to any theory of
the unitary executive: the president’s power to remove subordinate
policy-making officials at will, the president’s power to direct the
manner in which subordinate officials exercise discretionary
executive power, and the president’s power to veto or nullify such
4
officials’ exercises of discretionary executive power. We also
employ the interpretive methodology known as “departmentalism” or
“coordinate construction,” which is based on the principle that all
three branches of the federal government have the competency and

1. Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive During the First
Half-Century, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1451 (1997).
2. See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute
the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994); Steven G. Calabresi, The Vesting Clauses as Power
Grants, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1377 (1994); Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The
Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153
(1992).
3. Compare Calabresi, supra note 2, at 1378-1400, 1403-05 (arguing that the Article II
Vesting Clause represents a substantive grant of constitutional power); Calabresi &
Prakash, supra note 2, at 563-64, 570-81, 612-13 (same); Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note
2, at 1165-70, 1175-81, 1186-1206 (same), with Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The
President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 47-55, 119 (1994) (disagreeing
with Professor Calabresi’s views).
4. See Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 1, at 1458.
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responsibility to interpret the Constitution and that the meaning of the
Constitution is determined through the dynamic interaction of all
5
three branches.
As we shall see, presidential power ebbed and flowed several times
during the second fifty years under the Constitution. Congress
reasserted itself and remained ascendant in the years following
Andrew Jackson’s presidency until the crisis of the Civil War, which
led the country to look to the president for leadership once again.
Throughout these various shifts in the relative power of the branches
and regardless of which party was in power, presidents generally
defended their sole authority to execute the federal laws. Although
some deviations from the unitary executive model did occur during
this period, they were not so significant as to constitute presidential
acquiescence to congressional interference with presidential execution
of the laws.
We begin in Part I with the history of the unitary executive in the
years leading up to and including the Civil War and trace in Part II the
pivotal presidencies of Abraham Lincoln and Andrew Johnson. These
years culminated with a remarkable but ultimately unsuccessful attack
on the unitary executive when Congress impeached but failed to
remove Johnson from office because of his decision to fire Secretary
of War Stanton in violation of the Tenure of Office Act. We turn in
Part III to the reclamation of presidential power during the years
following Johnson’s disastrous presidency. All told, our survey covers
the years from 1837 to 1889, during which the Tenure of Office Act
was repealed after Congress finally saw it as the constitutional
monstrosity it truly was.
II. THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE DURING THE
JACKSONIAN PERIOD, 1837-1861
By modern standards, the eight presidential administrations
between the Jackson and Lincoln administrations were generally
unremarkable, both in terms of historical significance and executive
effectiveness. Nevertheless, historical review convincingly
demonstrates that the actions and words of these presidents reflected a
consistent desire to protect the constitutional powers of the presidency
against incursions by Congress. Indeed, several presidents during this
period actually succeeded in expanding the constitutional powers of
5. For a more complete discussion of coordinate construction and its particular
applicability to separation of powers disputes, see id. at 1463-72.
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the presidency in a number of important ways.
But perhaps the best direct evidence that the presidents of this
period consistently protected their unitary constitutional powers from
Congress can be found in the words of one of the executive branch’s
greatest antagonists throughout this period, Henry Clay of Kentucky,
who commented:
The executive branch of the government . . . was eternally in
action; it was ever awake; it never slept; its action was continuous
and unceasing, like the tides of some mighty river, which
continued flowing and flowing on, swelling, and deepening, and
widening, in its onward progress, till it swept away every
impediment, and broke down and removed
every frail obstacle
6
which might be set up to impede its course.

The presidential history from this period would ultimately
underscore the truth underlying Clay’s words.
A. Martin Van Buren
President Martin Van Buren was not as outspoken as Andrew
Jackson on the great questions of presidential power that form the
topic of this series of articles. However, this relative silence was not
necessarily indicative of a passive view of executive power on Van
Buren’s part. Rexford Tugwell suggests that Van Buren was as
responsible as Jackson himself for the development of the spoils
7
system and of the powerful Jacksonian national political machine.
Indeed, as a New York senator in the 1820s, Van Buren had
orchestrated the use of lobbying for the removal and appointment of
8
federal officials to support the creation of local political machines.
He used his tenure in the Jackson administration to nationalize these
practices, which was one of the chief reasons why Van Buren
succeeded Jackson to the presidency, despite his lack of popularity
9
with much of the Democratic leadership in Congress.
Van Buren was generally a loyal follower and implementer of
Jackson’s views, which is significant given Jackson’s enthusiastic
10
embrace of the theory of the unitary executive during the Bank War.

6. LEONARD D. WHITE, THE JACKSONIANS: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY
1829-1861, at 109 (Macmillan 1967) (1954) (quoting 6 HENRY CLAY, WORKS 309 (Jan.
24, 1842)).
7. REXFORD G. TUGWELL, THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE PRESIDENCY 105-07 (1960).
8. CARL RUSSELL FISH, THE CIVIL SERVICE AND THE PATRONAGE 63-65 (1905).
9. See TUGWELL, supra note 7, at 105-07.
10. See Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 1, at 1531.
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Van Buren’s biographer, Major L. Wilson, describes Van Buren’s
close affinity with Jackson as follows:
In a public letter accepting the nomination of the Democratic party
to succeed Andrew Jackson as president, Martin Van Buren
pictured himself “the honored instrument” of the administration
party and vowed “to tread generally in the footsteps of President
Jackson.” Friends welcomed the statement as a pledge to defend
the work of Jackson . . . . When divested of partisan rhetoric, Van
Buren’s statement, and others of like tenor, have been taken by
historians as texts for the persistent
interpretation of his presidency
11
as the “third term” of Jackson.

During his four years in office, Van Buren governed much as
Andrew Jackson had as the leader of his political party. Van Buren
held “regular cabinet meetings” but “took no votes in the cabinet and,
12
as usual, reserved final decisions for himself.” At least two cabinet
members probably favored a national bank, “[y]et they readily
13
deferred to Van Buren’s views of party and presidential power.”
Wilson discusses Van Buren’s approach to leadership:
In regard to key questions in foreign affairs, President Van Buren
took a direct and active part. He also remained involved in the
affairs of the Treasury Department, particularly in the aspects of its
operations that bore upon his proposal[s]. On other and more
routine matters of administration, by contrast,
Van Buren allowed
14
virtual autonomy to department heads.

Van Buren’s support for the unitary executive is reflected in his
continuation of Jackson’s policy towards the Treasury Department,
which, as we have noted earlier, represented perhaps the most
dramatic conflict over the president’s authority to control the
execution of the law to take place during the first fifty years of the
15
Republic. Van Buren adamantly believed that the “keeping and
disbursing of Treasury funds without congressional safeguards . . .
gave the president an unchecked control over the nation’s purse and

11. MAJOR L. WILSON, THE PRESIDENCY OF MARTIN VAN BUREN xi (1984); see also
id. at 94 (noting that Daniel Webster also assailed Van Buren for “rejecting a national
bank solely on the ground of a ‘party pledge’ to follow in Jackson’s footsteps”); JAMES C.
CURTIS, THE FOX AT BAY: MARTIN VAN BUREN AND THE PRESIDENCY, 1837-1841, at 45
(1970) (noting that Van Buren pledged during the election of 1836 to continue Jackson’s
policies).
12. WILSON, supra note 11, at 70.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 171.
15. See Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 1, at 1538-59.
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16

an enormous engine of spoils.” This provoked the ire of the Whig
opposition, who criticized Van Buren for carrying
to the ultimate limit that tendency under Jackson—with his bank
veto, his removal of deposits, his ‘Specie Circular’—to wrest the
control of the Treasury from Congress and to place the nation’s
purse exclusively under executive power . . . . The forms of
republican government [would]
remain[], but its substance would
17
flow to a Treasury Caesar.

The Whigs would repeat the cry of “Treasury Caesarism” many
18
times.
Van Buren’s adherence to the theory of the unitary executive is
also manifest in his use of the power of removal. Van Buren exercised
this removal power sparingly at first, since many of the continuing
appointees were as much his as they were Jackson’s. Leonard White,
who often uses the heavily patronage-influenced postal service as a
barometer for presidential removal activity during this period, notes
that Van Buren removed only 364 of 12,000 postmasters during his
19
first two years in office. As Van Buren began positioning himself
within his party for a second term, however, he became more
aggressive in his use of the removal power, looking beyond mere
party affiliation and instead emphasizing personal political loyalty to
20
his own faction of the Democratic Party. Wilson reports that, “[a]s if
responding to earlier criticisms that he was too passive and fatalistic,
[Van Buren] began to act in a more vigorous and ‘political’ way. For
one thing, he surrendered his initial policy of making no outright
21
removals from office and began to brandish the ‘pruning knife.’”
Van Buren enjoyed the full support of his predecessor in this regard.
Wilson notes:
[Andrew Jackson] welcomed and justified the new policy. Arguing
that the opinions of all officeholders “ought to correspond with the
Executive in all of his important measures,” Jackson urged [Maj.
William B.] Lewis to resign as second auditor in the Treasury
before he was removed. “Rotation in office must from the great
pressure of public opinion be adopted by the President,” he

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

WILSON, supra note 11, at 114.
Id. at 95.
See id. at 99, 114, 197.
WHITE, supra note 6, at 309.
See id.; see also FISH, supra note 8, at 75; 2 WILLIAM M. GOLDSMITH, THE
GROWTH OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 981-82 (1974).
21. WILSON, supra note 11, at 130-31.
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22

explained.

The Van Buren administration’s reliance on the theory of the
unitary executive as the basis for its authority is reflected in an
opinion authored by Attorney General Benjamin Butler denying that
Congress had the right to require collectors of the revenue to disclose
their reasons for any removals of subordinate officers appointed by
them. Butler concluded that “constitutional power of removal
exercised by the President” prevented Congress from forcing the
president to disclose the reasons underlying his removals and that, by
analogy, the same principle protected collectors from being required
23
to do so. Van Buren did accede to two resolutions asking him to
provide the House with a list of all executive removals since the
24
adoption of the Constitution in 1787, a resolution with which Van
25
Buren complied the following year. Passage of this resolution
prompted no objection from Van Buren, since requiring a list of past
removals did not in any way purport to limit the president’s ability to
26
make further removals in the future. An earlier resolution that would
have established a select committee to inquire into all dismissals and
27
to consider restrictions on patronage would have been more
problematic. The House’s failure to pass this resolution obviated any
need for comment from Van Buren.
The Van Buren administration did litigate a landmark Supreme
Court case on the scope of the executive power, Kendall v. United
28
States ex rel. Stokes, that some scholars have erroneously suggested
29
undercuts the unitariness of the executive. The case arose when a
group who had contracted with the post office to transport the mail
asserted a claim for an additional payment that Postmaster General
30
Amos Kendall, a close confidant of Van Buren and Jackson, refused
to pay. The contractors then successfully obtained enactment of

22. Id. at 131.
23. 3 Op. Att’y Gen. 325, 326 (1838).
24. CONG. GLOBE, 25th Cong., 3d Sess. 225 (1839).
25. H.R. DOC. NO. 26-130 (1840).
26. See DARRELL H. SMITH, THE UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION 4-6
(1928).
27. CONG. GLOBE, 25th Cong., 2d Sess. 189 (1838).
28. 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838).
29. Lessig and Sunstein discuss the Kendall case at some length. Lessig & Sunstein,
supra note 3, at 55-61.
30. The Postmaster General was a key figure in the patronage machine that Jackson and
Van Buren set up. Kendall was a close ally of Jackson and Van Buren. See CURTIS, supra
note 11, at 58-60. Kendall had helped Jackson draft his message vetoing the rechartering
of the Bank of the United States. Id. at 38.
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private legislation directing the solicitor of the treasury to settle the
claim in the contractors’ favor. After Kendall continued to refuse to
honor the award even after the solicitor of the treasury had ruled
otherwise, the contractors went to court and obtained a writ of
mandamus from Judge William Cranch of the circuit court of the
District of Columbia against Kendall obliging him to pay the
31
additional money. The Supreme Court upheld the issuance of the
writ of mandamus by a vote of six to three on the grounds that the
solicitor’s award had left Kendall only to perform a purely ministerial
32
act in paying Stokes. The Court found Kendall had no executive
33
discretion to decline to perform that ministerial act. Kendall
ultimately bowed to the Court’s ruling and paid the additional
$40,000.
The case is of landmark significance because it establishes that
executive branch officials can be ordered by courts to perform
ministerial duties. Although the Van Buren administration was
skeptical about the propriety of this conclusion, modern proponents of
34
the unitary executive have readily conceded its validity. It would be
a mistake, however, to conclude that Kendall represents acquiescence
to any limitation of presidential authority to execute the laws. Van
Buren’s reaction to the pressure from party leaders to pay the
contractors the additional money is quite telling in this regard:
Van Buren turned back this pressure, however, and stood by the
postmaster general. He also supported Kendall’s decision to reject
a writ of mandamus, which was issued . . . by the circuit court in
the District of Columbia, ordering the payment of the award. In a
letter to Judge William Cranch, Kendall based his refusal on a
sweeping Jacksonian concept of executive power, at once unitary
in nature and independent of the other branches. The act of any
executive officer was ultimately the act of the president, he argued,
and therefore was not liable to direction from the judiciary. He
wrote: “The Executive is ONE—one in principle, one in object. Its
object is the execution of the laws. It is not susceptible of
subdivisions and
nice distinctions as to its duties and
35
responsibilities.”

Attorney General Butler echoed the same themes when arguing the
case before the Supreme Court when he based his argument on the

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Kendall, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 527-35.
Id. at 613.
Id. at 614.
See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 2, at 1502-03.
WILSON, supra note 11, at 174.
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36

celebrated Decision of 1789. Butler told the Court:
This doctrine [of the unitary executive] was also announced and
established by the congress of 1789, in the debates relative to the
power of removal . . . . [The theory flowed from] that clause which
declares that the “executive power shall be vested in the
President.” From that provision, and from the direction that the
President “shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed,”
[James Madison] deduced the conclusion, that it was “evidently the
intention of the constitution, that the first magistrate should be
responsible for the executive department.” He showed that this
principle of unity and responsibility was necessary to preserve that
equilibrium which the constitution intended . . . . But, whether the
particular question as to the power of removal was correctly
decided or not; no one, in that debate, disputed the position of Mr.
Madison and his associates, that the constitution had actually
vested in the President the whole executive power . . . . The whole
course of this debate, independently of the conclusion to which it
came, is, therefore, utterly irreconcilable with the recent suggestion
adopted and maintained by our learned adversaries; that when the
constitution says “the executive power shall be vested in a
President,” it only gives a name to the department, and merely
means that he shall possess such37executive power as the legislature
shall choose to confer upon him.

Even after having lost before the Supreme Court, the administration
attempted to have the last word by trying to get Congress to enact
legislation stripping the circuit court of its mandamus power. Van
Buren made clear that the bill was intended to take away “from the
judiciary at the seat of government the power to interfere with the
executive in the performance of its duties, even those of a
38
‘ministerial’ sort.” Although the bill passed the Senate, the effort

36. In our previous article on the unitary executive, we described the Decision of 1789
as follows:
Briefly stated, the initial draft of the bill to establish the Department of Foreign
Affairs provided that the Secretary of Foreign Affairs was “to be removable from
office by the President of the United States.” Concerned that this language
suggested that the power to remove the Secretary was conferred by congressional
rather than constitutional grant, Representative Egbert Benson offered an
amendment to this language to remove this implication. This amended language
was subsequently incorporated into the statutes creating the War Department
(without much controversy) as well as the Treasury Department (by the
narrowest of margins: the casting vote of Vice President Adams). Congress’s
action has been thereafter regarded as recognizing the constitutional basis of the
President’s removal power.
Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 1, at 1472 n.53.
37. Kendall, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 597-98 (argument of Attorney General Benjamin F.
Butler) (citation omitted).
38. WILSON, supra note 11, at 175.
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died when the House refused to take any action upon it.
Any claim that Kendall marked any large-scale derogation of the
president’s authority to execute the law is further belied by dicta in
the Court’s opinion drawing a distinction between executive acts and
“mere ministerial act[s],” which do not involve any exercise of
40
discretion. The Kendall Court elaborated as follows:
We do not think the proceedings in this case interfere[] in any
respect whatever with the rights or duties of the executive . . . . The
mandamus does not seek to direct or control the Postmastergeneral in the discharge of any official duty, partaking in any
respect of an executive character, but to enforce the performance
of a mere ministerial act, which41 neither he not the President had
any authority to deny or control.

The Supreme Court turned this dicta into a holding two years later
42
in Decatur v. Paulding. That case arose after the Secretary of the
Navy denied a claim for a general pension asserted by the widow of
Stephen Decatur after she had already collected a special pension
granted to her by private legislation. The circuit court refused to issue
a writ of mandamus ordering the Secretary to pay the pension. In
affirming the circuit court, the Supreme Court adopted the arguments
43
advanced by Attorney General Henry Gilpin and based its decision
squarely on the distinction drawn in Kendall “between executive
44
duties and ministerial acts.” Officials exercising executive powers
are “continually required to exercise judgment and discretion,” in
contrast to “mere ministerial duties,” which do not involve any
45
discretion whatsoever.
Finally, the Van Buren years saw the Supreme Court issue an
46
important ruling in Ex parte Hennen, a case in which the
administration appears not to have participated. In Hennen, the Court
held that a district court clerk could be removed by the judges who
appointed him at any time because inferior officers in the judicial and
executive branch serve not for life but at the pleasure of the official
47
who appointed them. In so holding, the Court specifically noted that
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id.
Kendall, 37 U.S. (14 Pet.) at 614.
Id. at 610.
39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497 (1840).
Id. at 509-10.
Id. at 515; see also id. at 514, 516 (citing Kendall).
Id. at 515.
38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230 (1839).
Id. at 259-60.
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it was the “practical construction of the Constitution that [the removal
power] was vested in the President alone” and not in the president and
48
the Senate jointly. Dicta in Hennen thus accept the Decision of 1789
as having construed the Constitution as giving the president unlimited
removal power. Indeed, the point was considered so well established
that all of the attorneys arguing the case before the Supreme Court
49
conceded as much.
When it came time in 1840 to seek re-election, Van Buren,
“[h]aving shaped his administration in the steps of Jackson, [looked]
50
to reelection on the same basis.” Van Buren’s critics attacked him
for the same monarchical tendencies that they discerned in Jackson.
They argued that “the greatest threat to liberty was Democratic
Caesarism—that is, the encroachment of executive power, supported
by a drilled and disciplined party that was bent on spoils rather than
51
the public good.” James Barbour of Virginia proclaimed, as had
Henry Clay during the Bank War, “We are indeed in the midst of a
revolution . . . . The forms of the Constitution are retained, but its
52
spirit is gone—your President is a monarch almost absolute.”
William Henry Harrison, the Whig candidate for president in 1840,
“evoked thunderous applause with the declaration that ‘the
Government is now a practical monarchy.’ The true issue was not
democracy versus aristocracy—the people against a privileged few—
53
as the Democrats claimed, but democracy versus monarchy.” Van
Buren was tagged as a would-be monarch, just as Jackson had been,
revealing the extent to which Van Buren’s philosophy of executive
power followed Jackson’s. Democrats responded in the 1840
campaign by stressing “the continuity of Van Buren’s administration
54
with that of Jackson,” thus accepting the Whig thesis that Van
Buren was just an extension of Old Hickory himself.
Van Buren was as staunch a proponent of the theory of the unitary
executive as his mentor, Andrew Jackson. Van Buren’s willingness to
exercise strong presidential authority, particularly against the
55
Treasury Department; his increasing use of his power of removal;
48. Id. at 258.
49. See id. at 233-35, 238 (argument of Mr. Coxe); id. at 246 (argument of Mr. Gilpin);
id. at 255 (argument of Mr. Jones).
50. WILSON, supra note 11, at 191.
51. Id. at 197.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 198.
54. Id. at 202.
55. See FISH, supra note 8, at 75; 2 GOLDSMITH, supra note 20, at 981-82.
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the opinion authored by Attorney General Butler reiterating that
Congress has no right to require the president to disclose the reasons
underlying his removals; and the positions advanced by his
administration before the Supreme Court each suggest that had Van
Buren was as committed a defender of the unitary executive as
Jackson.
B. William H. Harrison
The Whig presidency of William Henry Harrison saw the same
aggressive defense of executive power often associated with the
Jacksonian Democrats. This was surprising since the Whig Party’s
self-proclaimed raison d’être was belief in a limited and weak
executive branch. Many observers had assumed that the election of
Harrison would mark a sharp reversal in the president’s position with
regard to the unitary executive. Surely given the vehement opposition
of the Whigs to presidential removals during the Jackson and Van
Buren administrations and Harrison’s pre-election dedication to strict
56
limitations on presidential power, the Harrison administration would
have little choice but to forego the transient political advantage of
displacing twelve years worth of Democratic appointees to federal
office and instead adhere to the limited vision of the executive power
it had previously so vigorously espoused. However, despite the best
efforts of Whig luminaries Henry Clay and Daniel Webster, Harrison
clung steadfastly to a belief in the assertive use of the executive
power.
Harrison started out by pleasing Whigs with an inaugural address
that pledged to curtail the perceived trend toward presidential
57
despotism. He vowed to limit himself to a single term and promised
58
caution in using the veto power. At the same time, however,
Harrison’s inaugural address had made it clear that he believed that
the Constitution conferred the removal power upon the president. As
Harrison commented, “It was certainly a great error in the framers of
the Constitution not to have made the head of the Treasury
Department entirely independent of the Executive. He should at least
56. In 1838, Harrison had espoused a program that would confine presidential service to
a single term, establish a Treasury independent of presidential control, and strictly limit the
use of the veto power. See Letter from William Henry Harrison to Harmar Denny (Dec. 2,
1838), reprinted in 2 GOLDSMITH, supra note 20, at 637-41.
57. William H. Harrison, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1841), in 3 A COMPILATION OF
THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1860, 1863 (James D. Richardson ed.,
1897) [hereinafter MESSAGES & PAPERS]. See generally WHITE, supra note 6, at 46-47.
58. Harrison, Inaugural Address, supra note 57, at 1863-66.
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have been removable only upon the demand of the popular branch of
59
the Legislature.” To Harrison, “it appear[ed] strange indeed that
anyone should doubt that the entire control which the President
possesses over the officers who have the custody of the public money,
by the power of removal with or without cause, does for all
mischievous purposes at least, virtually subject the treasure . . . to his
60
disposal.” Although Harrison believed the decision to confer the
removal power upon the president to be a mistake, he nonetheless
implied that he regarded the issue to be settled, a conclusion
61
supported by the opinions issued by his Attorney General.
Therefore, Harrison could only offer his assurances to the people that,
as a matter of policy, he would “never . . . remove a Secretary of the
Treasury without communicating all the circumstances attending such
62
removal to both Houses of Congress.”
Harrison’s qualms about broad exercises of presidential removal
power ultimately proved short-lived. Although at one point he seemed
to be willing or compelled to “yield his will to a majority vote in his
63
Cabinet,” an anecdote in Leonard White’s The Jacksonians shows
that Harrison ultimately believed that broad presidential power also
extended to appointment of inferior officers, independent of
consultation with Congress or the cabinet:
At a Cabinet meeting, so the story is told, [Secretary of State]
Webster informed the President that the Cabinet had decided on

59. Id. at 1868.
60. Id. at 1867.
61. As Attorney General Hugh S. Legare noted:
Whatever I might have thought of the power of removal from office, if the
subject were res integra, it is now too late to dispute the settled construction of
1789. It is according to that construction, from the very nature of executive
power, absolute in the President, subject only to his responsibility to the country
(his constituent) for a breach of such a vast and solemn trust.
4 Op. Att’y Gen. 1, 1-2 (1842). Legare had previously opined:
If any authority were needed to enforce considerations which seem so obvious
and conclusive in themselves, I think the celebrated debate on the power of
removal in the first Congress would furnish it. The whole country seems to have
acquiesced in the argument of Mr. Madison, in favor of that power drawn from
the character of executive power and responsibility, and from the irresistible
necessity of the case.
3 Op. Att’y Gen. 673, 676 (1841); see also 4 Op. Att’y Gen. 165 (1843) (reasoning that
even assuming arguendo that Congress may restrain cabinet secretaries’ exercise of the
removal power, “the power of the President as head of the government, under the
constitutional injunction to see the laws faithfully executed, stands, I incline to think, in a
different category”).
62. Harrison, Inaugural Address, supra note 58, at 1868; see also 2 GOLDSMITH, supra
note 20, at 649; WILFRED E. BINKLEY, PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS 90 (1947).
63. WHITE, supra note 6, at 47.
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James Wilson to be governor of [the] Iowa [Territory]. Harrison
wrote a few words on a slip of paper and asked Webster to read
them aloud: “William Henry Harrison, President of the United
States.” The President then rose to his feet and said, “And William
Henry Harrison, President of the United States, tells you
gentlemen, that
. . . John Chambers shall be Governor of [the] Iowa
64
[Territory].”

Norma Peterson, Harrison’s biographer, paints a similar picture of
an active chief executive who was willing to assert his authority over
the execution of the law. She notes that Harrison “visited every
department to observe operations [and he] then called for reports
65
detailing the activities and responsibilities of each office.”
Nor did the Whigs exhibit much restraint in effecting removals. In
a March 1841 cabinet meeting that took place shortly after the
election, the Whig leaders agreed to wield the removal power in the
66
same partisan manner as Jackson had. Harrison proceeded to remove
executive officials at a rate far exceeding that of either Jackson or
67
Van Buren. Peterson adds:
[I]nnumerable removals were made for political reasons. All the
leading Whigs, as well as lesser members of the party, had
countless friends to reward. Because his department controlled
more positions than any of the others, Postmaster General Granger
probably held the record for dismissals. During his six months in
office, he ousted seventeen hundred postmasters and boasted that
had he remained in the cabinet another two or three weeks, three
thousand more would have been gone. For the time being, at least,
the creation of a nonpartisan civil service was impossible. The
Democrats had
been in command for a long period, and the Whigs
68
were hungry.

In filling positions, Harrison repeatedly annoyed powerful Whig
Senator Henry Clay who unsuccessfully tried to control
administration appointments. To Clay’s immense irritation, Harrison
rejected Clay’s candidate for Secretary of the Treasury and for the
collectorship of the port of New York (a key patronage position that

64. Id. at 47-48 (quoting Parmelee, Recollections of an Old Stager, 47 HARPER’S NEW
MONTHLY MAGAZINE 753, 754 (1873)).
65. NORMA LOIS PETERSON, THE PRESIDENCIES OF WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON &
JOHN TYLER 39 (1989).
66. See PAUL P. VAN RIPER, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE 41
(Greenwood Press 1976) (1958).
67. See 2 GOLDSMITH, supra note 20, at 981-82; FISH, supra note 8, at 73-76.
68. PETERSON, supra note 65. at 39-40.
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69

controlled possibly five hundred jobs). Harrison and Clay’s
argument over the composition of the cabinet ultimately became so
heated that Harrison ended his final meeting with Clay by declaring,
70
“Mr. Clay, you forget that I am the President.”
Although the Whigs’ sudden conversion could cynically be
attributed to the triumph of political necessity over principle, it can
just as easily be attributed to structural factors: the Whigs’ return to
the White House brought home the simple truth that presidents must
have the power of removal if they are to ensure the proper execution
of the laws. The Democrats, having endured Whig criticism of
presidential removals for twelve years, could not let this abrupt
reversal in Whig constitutional philosophy pass unchallenged.
Therefore, on June 17, 1841, Senator (and future President) James
Buchanan introduced a resolution requesting that the President
provide a list of all removals made during the current
71
administration. Buchanan freely admitted that the resolution was
introduced not to articulate a particular constitutional theory, but
rather to embarrass the Whigs by showing “the beautiful consistency
between Whig professions and Whig practice; between promises
72
made before the election, and the performance afterwards.” The
73
Buchanan resolution eventually passed the Senate, and a similar
74
resolution passed the House on July 16, 1841. However, since
neither of these resolutions did anything more than request a list of
those officers removed, as during the Van Buren administration, the
eventual passage of such a resolution did not have any particular
precedential significance. More far-reaching resolutions that would
have required the President to present Congress with the reasons
69. See id. at 34, 37.
70. Id. at 34; see also WILFRED E. BINKLEY, THE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT 89-91
(1937); 2 GOLDSMITH, supra note 20, at 651-54.
71. CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 1st Sess. 63-64 (1841); S. RES. 25, 27th Cong. (1841).
72. Buchanan reportedly charged:
[T]he ruthless proscription which was now progressing so directly at variance
with all the professions and pledges of the Whig party, was the most glaring
and signal example in the history of any Government, ancient or modern, of
the opposition, between professions before an election, and practice
afterwards. No popular Government had ever existed . . . in which a political
party had so recklessly and so suddenly violated their most solemnly professed
principles as the Whig party of the present day had done. It was no wonder that
they should endeavor to shroud their conduct in mystery, and to conceal their
removals from the world.
CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 1st Sess. 102 (1841).
73. Id. at 230.
74. See H.R. DOC. NO. 27-48, at 1 (1841). See generally SMITH, supra note 26, at 5.
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underlying the removals of certain officers were submitted but never
75
enacted.
C. John Tyler
The obvious dismay that these incidents inspired in the
congressional Whig leadership deepened when Harrison died at the
end of his first month in office. Despite Harrison’s apostasy in many
areas of Whig presidential doctrine, most congressional Whigs
accepted him as a “birthright” Whig whose other party loyalties were
76
basically secure. Vice President John Tyler, a traditional states’
rights Democrat who had joined the Whig ticket in the spirit of antiJackson coalition, did not inspire similar confidence among the
77
Whigs. Because of doubts about Tyler and general Whig hostility to
presidential power, many congressional Whig leaders, upon learning
of Harrison’s death, immediately attempted to undermine Tyler’s
78
nascent presidency. They did this by advancing the textually
plausible claim that the Constitution did not permit a vice president
actually to become president but instead only allowed the vice
president to adopt the role of “acting president” while continuing in
79
the official title of vice president.
To his credit, Tyler refused to accept this Whig interpretation of
constitutional law. Tyler immediately assumed the title of president,
rather than acting president, and he went on to take the presidential
oath of office specified by the Constitution and collect the presidential

75. On June 17, 1841, Representative Alford introduced a resolution requesting that the
President furnish the names of all officers removed along with the reasons for their
removals. H.R. DOC. NO. 27-48, supra note 74, at 65-66. On July 1, 1841, Senator Benton
offered a resolution requesting that the President communicate to the Senate his reasons
for removing five named officers. Id. at 133. On July 27, 1842, Representative Garrett
Davis reported a resolution requesting the reasons for the removal of H.H. Sylvester.
SMITH, supra note 26, at 6. Also in 1842, a House committee reported a proposal that
would require the President to present to Congress the causes of all removals made in the
future. H.R. REP. NO. 27-945 (1842). The Senate Committee on Retrenchment reported a
similar bill on June 15, 1844. S. DOC. NO. 28-399 (1844); see also 2 GEORGE H. HAYNES,
THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 799 n.1 (1938); WHITE, supra note 6, at 323-24.
Finally, in 1845, Henry Grider and William P. Thomasson proposed instructing the
Judiciary Committee to develop legislation requiring that the executive branch assign
reasons for all removals or placing other restrictions on removals. CONG. GLOBE, 28th
Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1845) (Grider resolution); CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 1st Sess. 99
(1844) (Thomasson resolution). See generally SMITH, supra note 26, at 4-6.
76. See 2 GOLDSMITH, supra note 20, at 654-55.
77. See id. at 669.
78. See id. at 657.
79. See PETERSON, supra note 65, at 45-48; see also 2 GOLDSMITH, supra note 20, at
654.
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salary. Ultimately, both houses of Congress voted to recognize Tyler
80
as president rather than acting president. This incident marked the
beginning of Tyler’s jealous protection of his executive powers from
81
Congress for the remainder of his combative term.
In his inaugural address, however, Tyler committed one horrible
mistake that forever brands him as something of a pariah to unitary
executivists. Tyler, in a fit of anti-Jackson indiscretion, said:
I deem it of the most essential importance that a complete
separation should take place between the sword and the purse. No
matter where or how the public moneys shall be deposited, so long
as the President can exert the power of appointing and removing at
his pleasure the agents selected for their custody the Commander
in Chief of the Army and Navy is in fact the treasurer.
A
82
permanent and radical change should therefore be decreed.

Tyler went on to propose the creation of a five-person
“Independent Board of Exchequer,” the majority of whose members
would be appointed by the president with the consent of the Senate
and who could be removed “only for physical inability,
incompetency, or neglect or violation of duty, with reasons laid before
the Senate. The Exchequer Board was to become the sole agency to
receive, hold, and disburse all public money—’safe from Executive
83
control.’” This wild scheme outdid anything ever previously
proposed and can only be understood if one recollects the charges of
84
Caesarism and Napoleonism leveled against Andrew Jackson.
Happily, Tyler’s idea sank without a trace as other “issues pushed
aside one so academic in nature. No President followed Tyler’s
85
lead.”
In all matters other than the proposed Independent Board of
Exchequer, Tyler was a paragon of virtue in defending presidential
prerogatives. Tyler’s son and private secretary reported that Tyler’s
first cabinet meeting gave him a striking opportunity to show his
belief in a strong unitary presidency. After being told by Secretary of
State Daniel Webster that all matters discussed in cabinet meetings
should be decided by majority vote with each secretary and the
80. PETERSON, supra note 65, at 49-50.
81. See id. at 45-48.
82. See WHITE, supra note 6, at 43.
83. Id.
84. See id. at 43-44.
85. Id. at 44; see also id. at 44 n.62 (“In 1841, Congressman Millard Fillmore was
committed to ‘the separation of the purse and the sword from the hands of the executive.’ .
. . As President he forgot the issue.”).
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President having only one vote, Tyler is said to have responded:
I beg your pardon, gentlemen; I am very glad to have in my
Cabinet such able statesmen as you have proved yourselves to be.
And I shall be pleased to avail myself of your counsel and advice.
But I can never consent to being dictated to as to what I shall or
shall not do. I, as President, shall be responsible for my
administration. I hope to have your hearty cooperation in carrying
out these measures. So long as you see fit to do this, I shall be glad
to have you with86me. When you think otherwise, your resignations
will be accepted.

Tyler’s unofficial press organ, The Madisonian, expressed the
administration’s commitment to a unitary executive branch,
describing what it saw as “the proper relationship between the
president and his cabinet”:
The executive branch, it declared, should be a whole unit, with the
department heads acting as sincere and willing exponents of the
president’s deliberate convictions. Otherwise the administration
would present to the world the “absurd spectacle” of a power
divided against itself. Taking issue with this point of view, the
National Intelligencer [Henry 87Clay’s press organ] called it an
“odious Jacksonian pretension.”

Tyler’s extensive correspondence with his first secretary of state,
Daniel Webster, indicates “[his] close attention to detail and the time
88
he spent reading documents and considering what should be done.”
He was a hands-on chief executive who sometimes bypassed even his
secretary of state in communicating directly with the U.S. ambassador
to Great Britain. On December 30, 1842, he announced the Tyler
Doctrine, whereby the Monroe Doctrine was extended to the
“Sandwich Islands,” today known as Hawaii. This type of broad
proclamation of foreign policy, like the Monroe Doctrine itself or like
George Washington’s Neutrality Proclamation, suggests a willingness
to exercise vigorous control over all matters involving the state
89
department.
Perhaps the most striking example of Tyler’s belief in the assertive
use of executive power was his aggressive defense of the presidential

86. Id. at 86 (quoting Interview with John Tyler, Jr., 41 LIPPINCOTT’S MONTHLY MAG.
417, 417-418 (1888)); see also OLIVER PERRY CHITWOOD, JOHN TYLER: CHAMPION OF
THE OLD SOUTH 270 (1964); BINKLEY, supra note 70, at 95-96.
87. PETERSON, supra note 65, at 71.
88. Id. at 145.
89. See Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 1, at 1513.
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90

veto power. In a confrontation that echoed the earlier Bank War of
91
the Jackson administration, Tyler vetoed numerous pieces of Whigsponsored legislation during his tenure. Most notably, Tyler twice
vetoed bills attempting to recharter the Bank of the United States on
92
the Jacksonian grounds that they were unconstitutional. Tyler also
93
vetoed a number of proposed tariffs that he thought were excessive.
These vetoes caused outrage among the leaders of the Whig party,
most notably Henry Clay, who unsuccessfully argued that the
presidential veto power should be narrowly constrained by
94
On several occasions, Clay
constitutional amendment.
unsuccessfully sought a constitutional amendment “that would allow
presidential vetoes to be overturned by a simple majority in each
house, rather than by the current constitutional stipulation of a two95
thirds vote of the House and the Senate.” Clay also implied in a
famous Senate speech that Tyler’s repeated use of the veto power
suggested that he was out of touch with the contemporary political
consensus and, like a latter-day prime minister, should consider
96
resignation from the presidency. Tyler stubbornly refused to yield to
these Whig arguments. In fact, the rude manner in which one of his
97
veto messages was received prompted him to file a “Protest” that
was somewhat reminiscent of the similarly named document lodged
98
by Andrew Jackson. As happened to Jackson, Congress refused to
99
receive Tyler’s Protest. Tyler’s course of action ultimately prompted
his expulsion from the Whig Party, congressional criticism, and
100
political acrimony that undermined the remainder of his presidency.
Turnover in the cabinet was common during the Tyler
administration. Including the holdover cabinet members appointed by
90. See WHITE, supra note 6, at 31.
91. See Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 1, at 1538-39.
92. John Tyler, Veto Message (Aug. 16, 1841), in 3 MESSAGES & PAPERS, supra note
57, at 1916; John Tyler, Veto Message (Sept. 9, 1841), in 3 MESSAGES & PAPERS, supra
note 57, at 1922.
93. John Tyler, Veto Message (June 29, 1842), in 3 MESSAGES & PAPERS, supra note
57, at 2033; John Tyler, Veto Message (Aug. 9, 1842), in 3 MESSAGES & PAPERS, supra
note 57, at 2036.
94. TUGWELL, supra note 7, at 118.
95. PETERSON, supra note 65, at 78; see also id. at 90, 100, 104.
96. See 2 GOLDSMITH, supra note 20, at 668; BINKLEY, supra note 62, at 99-100;
PETERSON, supra note 65, at 95-112.
97. John Tyler, Protest (Aug. 30, 1842), in 3 MESSAGES & PAPERS, supra note 57, at
2043.
98. See Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 1, at 1545-54.
99. See Tyler, Protest, supra note 97, at 2043.
100. See 2 GOLDSMITH, supra note 20, at 676, 705-06.
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Harrison, the Tyler administration featured four secretaries of state,
four secretaries of the treasury, five secretaries of the navy, four
secretaries of war, three attorneys general, and two postmasters
101
Tyler even suffered the mass resignation of all the
general.
holdover cabinet secretaries Harrison appointed in 1841, except for
Daniel Webster, to protest his second veto of legislation that would
have rechartered the Bank of the United States. Even the strongwilled Whig Daniel Webster eventually resigned as Secretary of
State, both because Tyler was determined to push forward with the
annexation of Texas and because Tyler was trying to run for reelection as a Democrat. The one constant in Tyler’s administration
was Tyler himself, and he was indisputably in control of all aspects of
his administration’s foreign and domestic policy.
In his use of the removal power, Tyler continued the trend towards
partisan removal of office holders originally authorized by Harrison.
In fact, historian Carl Russell Fish, after a comprehensive comparison
of the removal behavior of the Harrison and Tyler administrations
with the Jackson administration, found the difference between the socalled “sweep of 1829” and the “sweep of 1841” to be merely one of
degree, with the Whig administrations making a total of 304
102
politically-motivated removals from a potential total of 924. Tyler
became particularly aggressive in partisan use of the removal power
as his political future became progressively bleaker during his term in
office. He commented to his Treasury Secretary, “[W]e have
numberless enemies in office and they should forthwith be made to
quit . . . in short the changes ought to be rapid and extensive and
numerous . . . we must be cautious and never appoint any other than a
103
well known friend.”
Tyler also “made the strongest statement made thus far by a chief
executive on the president’s right to use discretion in complying or
refusing to comply with congressional requests or demands for
104
information from the executive branch.”
The President, Tyler pointed out, was directed by the Constitution
to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed.” This included an
obligation to inquire into the manner in which all public agents

101. PETERSON, supra note 65, at 146.
102. See FISH, supra note 8, at 150.
103. PETERSON, supra note 65, at 147 (quoting Letter from John Tyler, President, to
John Spencer, Treasury Secretary, (May 13, 1843 and Sept. 2, 1843) (on file in
Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress)).
104. Id. at 170.
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performed their duties. If the president were not able to use
discretion in the dissemination of information collected in
investigations, an inquiry could be arrested in its first
stage, and
105
those who were under suspicion could elude detection.

The Whig fury at Tyler, which commenced during the second
round of bank wars in 1841 and continued unabated for the rest of his
tempestuous term, thus stemmed from Tyler’s near-Jacksonian
conception of presidential power. The Whigs had been formed as a
party to oppose the Jacksonian conception of the presidency, and so
they came to consider Tyler a traitor to their cause. Peterson reports:
[Tyler’s] undermining of the creation of a national bank was
harmful, but what really angered the congressional Whigs was
Tyler’s thwarting of their determination to control the chief
executive and to destroy, for all time, presidential usurpation.
Therefore, to secure the nation against future abuses,
encroachments, and usurpations by the chief magistrate, the Whig
caucus reiterated many of the points voiced during the 1840
campaign: a single term for the incumbent in the president’s office,
the right of Congress to appoint the secretary of the treasury,
severe restrictions on the president’s power to dismiss from office,
the establishment of a fiscal agent (a national bank), and the
adoption of an amendment to the Constitution which would limit
the chief executive’s use of the veto. Tyler had to be brought to
heel; otherwise, there would be three more years of “the same kind
of suffering inflicted during the last twelve years by the
maladministration
of the Executive Department of the
106
government.”

When Tyler refused to bend to the Whig caucus, he was not only
expelled from the Whig Party, but he was also threatened with
107
impeachment, making him the first president to be so threatened.
Impeachment went nowhere, but Tyler governed for the remainder of
his term with minimal support in Congress, and the support he did
have was from Jacksonian Democrats, not his fellow Whigs.
As Tyler was preparing to leave office in the winter of 1845, he
succeeded, with the help of President-elect James K. Polk, in pushing
through the annexation of Texas and its admission to the Union as a
108
state. This was an extraordinarily important action for an embattled
chief executive to take. He also secured adoption of a major treaty
with Great Britain that settled a disputed boundary along the U.S.105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at 172.
Id. at 89-90.
See id. at 102, 169.
See id. at 201-59.
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Canadian border in a manner that presaged the Polk administration’s
109
settlement of the Oregon boundary line. In sum, Tyler’s belief in a
strong, assertive, and unitary executive branch always remained firm.
This prompted Wilfred Binkley to note that, “Tyler saved the
presidency from suffering a backset,” even in the face of
110
unimaginable personal political damage.
D. James K. Polk
Presidential support for the unitary theory of the executive branch
did not waver when the Jacksonian Democrats returned to power
under James K. Polk. A Jacksonian Democrat from Tennessee, Polk
was often called “Young Hickory,” and his assertive philosophy of
presidential power mirrored that of his colloquial namesake, Andrew
111
Jackson. Polk’s biographer, Paul Bergeron, reports:
Polk did not conform to the Whiggish notions about weak or
limited presidents who yielded to a vigorous and dominant
legislative branch. Imitating the model established by his mentor,
Andrew Jackson, Polk set out to dominate the nation’s capital in
just about every respect possible. He knew, as all effective
presidents have known, that the office is more than an enumeration
of constitutional duties and prerogatives. Indeed, the presidency is
whatever the occupant
can make of it (within constitutional
112
bounds, of course).

Bergeron adds that Polk “follow[ed] Jackson’s concept of the
[presidential] office. Regardless of how one responds to Polk’s
policies and programs, there is no question that he was a strong
executive. The nation would not see such again until the
administration of Abraham Lincoln, an old Whig who essentially
113
abandoned Whiggish ideas about the presidency.” Charles Sellers
adds that “Polk was to display a brand of presidential legislative
leadership that the country would not see again until the time of
114
Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson.”
Polk himself once made the following comment on presidential
power as it related to Whig views of presidential subservience to
other branches of government:
109. See id. at 113-31.
110. BINKLEY, supra note 70, at 104.
111. See TUGWELL, supra note 7, at 117; PAUL H. BERGERON, THE PRESIDENCY OF
JAMES K. POLK 144 (1987).
112. BERGERON, supra note 111, at xi.
113. Id. at xi-xii.
114. CHARLES SELLERS, JAMES K. POLK: CONTINENTALIST 310 (1966).
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Any attempt to coerce the President to yield his sanction to
measures which he cannot approve would be a violation of the
spirit of the Constitution . . . and if successful would break down
the independence of the Executive department and make the
President clothed by the Constitution with the power to 115
defend
their rights the mere instrument of the majority of Congress.

Polk articulated another Jacksonian notion that had infused the
unitary executive arguments of Jackson’s protest message vis-à-vis
the Bank of the United States. This was the argument that the
president was the only true representative of the whole people of the
United States since he alone had been elected by the whole people:
Polk felt confident in his attitude toward and his relationship with
Congress, for he believed that he was the true representative of the
people of the United States. Jackson had been the first
to express
116
such a startling notion; Polk reiterated it and refined it.

“More boldly and more cogently than Jackson had done earlier,
Polk declared that the president was the representative of the whole
people of the United States, whereas congressmen were relegated to
117
lesser roles of representing only portions of the people.” Polk was
committed to the Jacksonian notion that the president was uniquely a
spokesman of the whole people of the United States. Polk, like
Jackson, was thus unquestionably a believer in a strong and
independent presidency.
As one historian has noted, Polk “undertook to make reality of the
principle sought to be established by Washington, that the executive
branch of the government was one whole to be managed by the
118
President alone.” Paul Bergeron reports:
Polk effectively seized control of the governmental bureaucracy.
Upon occasion he boasted, and justifiably so, of his mastery of the
details of the functioning of the various executive departments.
Because he kept such close scrutiny over them, he was able to
control them. This was particularly noteworthy with regard to the
Treasury Department, which, since the days of Alexander
Hamilton, had been accustomed to functioning more or less
independently of the president. But Polk did not permit his
secretary of the Treasury to stray from presidential policy or to
exhibit independence. One of the chief consequences of Polk’s
domination was that his administration produced what could truly

115.
116.
117.
118.

BINKLEY, supra note 70, at 106.
BERGERON, supra note 111, at xiii.
Id. at 183.
TUGWELL, supra note 7, at 134-35.
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be called an
executive budget, the first such in the nation’s
119
experience.

Bergeron adds that “[c]ombing through [Polk’s] diary, one is able
to account for at least 364 cabinet meetings during [his] four years” in
120
office, an incredible average of one cabinet meeting every four
days. The diary goes on to indicate that the President met with cabinet
visitors during parts of 1079 days in a period of three and a half
121
years. “Having an apparently prodigious mind for minute details
and an accurate memory, the president astounded his cabinet
members and others with his knowledge of the bureaucracy of the
122
federal government.” In September 1848, while four of his six
cabinet members were absent from Washington on trips, Polk handled
the details of governance in the absence of his departmental
secretaries. Polk bragged after a month of this work:
Indeed, I have become so familiar with the duties and workings of
the Government, not only upon general principles, but in most of
its minute details, that I find but little difficulty in doing this. I
have made myself acquainted with the duties of the subordinate
officers, and have probably
given more attention to details than
123
any of my predecessors.

Polk’s boast indicates that he was the ultimate hands-on president
of his day, a figure comparable to Jimmy Carter or Bill Clinton in his
willingness to become immersed in the details of governance and
public policy. Another example of this tendency was Polk’s
aggressive management of individual Cabinet members, including a
requirement that all secretaries read status reports to him regularly
124
and verbatim.
Leonard White quotes Polk: “If [the President]
entrusts the details and smaller matters to subordinates constant errors
will occur. I prefer to supervise the whole operations of the
Government myself rather than entrust the public business to
125
subordinates, and this makes my duties very great.” Polk was also
the first president to manage the flow of information between his

119. BERGERON, supra note 111, at xii.
120. Id. at 36.
121. Id. at 39.
122. Id. at 45.
123. Id. at 46; see also WHITE, supra note 6, at 69; TUGWELL, supra note 7, at 133-34
(recounting Polk’s personal management of several cabinet departments when his
secretaries left Washington).
124. WHITE, supra note 6, at 76; TUGWELL, supra note 7, at 135.
125. WHITE, supra note 6, at 69 (quoting 4 JAMES K. POLK, THE DIARY OF JAMES K.
POLK DURING HIS PRESIDENCY, 1845-1849, at 261 (Milton Milo Quaife ed., 1910)).
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subordinates and Congress, explicitly prohibiting cabinet members
from communicating with members of Congress without his
126
permission.
Perhaps the most striking illustration of Polk’s belief in a strong
executive branch was seen in Polk’s groundbreaking use of the
commander-in-chief powers of the presidency during the Mexican
War. During this conflict, Polk used his military powers under the
Constitution vigorously. Deferring to the practical advice of his
Secretary of War, Polk refrained from aggressively removing military
officers whose political motivations he questioned, but nevertheless
127
subjected their actions to a high degree of direct supervision. Polk
also used the appointment power to create new positions within the
military, in part to counter the influence of Zachary Taylor and
Winfield Scott, whom he correctly suspected of having Whig political
sympathies. Just as he managed all other aspects of war policy, Polk
managed most of these appointments personally and without
128
congressional or military input. As Polk’s Secretary of the Navy
George Bancroft was later to observe, Polk “insisted on being [his
administration’s] center and in overruling and guiding all his
129
secretaries to act as to produce unity and harmony.”
Unsurprisingly, Polk’s assertive and occasionally partisan
management of the Mexican War drew heavy criticism from his
opponents in the Whig Party, who often referred to the conflict as
130
“Polk’s War.” Regardless of the merits of such criticism of Polk, it
seems unquestionable that his management of state affairs during this
conflict was one of the strongest examples of the use of presidential
power to direct specifically the conduct of subordinate officers since
the Jackson administration.
Polk was even less restrained in his use of the removal power with
respect to civilian positions. Polk made wide use of his removal
power specifically to sweep out Whig loyalists appointed by Harrison
131
and Tyler.
In the Postal Service alone, Polk used induced
132
resignations to replace as many as 13,000 federal employees. Paul
Bergeron observes:

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

TUGWELL, supra note 7, at 135.
See WHITE, supra note 6, at 60-61.
See generally id. at 55-57.
BINKLEY, supra note 70, at 105.
2 GOLDSMITH, supra note 20, at 834.
VAN RIPER, supra note 66, at 41; WHITE, supra note 6, at 311-12.
WHITE, supra note 6, at 312.
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Polk launched his removal policy in a fashion befitting the days of
Andrew Jackson’s presidency. He apparently decided to make
extensive removals, but in the words of one observer, he “would
not tomahawk beyond what might be considered Christian
ferocity.” The first removal notices hit the desks of Washington
clerks on 29 March; the new broom intended to sweep clean. The
president ordered all department heads to submit to him detailed
lists of all employees, with information about their political
loyalties, the circumstances of their original appointment, and
recommendations to retain or dismiss said employees. With that
available data, the president would be able to proceed with a
systematic realignment of personnel in the Washington offices.
Federal employees who were located elsewhere would happily
have a bit more time before the new administration would reach
them. All in all, it was a truly serious business that the Polk crowd
set about doing. Once the president had launched removal
procedures during the very first month, office seekers began to
descend
upon Washington like the plague of locusts in Biblical
133
Egypt.

Bergeron adds with reference to Polk’s removals in the post office
that “by the end of the administration, there had been an astounding
13,500 appointments as postmasters,” and he notes that “[o]ne
marvels that the mail was ever delivered in those days of disruption
134
and turmoil in the post offices.” Most of these removals were
without significant debate or protest because, by the ascension of Polk
to the presidency, “the country was by this time so used to the
135
practice [of partisan removal] that little complaint [was] heard.”
Polk consulted with individual members of Congress in making
local executive appointments, but always made clear that such
consultations were purely advisory and that Congress should not
abuse his courtesy. Polk observed that “I have treated [members of
Congress] with great civility and have yielded to their wishes about
appointments in their respective States until they seem to come to the
conclusion that I must administer the Government precisely as they
136
may direct. In this they will find themselves mistaken.”
The Polk administration’s support for the unitary executive theory
can also be seen in the opinions of his attorneys general espousing the
view that the Constitution granted the power of removal to the
president. In the eyes of Attorney General John Young Mason, the
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removal power stemmed from “the constitutional duty of the
137
President to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”
Mason’s successor, Nathan Clifford, similarly maintained that the
president possessed the power to remove civil officers “at pleasure in
all cases under the constitution where the term of office is not
138
specially declared.” Although Clifford recognized that Hamilton in
The Federalist No. 77 had suggested otherwise, the issue “was
distinctly settled by the Congress of 1789 in favor of the power of the
President” after “one of the ablest discussions in the history of the
country” upon the ground that the power to remove “was clearly in its
nature a part of the executive power, and was indispensable for a due
execution of the laws and a regular administration of the public
139
affairs.”
Clifford further noted that the decision received the
sanction of every department of the government, as well as Justice
140
Story, Chancellor Kent, and the Supreme Court.
Polk’s attorneys general, however, stopped short of arguing that the
president possessed the plenary power to direct his subordinates.
Relying on the previous opinions offered by Attorneys General
141
William Wirt and Roger Taney, Mason concluded that the president
“has the power of removal, but not the power of correcting, by his
own official act, the errors of judgment of incompetent or unfaithful
142
subordinates.” Thus, despite the Polk administration’s firm support
for the president’s power to remove, its position on the president’s
power to direct represented another swing in the pendulum that began
during the Monroe and Jackson administrations. This minor deviation
hardly represents the degree of acquiescence required to establish a
particular constitutional construction under the methodology of

137. 4 Op. Att’y Gen. 515, 516 (1846).
138. 4 Op. Att’y Gen. 603, 609 (1847).
139. Id. at 609.
140. Id. (citing in part Ex parte Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230, 259 (1839)). Clifford
noted that even though “several commentators on the constitution” did “not entirely admit
the correctness of the construction adopted,” those commentators felt “nevertheless
constrained to regard the question as closed.” Id.
141. See Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 1, at 1519, 1536 n.298. We have previously
shown that these opinions do not stand for the broad proposition for which Mason cites
them. See id. at 1520-21, 1536, 1561.
142. 4 Op. Att’y Gen. 515, 516 (1846). The opinion rejected such power of direction
out of hand, reasoning that the president could not feasibly “undertake to review the
decisions of subordinates on the weight or effect of evidence in cases appropriately
belonging to them.” Id. at 516 (emphasis added). Thus, it is arguable that Mason would
have condoned presidential intercession to correct subordinates’ erroneous determinations
of general federal policy. Even so read, Mason’s opinion would represent a substantial
deviation from the unitary executive model.
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departmental or coordinate construction. It does not alter the
overriding fact that Polk was a committed Jacksonian and an ardent
believer in the theory of the unitary executive. He was also by any
measure a strong and effective president.
E. Zachary Taylor
Zachary Taylor was a genuine war hero in the mold of Presidents
George Washington, Andrew Jackson, and William Henry Harrison.
He was narrowly elected in 1848, largely because of public
admiration for his role in helping to win the Mexican War, where he
earned the nickname “Old Rough and Ready.” Taylor was selected as
the Whig candidate for president because, like the previous Whig
victor, William Henry Harrison, Taylor was a former general.
Unfortunately for the Whigs, who elected only these two presidents,
Taylor, like Harrison, was to die in office. Taylor’s term in office
lasted only sixteen months, from March 4, 1849, to July 9, 1850, and
his reputation has suffered from his brief service as well as the
repeated derision of his presidency by elite nineteenth-century
historians who treated him with disdain as a general-turned143
president.
Taylor had some genuinely Whiggish ideas about the presidency
and presidential power. A supportive newspaper once went so far as
to say:
Taylor . . . had taken office against “the Executive influence,
Executive patronage, Executive dictation, and the Executive veto.”
Under Jackson these elements had “resolved the Government into
the one-man power and almost annihilated the Legislature.”
Congress under the Democrats had “ceased to be what it was
intended to be under the Constitution, the independent and only
legitimate organ for the expression of the public will.” To correct
this great
evil had been a major reason for electing General
144
Taylor.

Taylor was most obviously a Whig in his aversion to use of the
presidential veto, which he had often denounced “as a tool of
145
presidential tyranny.” Notwithstanding his opposition to use of the
veto, Taylor was happy to threaten a veto of the Compromise of

143. ELBERT B. SMITH, THE PRESIDENCIES OF ZACHARY TAYLOR AND MILLARD
FILLMORE 257 (1988).
144. Id. at 144.
145. Id. at 146.
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146

and Taylor believed in the use of the veto against
1850,
constitutionally suspect legislation.
While Taylor may have had Whiggish ideas about the use of the
veto, he was far from being passive and meek during his sixteen
months as president, owing no doubt in part to his experience as a
147
military commander. British chargé d’affaires John F. Crampton
emphasized Taylor’s strong will and remarked upon the “fearless and
determined manner” with which Taylor pursued a course of
148
conduct. Taylor had a “well-known reputation for bold and decisive
149
action,” and his biographer Elbert Smith reports:
During most of his presidency, Taylor bore insults and
condemnations with equanimity and angry defiance. He had often
been a center of controversy during his long military career, and he
took the presence of enemies for granted. Indeed, like Andrew
Jackson, he seemed almost to enjoy quarrels over principle. He had
never been reluctant to make up his own mind and to stand firm
against overwhelming
pressures, and this trait did not desert him in
150
the White House.

Smith further reports that Taylor dominated his cabinet and set all
the major policies of his administration, which opposed the spread of
slavery to California and New Mexico and which opposed Texas’s
territorial designs on much of present day New Mexico. Cabinet
meetings were held but no votes were taken, and Taylor made all the
important policy decisions himself. Some Taylor critics accused the
President of being under the influence of William H. Seward, the free
soil Whig Senator from New York, or of his cabinet, but Taylor’s
biographer reports:
Long before he had been elected president, Taylor had stated the
basic convictions from which he did not deviate during his brief
term in office. If he and most of his cabinet were a harmonious
group on important policies, it was because they agreed on what
should be done and not because strong advisors had captured the
mind of a weak and ignorant president. Indeed, on the subject of
Texas and New Mexico, Taylor’s belligerence went far beyond
that of his advisers. No one had to let Taylor be Taylor; no one
could have kept Taylor from being Taylor. He was neither weak

146. See BINKLEY, supra note 70, at 128.
147. “As a military commander, Taylor was not accustomed to take votes on important
decisions, although he was always open to advice.” SMITH, supra note 143, at 55-56.
148. Id. at 75.
149. Id. at 128.
150. Id. at 66.
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nor modest, and no had always been one of his favorite words.

Taylor actually went so far as to threaten to protect New Mexico
152
from any invasion by Texas over the disputed boundary, and he
volunteered to lead the U.S. Army himself in defending New
Mexico’s territorial integrity. Taylor “minced no words. When he
announced that he would defend New Mexico, in person if necessary,
153
no one doubted it.”
Taylor and Secretary of State John M. Clayton enjoyed a relatively
successful foreign policy, much to Taylor’s credit:
The question naturally arises of whether the bulk of the credit
should go to Taylor or to Clayton. The answer must be that Taylor
selected Clayton in the first place, approved and took full
responsibility for every policy, clearly played an important role in
the formulation of some of the policies, and actually took a
stronger stand than Clayton did when dealing with the British and
Nicaragua. Because Taylor bore the brunt of the incessant attacks
by opposing politicians and newspapers on each of his policies, it
is only fair that he should receive much credit for his firmness,
good sense, decisiveness, clarity of expression, and patriotism. In
each case, it is difficult to imagine an 154
alternative policy that would
have served American interests better.

With regard to use of the removal power, Taylor pledged
circumspection and stated in his inaugural address: “So far as it is
possible to be informed, I shall make honesty, capacity, and fidelity
indispensable prerequisites to the bestowal of office, and absence of
either of these qualities shall be deemed sufficient cause for
155
removal.” It should be noted that in pledging to use the removal
power sparingly, Taylor was acknowledging that the president had the
power to remove. In any event, Taylor removed subordinates from
office with great vigor. The Democrats’ legacy left almost no Whigs
in federal positions by 1849, and the Whigs were keenly aware of the
156
missed opportunities.
Smith reports, “Of 17,180 governmental
employees in 1849, 3,400 were removed and 2,800 resigned. The
Whigs, who had previously held virtually none of the 929 presidential
appointments, received 540 of these prizes, while Democratic leaders

151. Id. at 62-63.
152. DAVID M. POTTER, THE IMPENDING CRISIS: 1848-1861, at 106 (1976).
153. SMITH, supra note 143, at 191.
154. Id. at 89.
155. Zachary Taylor, Inaugural Address (Mar. 5, 1849), in 4 MESSAGES & PAPERS,
supra note 57, at 2542, 2544.
156. SMITH, supra note 143, at 58-59.
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and press screamed to high heaven about the injustice of it all.” In
other words, upon returning to office, the Whigs embraced the
Jacksonian spoils system and removed subordinate executive branch
158
officials freely and at will, just as they had done in 1841.
Again, senators in the opposing party could not resist the
159
temptation to needle the Whigs for their wide-scale removals.
Congressional actions on these proposals generally failed to shed
much light on the constitutional issues, since these resolutions were
offered primarily to score political points and not to challenge the
president’s power to remove. Senator Bradbury candidly
acknowledged that his resolution was intended to point out “the
inconsistency between the professions and practice of the party in
power” and not to call into question “the policy of making
160
removals.”
There is also strong anecdotal support in the historical record that
Taylor, despite his public claims to the contrary, acknowledged the
necessity for partisan use of the removal and appointment powers.
Leonard White offers support for this contention in a story in which
Taylor personally approached the Secretary of the Treasury—of all
departments!—to ensure that Whigs were receiving “their share of the
offices” in the department, noting that “[r]otation in office, provided
161
good men are appointed, is sound republican doctrine.”
Thus,
despite his urging of circumspection in the making of removals,
Taylor in practice used the removal power vigorously and for partisan
purposes, even in the supposedly “independent” Treasury
162
Department. There was no deviation from the theory of the unitary
157. Id. at 66; see also VAN RIPER, supra note 66, at 41 (noting that Taylor removed
thirty percent of all civil officers during his first year alone); 2 GOLDSMITH, supra note 20,
at 981-82.
158. See FISH, supra note 8, at 163-65.
159. On December 24, 1849, Senator Bradbury offered a resolution requesting that the
President provide the charges underlying his administration’s removals. CONG. GLOBE,
31st Cong., 1st Sess. 74-75 (1849). Bradbury subsequently amended the resolution to
require only a list of persons removed, dropping the request for the reasons for the
removals. CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 2d. Sess. 37 (1850). In 1850, Senator Dickinson
introduced a similar resolution calling upon the postmaster general to report the removals
or attempted removals of assistant postmasters. CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. 111
(1850). Lastly, in 1850, Senator Whitcomb submitted resolutions calling upon the
President to transmit copies of the charges made in support of the removal of two civil
officials. CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. 601 (1850) (regarding the removal of J.D.G.
Nelson and John Webster).
160. CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 51 (1850).
161. WHITE, supra note 6, at 312 (quoting THURLOW WEED BARNES, MEMOIRS OF
THURLOW WEED 177-176 (1884)).
162. See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 30.

698

Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy

[Vol. 26

executive during Taylor’s brief sixteen months in the White House.
Indeed, there is one area in which the Taylor administration
surpassed its immediate predecessor in its defense of the unitary
executive. On the issue of presidential direction of subordinates,
Taylor’s talented attorney general, Reverdy Johnson of Maryland,
163
contradicted the conclusion of Polk’s administration and took the
position that the department heads had the power to direct accounting
officers in their settlement of accounts. Johnson acknowledged that
such had “been the practice of the government from its origin, and
[was] well authorized by the laws organizing the departments, as it is
164
absolutely necessary to the proper operation of the government.”
Taylor’s contribution to the theory of the unitary executive is
unequivocal. He was a strong president who controlled his
administration down to the smallest details, and he was not afraid to
take on Henry Clay and other leading members of Congress, despite
his party’s doctrine of presidential submission to Congress. Taylor’s
strength as president is illustrated by the fact that two days before he
died, an opposition newspaper “demanded his impeachment ‘for
usurping kingly powers and for trampling on the rights of a sovereign
165
state.’” As Taylor’s vigorous and partisan use of the removal power
attests, the unitary executive survived his administration quite intact.
F. Millard Fillmore
Millard Fillmore was the last in a long series of presidents
genuinely committed to a policy of compromise between the interests
of the North and the South, which began under the Monroe
administration with the Missouri Compromise of 1820 and continued
through the Compromise of 1850. As a congressman in 1841,
Fillmore had been committed to the separation of the purse and the
166
sword, but as president he forgot the issue. Fillmore succeeded
Zachary Taylor as president on July 10, 1850, and like John Tyler, he
immediately assumed the title of president (rather than acting
president) and proceeded to exercise the full powers of the
presidential office. His first acts in office were to fire and replace all
167
of Taylor’s cabinet, which had been tarred by a minor scandal, and
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to throw his enthusiastic support behind the Compromise of 1850,
which was then pending in Congress. This marks the only time a
succeeding vice president has ever fired his predecessor’s entire
168
cabinet. Both actions are important to us. The firing and replacing
of Taylor’s whole cabinet indicates Fillmore’s desire to control his
own administration and his belief in the removal power. Fillmore’s
active legislative support for the Compromise of 1850 indicates his
desire, as a Northerner with Southern sympathies, to mediate the
sectional conflict and put it behind him.
Today, Fillmore is remembered as one of America’s most
169
forgettable presidents, but he was by no means a cipher while in
office. Fillmore’s biographer Elbert Smith reports:
Millard Fillmore was neither quarrelsome nor vindictive by nature,
but his bland exterior and impeccable manners concealed a
fighting spirit in its own way just as tough as that of Zachary
Taylor. Fillmore had not risen from dire poverty to the nation’s
second highest office without a driving ambition,
enormous
170
energy, and a shrewd eye for his own best interests.

Fillmore selected very high quality men for his cabinet, which was
perhaps most distinguished by the presence of Daniel Webster as
secretary of state. Fillmore was not afraid of being overshadowed by
the great Webster, and he worked effectively with Webster during
their time together in office. At one point, when Webster was near
171
death, Fillmore handled a crisis involving Cuba entirely on his own.
Elbert Smith reports that Fillmore’s leadership was admirable:
Like Taylor, Millard Fillmore deserves high praise for his
leadership as a maker of foreign policy. His decisions and actions
were clear and unequivocal and were marked by imagination,
moderation, and firmness. He followed his own judgments with
but little regard for public or political pressures, although he did
allow [Edward] Everett [Webster’s successor as secretary of state]
to soften his Cuban policy with some harmless rhetoric. Webster,
before he was overtaken by illness, and Everett, after Webster’s
death, were able secretaries of state, but the president was the final
arbiter and accepted full responsibility. In appointing Webster,
Fillmore, unlike some presidents, did not hesitate to give the top
cabinet post to a man whose national reputation far exceeded his
own. Everett, a brilliant scholar, was an equally wise choice.

168.
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Fillmore worked closely with both of them, participated fully in
the making of virtually every decision, and did172not hesitate to
countermand Webster over the incident with Peru.

Fillmore was thus personally involved in the details of his
administration’s foreign policy, and he deserves credit for its
successes, which included the launching of Commodore Mathew
Perry’s expedition to open up Japan. In sum, Fillmore was an
involved and conscientious executor of the presidential office.
Fillmore repeated Taylor’s pledge to defend the federal territory of
173
New Mexico from Texas by military force if necessary.
The
determination of these two Whig presidents to prevent Texas from
seizing big chunks of New Mexico was absolutely critical to
preventing a civil war from breaking out and was essential to laying
the groundwork for the final Compromise. “Any show of weakness or
indecision by the president that could [have] lead the Texans to
believe they would be fighting only against New Mexicans might well
174
have invited the fatal attack.”
Fillmore’s defense of New Mexico’s territorial integrity was an
appeal to the North, for New Mexico seemed destined to be a free
state while Texas, which had designs on New Mexican land, was of
course a slave state. But the Compromise of 1850, which Fillmore
shepherded through Congress, had in it one big sop to the South, and
175
that was the passage of the Fugitive Slave Act. In the wake of the
176
Supreme Court’s decision in Prigg v. Pennsylvania, the onus for
recovering fugitive slaves fell on the federal government, and
Southerners demanded the Fugitive Slave Act as their price for
admitting new free states like California and giving up the parity they
had enjoyed between free and slave states in the Senate. The Fugitive
Slave Act thus represented a key part of the Compromise of 1850. It
passed with the support of northern Whigs like Daniel Webster, but
was hated by most Northerners. A key question of presidential power
loomed: To what extent would Fillmore “faithfully execute” the
Fugitive Slave Act in the North, where the law was bitterly opposed
by much of the population?
Fillmore was relentless in vigorously executing the Fugitive Slave
Act. In one instance in Pennsylvania he “instructed the Marine
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id. at 233.
Id. at 192.
Id.
Act of Sept. 18, 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462.
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commander at Philadelphia to assist the marshal or deputy if he was
177
supported by a federal judge.” In another prominent instance in
Boston, “Fillmore, with no other legal alternative, announced that he
178
would use troops, if necessary, to enforce the law.” Fillmore told an
ally that he would “enforce the laws of the land at all hazards, and put
down, with the whole power of the government, if need be, any illicit
179
or violent attempt to counteract or overturn them.” Elbert Smith
reports, “In each of the prominent fugitive-slave cases in which he
could not escape responsibility, Fillmore [spoke] and acted decisively
180
in support of the law.” The Fugitive Slave Act was a hateful law,
but Fillmore fully, vigorously, and faithfully executed it as the
181
president was bound by oath to do. Fillmore’s personal willingness
to execute the Fugitive Slave Act in the face of enormous opposition
in the North reveals him to be a proponent of the unitary executive
theory, under which the president himself is responsible for the
vigorous execution of the nation’s laws.
It bears noting that Fillmore was no more willing to tolerate lawbreaking activities when the South tried them either. In November
1850, Fillmore received reports that Southern radicals were “planning
to seize the federal forts at Charleston [South Carolina] as the first
step toward secession. The United States attorney and other federal
officers in South Carolina resigned, and Fillmore had great difficulty
182
replacing them.” Fillmore reacted to this crisis with firm resolution,
including General Winfield Scott, a Mexican War hero, in cabinet
meetings to develop a response to a potential insurrection:
On Scott’s advice, Fillmore strengthened the Charleston forts and
stationed additional troops in both South and North Carolina.
When the governor of South Carolina demanded an explanation,
Fillmore replied that it was his duty as commander in chief of the
armed forces to station troops wherever he thought it would serve
the public interest 183
and that he owed no explanation to the governor
of South Carolina.

With respect to removal policy, Fillmore began his term in office

177. SMITH, supra note 143, at 211.
178. Id. at 212.
179. Id. at 213 (quoting HENRY S. FOOTE, CASKET OF REMINISCENCES 162-65
(Chronicle Publ’g 1880)).
180. Id. at 216.
181. Id. at 239, 241 (“Fillmore could point to a consistent record of supporting the
compromise and trying to enforce the Fugitive Slave Act.”).
182. Id. at 217.
183. Id.
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by firing all of Taylor’s cabinet, as noted above, even though both he
184
and President Taylor were loyal members of the Whig Party.
Fillmore publicly echoed Taylor’s policy of being willing to remove
anyone who misbehaved in office. In his first annual message to
Congress, issued in December 1850, Fillmore observed:
In so extensive a country . . . where few persons appointed to
office can be known to the appointing power, mistakes will
sometimes unavoidably happen and unfortunate appointments be
made notwithstanding the greatest care. In such cases the power of
removal may be properly exercised; and neglect of duty or
malfeasance in office will be no more tolerated in185individuals
appointed by myself than in those appointed by others.

It should be noted that in pledging to use the removal power
sparingly, Fillmore, like Taylor before him, was implicitly
acknowledging that the president possessed the constitutional power
to remove. Fillmore’s very able attorney general, John J. Crittenden,
made this point explicit in opinions that adopted the position
advanced by every preceding administrations up to that time and
confirmed the constitutional foundation of the president’s removal
186
power. Fillmore’s partisan use of the removal power was striking in
one sense because he employed it against members of rival factions
within his own party as well as against Democrats. Early in his term,
Fillmore directed one of his cabinet members to “turn out [disloyal
Whigs] and put good competent Whigs in their places wherever it
187
could be done without prejudice to the public service . . . .” Elbert
Smith also reports that Fillmore ordered “a general housecleaning of
188
[Thurlow] Weed’s [Whig] friends holding federal offices.”
The Fillmore administration, following Taylor, adopted a rather
curious position regarding the power of direction. Attorney General
Crittenden maintained that the president lacked the authority to direct
189
accounting officers in their settlement of accounts, while at the

184. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
185. Millard Fillmore, First Annual Message (Dec. 2, 1850), in 4 MESSAGES & PAPERS,
supra note 57, at 2612, 2616.
186. See 5 Op. Att’y Gen. 287, 288 (1851) (opining that subordinate executive officials
remain “subject . . . to removal form office for every neglect or abuse of their public
trust”); 5 Op. Att’y Gen. 275, 278 (1850) (opining that the president may superintend the
conduct of subordinate officers by removing them).
187. WHITE, supra note 6, at 313 (quoting 1 MILLARD FILLMORE, PAPERS 341 (Frank
H. Severance ed., 1907)).
188. SMITH, supra note 143, at 207.
189. See 5 Op. Att’y Gen. 635, 635-36 (1852). Crittenden’s previous opinions on this
subject were arguably based on prudential grounds. 5 Op. Att’y Gen. 287, 288 (1851)
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same time maintaining that the department heads possessed such
190
authority. Close analysis of Crittenden’s position reveals it to be
somewhat problematic. First, it ignored the fact that many of the
authorities he cited for the principle that the heads of departments
could direct subordinate executive officials also recognized that the
191
president could direct those subordinate officials as well. Second,
although Crittenden’s opinion noted the absurdity of “a theory which
would make the heads of the departments and the President of the
United States, who are responsible for the due and efficient
administration of the executive government, . . . dependent for
supplies of money . . . on the subordinate members of the Treasury
192
Department,” Crittenden inexplicably failed to carry this reasoning
through to its logical conclusion by limiting its implications to the
heads of departments. Finally, Crittenden himself appeared to
recognize that the president might be reluctant to accept his views as
the administration’s policy when he conceded that “[i]f the President,
however, should take a different view of his duty, I am prepared, most
respectfully and cheerfully, to give him my opinion of the merits of
193
each of these cases.”
In any event, even if these isolated,
subpresidential disavowals of the president’s power to direct
subordinate federal officials are read for all that they are worth, they
are not a significant enough departure from the unbroken line of
presidential statements in favor of the unitary executive to constitute
presidential acquiescence.
Fillmore left office in 1853 with the nation prosperous and at peace
and the sectional conflict largely under control, at least for the time
being. Fillmore was a faithful executor of the laws of the United
States—for good and for ill—and he, like his fellow Whig Zachary
Taylor, was an enthusiastic exerciser of the removal power. The
unitary executive was alive and well when Fillmore left office in
March 1853 and the anti-presidential power Whigs lost power for the
(opining that it would be “judicious” for the President not to interfere with the functions of
subordinate public officers); 5 Op. Att’y Gen. at 277 (opining that presidential interference
with the particular duties of subordinate officers would be “exceedingly injudicious” and
would embroil the president in “an endless and invidious task”).
190. 5 Op. Att’y Gen. at 636 (opining that although the President lacks the authority to
intervene in the settlement of accounts, “the rightful authority of the head of the
department to interfere ‘a prior or a posteriori,’ is well established as binding on the
Auditor and Comptroller”); see also 5 Op. Att’y Gen. 386, 387 (1851) (opining that the
Secretary of War’s decision to promote to command officers to brevet ranks was binding
on the accounting officers of the treasury).
191. See 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 463, 464-65 (1831); 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 302, 303 (1829).
192. 5 Op. Att’y Gen. at 641.
193. 5 Op. Att’y Gen. at 278.
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last time.
G. Franklin Pierce
Franklin Pierce and his successor, James Buchanan, were two of
the worst presidents in American history. Pierce was a weak man who
wanted to please everybody, as well as an alcoholic. He was totally
dominated by his Southern cabinet members, especially his vocal and
very visible secretary of war, Jefferson Davis, future president of the
194
Confederacy. “The result was government by cabinet,” a disastrous
result except with respect to foreign policy, where the able secretary
195
of state, William Marcy, was able to rescue a few limited successes.
Notwithstanding his weaknesses both as a man and as president,
Pierce was a committed Jacksonian who, as a matter of political
philosophy, subscribed to the broad views of executive power
espoused by the Democratic Party for the previous twenty years. He
believed in the presidential removal power, opposed a national bank
and internal improvements, and maintained all the other elements of
the Jacksonian creed with great fervor. The Democrats, for their part,
began trying to associate Pierce with Andrew Jackson as early as the
196
election campaign of 1852. This period of adulation was short
lived. “Though his supporters labeled him ‘Young Hickory of the
Granite Hills,’ after the election no one ever compared Pierce to
197
Andrew Jackson” again.
Pierce’s biographer, Larry Gara, reports that “Pierce’s poor record
with a Congress that was dominated by his own party underlined his
198
weakness and ineptitude.” In addition, “Pierce was perceived as an
199
inept administrator incapable of carrying out his own policies.” His
appointments rapidly became “a part of the problem in Kansas” as
controversy over that state, fanned by Pierce’s own actions, began to
200
tear the Union apart. “In the 1850s, Democrats were still living in
Jackson’s shadow, though none of them could hope to equal him in
201
dynamism and popularity.” The problem, as Gara notes, was that
“Jacksonian democracy had run its course. The fundamental changes

194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

See LARRY GARA, THE PRESIDENCY OF FRANKLIN PIERCE 53-54 (1991).
Id. at 183.
Id. at 38.
Id. at 75.
Id. at 100.
Id. at 51-52.
Id. at 113.
Id. at 157.
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at work in all aspects of American life required a degree of political
adjustment that the president from New Hampshire could neither
202
understand nor implement.”
As best he could, Pierce tried to govern as president following the
Jacksonian creed. He vetoed some bills providing for internal
improvements and spending on the grounds they were beyond the
203
Constitution’s enumerated powers. In a series of opinions issued by
his capable but pro-Southern attorney general, Caleb Cushing, he
backed strict enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act, which had come
204
to be hated in the North. Pierce was thus, like Fillmore, a vigorous
and faithful executor of that iniquitous law. Pierce and his attorney
general also pressed a vigorous defense of executive privilege.
Cushing declared that “Congress had no right to make changes in
rank mandatory on the president, nor did it have a right to prescribe
qualifications for diplomats. With Cushing’s opinion to back him up,
Pierce refused to implement some of the objectionable provisions [of
205
a bill that Congress passed].” The best that can be said for Pierce is
that he was personally involved in the matters his departments
handled, and, while his cabinet was far from harmonious, none of its
206
members resigned during Pierce’s term.
Backed by three opinions authored by Attorney General Cushing
207
supporting the president’s power to remove, Pierce did occasionally
make use of the removal power, such as when he fired a governor of
208
the Kansas territory and when he ordered a purge of every federal
209
official with Know-Nothing sympathies. Although the presidency
had switched parties once again with the election of Pierce as a
Democrat, the change in partisan control did not elicit any change in

202. Id. at 126.
203. See Franklin Pierce, Veto Message (Aug. 14, 1856), in 4 MESSAGES & PAPERS,
supra note 57, at 2921; Franklin Pierce, Veto Message (Aug. 11, 1856), in 4 MESSAGES &
PAPERS, supra note 57, at 2921; Franklin Pierce, Veto Message (May 19, 1856), in 4
MESSAGES & PAPERS, supra note 57, at 2919; Franklin Pierce, Veto Message (Dec. 30,
1854), in 4 MESSAGES & PAPERS, supra note 57, at 2790; Franklin Pierce, Veto Message
(May 22, 1856), in 4 MESSAGES & PAPERS, supra note 57, at 2920; Franklin Pierce, Veto
Message (Aug. 4, 1854), in 4 MESSAGES & PAPERS, supra note 57, at 2789; Franklin
Pierce, Veto Message (May 3, 1854), in 4 MESSAGES & PAPERS, supra note 57, at 2780.
See generally GARA, supra note 194, at 86-87.
204. GARA, supra note 194, at 70.
205. Id. at 57.
206. See id. at 71.
207. See 6 Op. Att’y Gen. 87 (1853); 7 Op. Att’y Gen. 242 (1855); 8 Op. Att’y Gen.
223 (1856).
208. See GARA, supra note 194, at 115.
209. Id. at 163.
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presidential policy regarding the removal power. In fact, by the time
Pierce took office, the power of removal had been so firmly
entrenched that Pierce’s clean sweep of the previous appointees no
210
longer elicited any significant political interest. Indeed, most debate
in this extremely factional period of American history revolved
around how those appointments would be distributed based on
officeholder, region, party faction, and view on the subject of
211
Thus, to a significant extent, a practice had been
slavery.
established and reflected the general acceptance of the president’s
control of the executive branch through the removal power.
212
United States ex rel. Goodrich v. Guthrie, a case that tangentially
involved the President’s removal power, reached the Supreme Court
during the Pierce Administration. Guthrie involved the issue of
whether a Minnesota territorial judge, who had been removed by the
President, could sue for a writ of mandamus commanding the
Secretary of the Treasury to pay his salary for the unexpired portion
of his four year term of office. Attorney General Cushing, in his
argument of the case before the Supreme Court, asserted that the
President has had the removal power ever since the Decision of
213
1789 and that the power of removal was essential to fulfilling the
president’s constitutional duty to “take are that the laws be faithfully
214
executed.” The Court elided over the removal question and held
that no court had the power to order the disbursement of money from
the Treasury and that mandamus could only issue as to a ministerial
215
act, which was not the nature of the act here. Guthrie thus implies
tangential support for the theory of the unitary executive and for the
notion that the President has a broad removal power.
The Pierce administration did not simply support the unitariness of
the executive branch by asserting its removal power. It also strongly
endorsed the president’s power to direct subordinate executive
officials. In a strident opinion, Cushing joined Attorneys General
Berrien, Taney, Butler, Johnson, and Crittenden in rejecting Wirt’s
assertion that the president could direct the department heads, but not
216
lower-level executive officials. Such a doctrine was nonsensical

210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

See VAN RIPER, supra note 66, at 42.
See FISH, supra note 8, at 164-65; see also GARA, supra note 194, at 50.
58 (17 Howard) U.S. 284 (1854).
Id. at 286-87.
Id. at 287.
See id. at 303-05.
See 6 Op. Att’y Gen. 326, 342-43 (1854) (citing 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 624 (1823)
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and contrary to “settled constitutional theory,” which requires that
executive discretion be exercised in accordance with the “unity of
executive action, and, of course, unity of executive decision; which
by the inexorable necessity of the nature of things, cannot be obtained
by means of a plurality of persons, unduly independent of one
another, without corporate conjunction, and released from subjection
217
to one determining will.” Although the president was not under any
obligation to intervene in every possible decision, there was no
218
question that he had the authority to do so.
Cushing embraced the president’s power to direct even more
forcefully in a subsequent opinion. Cushing noted that in setting up
the various executive departments, Congress recognized that “in the
President is the executive power vested by the Constitution, and also
because the Constitution commands that HE shall take care that the
laws be faithfully executed: thus making him not only the depositary
of the executive power, but the responsible executive minister of the
219
United States.” Although the attorneys general had fluctuated on
220
the question, Cushing concluded that “no Head of Department can
lawfully perform an official act against the will of the President; and
that will is by the Constitution to govern the performance of all such
221
acts.” As Cushing reasoned, “If it were not thus, Congress might by
statute so divide and transfer the executive power as utterly to subvert
the Government, and to change it into a parliamentary despotism, like
that of Venice or Great Britain, with a nominal executive Chief utterly
222
powerless.” Armed with these opinions, Pierce took control of his
(Wirt); 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 302 (1829) (Berrien); 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 507 (1831) (Taney); 2 Op.
Att’y Gen. 652 (1834) (Butler); 5 Op. Att’y Gen. 87 (1849) (Johnson); 5 Op. Att’y Gen.
630 (1852) (Crittenden)). For a more complete discussion of these earlier opinions, see
Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 1, at 1536; supra notes 23, 164, 186, 189-93 and
accompanying text.
217. 6 Op. Att’y Gen. at 342-43. If Wirt’s view were correct, “it would have been the
singular condition of a great government, in which the executive power was vested by
Constitution in the President, and he had authority over the primary executive officers, but
neither he nor they had any authority over the secondary executive officers.” Id. at 342.
218. See id. at 342.
219. 7 Op. Att’y Gen. 453, 460 (1855); see also id. at 460 (“[T]he great constitutional
fact remains, that the ‘executive power’ is vested in the President, subject only, in the
respect of appointments and treaties, to the advice and consent of the Senate.”).
220. See id. at 464 (citing 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 636 (1824) (Wirt); 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 302
(1829) (Berrien); 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 507 (1832) (Taney); 5 Op. Att’y Gen. 630 (1852)
(Crittenden); 6 Op. Att’y Gen. 326 (1854) (Cushing)).
221. Id. at 469-70.
222. Id. at 470. Certain language in these opinions arguably suggested that the attorney
general operated independently of presidential control when rendering legal opinions. See
id. at 464; 6 Op. Att’y Gen. at 333-34 (1854). However, as Nelson Lund has explained, in
offering these statements Cushing simply meant to acknowledge that the attorney general
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administration to the extent that someone of his limited ability could,
issuing an executive order centralizing his control over the federal
223
government’s legal affairs. The Pierce administration thus firmly
advanced the president’s power to direct as well as the president’s
power to remove.
Finally, the Pierce administration rebuffed one of the earliest
attempts by Congress to impose what amounted to a legislative veto,
when both the House and the Senate passed separate resolutions
urging that the Secretary of the Interior reverse his denial of a claim.
Again, the administration’s primary instrument was an opinion by
Attorney General Cushing. As Cushing noted, “[T]he Constitution
provides for co-ordinate powers acting in different and respective
spheres of co-operation. The executive power is vested in the
224
President, whilst all legislative powers are vested in Congress.”
Thus the Constitution gave Congress the authority to participate in the
enactment of general laws. However, “the Constitution has not given
to either branch of the legislature the power, by separate resolution of
its own, . . . to apply [a general law] to a given case. And its
resolutions have obligatory force only as far as regards itself or things
225
dependent on its own constitutional power.” That the resolutions
were directed at the Secretary of the Interior and not the President was
immaterial. Cushing noted that a department head acts “in
subordination always to his constitutional and legal relation to the
226
President of the United States.” Put simply, “the authority of each
Head of Department is a parcel of the executive power of the
President. To coerce the Head of Department is to coerce the
227
President.”
Thus, despite the fact that Pierce is almost invariably placed
was entitled to his own opinions when offering legal advice; he did not mean to suggest
that the president or any other part of the executive branch would be bound to follow his
opinions. See Nelson Lund, Rational Choice at the Office of Legal Counsel, 15 CARDOZO
L. REV. 437, 441-46 (1993).
223. See Susan Low Bloch, The Early Role of the Attorney General In Our
Constitutional Scheme: In the Beginning, There Was Pragmatism, 1989 DUKE L.J. 561,
618 n.184 (citing HOMER C. CUMMINGS & CARL MCFARLAND, FEDERAL JUSTICE:
CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF JUSTICE AND THE FEDERAL EXECUTIVE 145-47 (1937);
Griffin Bell, The Attorney General: The Federal Government’s Chief Lawyer and Chief
Litigator, or One Among Many?, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 1049, 1052 (1978)); 2 HAYNES,
supra note 75, at 1578-79.
224. 6 Op. Att’y Gen. 680, 682 (1854).
225. Id. at 684-85. “Indeed, it seems little better than a mere truism to say, that a
separate resolution of either House of Congress is not a law.” Id. at 684.
226. Id. at 682 (citing Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497 (1840)).
227. Id. The Attorney General went on to explain that “the act of a Head of Department
is, in effect, an act of the President.” Id.
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the
towards the bottom of any attempt to rate the presidents,
incompetence of his administration did not stop it from vigorously
defending the president’s sole authority to control the execution of the
law. By supporting the president’s power to remove and direct and by
opposing Congress’s attempt to interfere directly with the execution
of the law, the Pierce administration supported every major facet of
the unitary executive. Moreover, although some of the attorneys
general during the Monroe, Jackson, Polk, and Taylor administrations
had evinced some willingness to tolerate limitations on the president’s
authority to oversee the actions of all subordinate executive officers,
Pierce’s strong opposition to such limitations essentially vitiated
previous executives’ acquiescence for the purposes of coordinate
construction.
H. James Buchanan
If Pierce was a bad president, then it must be said at the outset that
James Buchanan was even worse. A former Federalist who had
229
become a Jacksonian Democrat by 1828, Buchanan was narrowly
elected to the presidency in 1856 because the Whig Party had
disappeared and the Republicans and Know-Nothings split the antiDemocratic vote.
Buchanan came to the presidency with a well-established
reputation as a defender of the president’s authority to execute the
law, having defended the president’s veto power on Jacksonian
grounds, and having personally authored the Democratic response to
Whig assertions of limited executive power as a Democrat in the
Senate during the Tyler administration. Indeed, it was Buchanan’s
writings during the 1840s that effectively served as the last word on
230
the question of presidential power to veto legislation at will.
But the defining moment of the Buchanan administration from the
standpoint of the unitary executive occurred during the months
following Abraham Lincoln’s election in November 1860 and
Lincoln’s inauguration in March 1861. During these lame-duck
months, Buchanan did nothing while state after state seceded from the
Union. Although his refusal to surrender Fort Sumter was not
insignificant, it pales beside his larger failings faithfully to execute
the Constitution and laws with respect to secession.

228. GARA, supra note 194, at 180.
229. Id. at 11, 14.
230. See TUGWELL, supra note 7, at 117-118.
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Buchanan’s administration got off to a horrible start when the
President-elect undertook to communicate with several Supreme
231
This
Court Justices about the pending Dred Scott case.
correspondence involved a severe dereliction of duty by both
Buchanan and the justices involved, and Buchanan’s involvement, in
particular, constituted a failure of his responsibility to faithfully
execute the Constitution—in violation of his oath of office.
During the Buchanan Administration, cabinet meetings were held
regularly and were “supplemented by equally regular dinners and
family-type gatherings,” and no “crises were met without long,
special cabinet sessions in which the president and his advisers
convened as allies against adversaries usually considered enemies as
232
well as opponents on principle.” It would be a mistake, however, to
infer from Buchanan’s willingness to consult his cabinet any lack of
conviction in the president’s authority over the administration of the
law. The cabinet members “always insisted that despite the attention
their views invariably received, the president himself was always in
command. The administration was a directory because the president
shared fully the basic precepts and emotional attachments of his
233
ministers.”
Buchanan’s support for the unitary executive was also made
234
manifest in his widespread use of the removal power. Not only did
Buchanan use this power freely, he is cited by modern historians as
the executive who took the power of partisan removal to its logical
conclusion when he extended its application to Pierce appointees,
235
despite the fact that all of them were fellow Democrats. Buchanan’s
willingness to use the removal power is dramatically illustrated by his
attempts to muster support for an early legislative effort to get Kansas
admitted to the Union as a slave state when most of the people in the
236
A bill to this effect
Kansas territory were clearly anti-slavery.
passed the Senate, with “the cabinet lobbying directly, firing opposing
postmasters and other officeholders right and left, and using both
threats and promises wholesale,” but failed to be adopted in the House
231. See ELBERT B. SMITH, THE PRESIDENCY OF JAMES BUCHANAN 23-29 (1975);
POTTER, supra note 152, at 274.
232. SMITH, supra note 231, at 22.
233. Id.
234. See VAN RIPER, supra note 66, at 42; see also 9 Op. Att’y Gen. 516, 518 (1860)
(acknowledging the president’s power to “remove[] [his subordinates] at pleasure”).
235. See FISH, supra note 8, at 166-67; SMITH, supra note 231, at 21; VAN RIPER,
supra note 66, at 42; WHITE, supra note 6, at 313.
236. See SMITH, supra note 231, at 31-42.
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237

of Representatives.
The widespread removals and threats of removals attest to
Buchanan’s belief in the Jacksonian theory of an unlimited removal
power. Phillip Shaw Paludan, a Lincoln biographer, reports:
When Buchanan sought votes for the Lecompton [Kansas]
constitution, passed because of massive vote fraud in Kansas, he
bribed legislators with offers of jobs and with contracts to firms
owned by congressmen’s relatives . . . . To get support for [another
Kansas bill] the Buchanan administration walked the lobbies and
aisles of the House, alternating bribes of government contracts
with threats of loss of patronage. In June 1860 a committee of the
House, the Covode committee, reported corruption ranging from
Kansas to the navy yards in the East, including instances of
promises of offices to congressmen and offers of printing contracts
to editors for political support . . . . [T]he overall effect was to
brand the Buchanan administration238as “the Buchaneers,” more
interested in spoils than in principle.

Even after his policy and strategy produced horrible losses in the
1858 mid-term elections, Buchanan continued to use the removal
power as a political weapon in retaliating against Northern Democrats
like Stephen Douglas, who had sensibly opposed Buchanan’s efforts
to admit Kansas as a slave state. Throughout Douglas’s hard-fought
1858 Senate re-election campaign against Lincoln, “the
administration did everything possible to destroy Douglas.
Democratic newspapers had to oppose him or lose the public printing.
Postmasters, other officeholders, and those hoping to be officeholders
239
dared not speak a word in his favor.” Ultimately, Douglas squeaked
out a victory over Lincoln, “but most Northern Democrats were less
fortunate,” as “[t]hroughout the North the Republicans were swept
240
into governorships, the Senate, and the House.”
Buchanan unflinchingly asserted control over his administration.
Indeed, it was one of the few activities that provided any respite from
the many political setbacks he was suffering. As Smith reports:
Frustrated at every turn by an opposition Congress, [Buchanan]
sought personal relief through immersion in administrative affairs.
When Cabinet members became ill or took time off, he assumed
their duties. At the Department of State he busied himself with

237.
238.
239.
240.

Id. at 44.
PHILLIP SHAW PALUDAN, THE PRESIDENCY OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 22-23 (1994).
SMITH, supra note 231, at 53.
Id. at 81.
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grandiose but impossible dreams of territorial expansion.

As president, Buchanan was among the first to confront a new and
serious attempt by Congress to limit the president’s control over his
administration: the appropriations rider. Specifically, when Congress
appropriated $500,000 to complete the Washington Aqueduct in
1860, it attempted to prevent Secretary of War John B. Floyd from
transferring the designer of the aqueduct, Captain Montgomery C.
Meigs, to a distant post by attaching a rider requiring that the funds
“be expended according to the plans and estimates” and “under [the]
242
superintendence of Captain Meigs.” Buchanan signed the bill, but
criticized the rider as an unconstitutional impingement on his
243
constitutional authority. According to Buchanan, it was impossible
that Congress could have intended to interfere with the clear right
of the President to command the army and to order its officers to
any duty he might deem most expedient for the public interest. If
[Congress] could withdraw an officer from the command of the
President and selected for the performance of an Executive duty,
they might, upon the same principle, annex to an appropriation to
carry on a war on condition [that] . . 244
. a particular person of its own
selection should command the army.

Since Congress could not have “intend[ed] to deprive the President
of the power to order [Meigs] to any other army duty for the
performance of which he might consider him better adapted,”
Buchanan announced that he would treat this rider merely as an
expression of Congress’s “preference” rather than a binding
245
legislative command.
In the end, Meigs’s bid to remain in Washington failed. In defiance
of the clear mandate of the rider, Buchanan relieved Meigs of his
duties and transferred him to the Gulf of Mexico. Meigs sent the
aqueduct funds to the Treasury and urged that no project expenses be
incurred in his absence, but his recommendations were ignored. By
the time Floyd’s resignation permitted Meigs to return to the capital
241. Id. at 85.
242. Act of June 25, 1860, ch. 211, 12 Stat. 104, 106.
243. See Christopher N. May, Presidential Defiance of “Unconstitutional” Laws:
Reviving the Royal Prerogative, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 865, 949 (1994).
244. James Buchanan, Special Message to the House (June 25, 1860), in 4 MESSAGES
& PAPERS, supra note 57, at 3129. Buchanan’s hypothetical, although intended to be
reductio ad absurdum, became reality during the presidency of Andrew Johnson with the
passage of the rider to the Army Appropriations Act. See infra notes 440-441 and
accompanying text.
245. Buchanan, Special Message, supra note 244, at 3129; see also May, supra note
243, at 949-50.
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six months later, the Army had already paid out more than $150,000
of the $500,000 allocated in direct contravention of the rider attached
246
In the end, Buchanan successfully rebuffed
by Congress.
Congress’s first major attempt to limit presidential control over the
executive branch through an appropriation rider.
The momentous four-way presidential election of 1860 led to the
first ever victory for a Republican candidate: Abraham Lincoln of
Illinois. There followed the greatest crisis in the “faithful execution”
of the laws that was ever known to the Union. After the election and
Lincoln’s victory, the echoes of secession grew louder, and the
slaveholding states began to threaten federal forts. The South viewed
the issue of the Union forts located behind Southern lines “as an
indicator of Northern intentions. If the Union would give them up or
if they could be taken without inciting a war, a peaceful secession
247
would be a reality.”
Most important was Fort Sumter, in
Charleston, South Carolina, defended by Major Robert Anderson
who, although of Southern background, was “a Unionist and a
248
military professional determined to do his job.”
All eyes were glued to the White House to see what Buchanan’s
policy might be. “With the growing threat to the federal forts and
other national property in the background, the President had to decide
upon an overall policy and approach to secession. Was secession
constitutional? Did the federal government have the constitutional
249
power to coerce a seceding state back into the Union?” If secession
were constitutional, what about the problem of all the federal forts,
post offices, and other property in the seceding states? Could the
President give up all this federal property consistently with his
constitutional obligation to “take care that the laws be faithfully
executed?”
Buchanan approached this situation “with his usual strong
250
determination, dogged stubbornness, and confused insight.”
As
usual, he was conscientious and diligent about carrying out his duties.
251
He met with his cabinet faithfully and energetically, but he waffled
over sending reinforcements to Fort Sumter. He knew that the army

246. May, supra note 243, at 949-51; Charles Warren, Presidential Declarations of
Independence, 10 B.U. L. REV. 1, 18 (1930).
247. SMITH, supra note 231, at 168.
248. Id. at 169.
249. Id. at 145.
250. Id. at 143.
251. Id. at 144.
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numbered only sixteen thousand men, and he considered a call for
252
volunteers early on to be “both unconstitutional and unwise.”
Buchanan’s cabinet met with him almost daily and split over the
question of secession. Secretary of State Lewis Cass, the 1848
Democratic nominee for president, and Attorney General Jeremiah
Black said that the President could not acknowledge any right of
secession, while three Southern members of the cabinet came out in
253
favor of secession. Buchanan asked Black for a legal opinion on the
situation. Black emphatically denied that the president had any
254
authority to recognize secession and underscored the president’s
right to collect customs and his duty to defend public property and to
255
execute the laws. In addition, the military act of 1795 gave the
president the power to call out the militia when judicial proceedings
256
were insufficient to check dissenting states.
Buchanan delivered his annual message on December 3, 1860, and
the only useful thing he had to say was that the South was in no
danger from Lincoln’s mere election and that it should wait for some
257
actual grievance to emerge before resorting to secession. Buchanan
took the view that secession was unconstitutional if it was called
258
secession, but suggested that it might be permissible if it were
259
instead called a “revolution.” With respect to the forts, Buchanan
260
added that the president must fulfill his oath of office and that if
anyone tried “to expel the United States from [its] property by
force . . . the officer in command of the forts has received orders to
act strictly on the defensive” and that “responsibility for
consequences would rightfully rest upon the heads of the
261
assailants.”
In the months that followed, Buchanan adopted perhaps the
narrowest view of presidential power of any president prior to the
Civil War, viewing the president as “no more than the chief executive
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

Id.
Id. at 147.
9 Op. Att’y Gen. 516, 523-24 (1860).
Id. at 518-21, 524.
Id. at 522.
James Buchanan, Fourth Annual Message (Dec. 3, 1860), in 4 MESSAGES &
PAPERS, supra note 57, at 3157, 3159.
258. Id. at 3161-65.
259. Id. at 3161, 3165.
260. Id. at 3165.
261. Id. at 3166; see also DAVID HERBERT DONALD, LINCOLN 257 (1995) (“Buchanan
was torn between his belief that secession was unconstitutional and his conviction that
nothing could be done to prevent it.”).
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officer of the government” whose sole province was “not to make but
262
He thus misused the bully pulpit of the
to execute the laws.”
presidency to encourage rather than discourage secession, in
contravention of his oath to take care that the laws be faithfully
executed. President-elect Lincoln tried to calm the waters by pledging
263
to enforce the Fugitive Slave Act, but it was too late. Seven states
264
in the deep South passed ordinances of secession.
Buchanan did stand firm in one regard, however: He would not
abandon the forts, as “[t]hey were federal property and could not be
taken legally under either the right of secession, which he opposed, or
265
the right of revolution, which he defended.” On December 12,
1860, as the issue of the forts percolated, Buchanan received a blow
when Secretary of State Lewis Cass resigned in a letter “protesting
266
Buchanan’s refusal to send troops to Charleston.” Cass became an
immediate hero, and Buchanan responded by moving Attorney
General Black to the State Department and by appointing the soon-to267
be-famous Edwin M. Stanton attorney general.
Elbert Smith
reports:
Some historians have given Black . . . and Stanton all the credit for
Buchanan’s refusal to abandon Fort Sumter, but the president
himself indicated no great respect and certainly no affection for . . .
Stanton . . . . He did usually listen to Black, but the position he
followed on Fort Sumter was probably influenced far more by
Northern public opinion than by any of his cabinet. Every hint of
weakness brought a storm of abuse. Every show
of defiance
268
toward South Carolina brought momentary praise.

When South Carolina seceded and its governor asked for the
immediate surrender of Fort Sumter, Buchanan wrote that “[o]nly
Congress . . . could decide on relations between the federal
government and South Carolina, and [that] he had no power to

262. Buchanan, Fourth Annual Message, supra note 257, at 3157; see also PETER M.
SHANE & HAROLD H. BRUFF, THE LAW OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER: CASES AND
MATERIALS 16 (1988).
263. SMITH, supra note 231, at 157; DONALD, supra note 261, at 269 (“Lincoln had
always accepted the constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Law and now, to please the
Southerners, he said he was willing to see it more efficiently enforced, provided that it
contained the usual safeguards to liberty, securing free men against being surrendered as
slave”) (quotation ommitted).
264. See PALUDAN, supra note 238, at 5.
265. SMITH, supra note 231, at 169-70.
266. Id. at 172.
267. Id. at 173.
268. Id. at 175.
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recognize the dissolution of the Union or surrender Fort Sumter to
269
anyone.” An attack on the fort absent congressional action would
be militarily repelled. Finally, by the end of December 1860,
270
Buchanan ordered federal warships to resupply Fort Sumter.
On January 8, 1861, Buchanan sent a special message to Congress,
again insisting that “only Congress had the power and responsibility
to find a peaceful solution [to the crisis] or to authorize the use of
271
force to protect federal property.”
President-elect Lincoln,
meanwhile, circumspectly informed listeners that “he would preserve,
protect, defend, and enforce the Constitution equally in all parts of the
272
country.” Buchanan, in contrast, stood idly by in late 1860 and
early 1861 as state after state seceded from the Union. In so doing, he
abdicated his sworn responsibility to enforce the Constitution and
laws of the United States.
Even though Buchanan may have been the worst president in
American history as a general matter, on the issues that are central to
this survey—issues of the unitariness of the executive—he gets a
passing mark. There was no acquiescence during Buchanan’s one
term in office in any congressional plan to limit the president’s
removal power or his ability to control the executive branch.
Buchanan did fail to defend the Constitution and faithfully execute
the laws during the winter of 1860 to 1861, but he declined to
surrender Fort Sumter, and in any event, Lincoln immediately stepped
in to repair the breach. The greatest outbreak of lawlessness and
insurrection against federal authority in our history was to be
followed by the greatest unilateral use of executive power to defend
the Constitution. Buchanan was the last of the Jacksonian presidents,
and at the end of this period the concept of the unitary executive
bequeathed by the Founding Fathers was alive and well, even though
no Jacksonian president was elected to a second term and several
were very weak chief executives by modern standards.
***
Despite the historically unremarkable administrations of many of
the Jacksonian presidents, the record clearly shows that these
presidents explicitly or implicitly held the same views of unitary
executive power as Andrew Jackson, even though all but Polk were

269.
270.
271.
272.

Id. at 177.
Id. at 183.
Id. at 161.
Id. at 163.
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far weaker than Old Hickory while in office. As Leonard White
observes:
The Democrats maintained the tradition that heads of departments
were assistants to the President. Any doubt about the independent
position of the Treasury was dispelled when Jackson removed
William Duane. No Secretary from 1829 to 1861 challenged the
supremacy of the Chief Executive. The Whigs appeared at times to
lean toward a type of cabinet government, but such a theory found
lodgment nowhere. The President appointed, the President gave
directions, and in case of necessity,
he had the undoubted power to
273
remove the department heads.

This consistency is all the more remarkable when considered in
light of three historical factors specific to this period of American
history. First, these presidencies all occurred during a time when
congressional assertiveness had reach unprecedented heights, led by
such luminaries as Henry Clay, Daniel Webster, and John Calhoun.
Second, four of these presidents were nominal Whigs, a party whose
central political tenet was an executive branch of limited power
relative to Congress. Third, all of these presidencies, and particularly
the last four, took place at a time when sectionalism and factionalism
over slavery were eroding the power of all of the branches of
government, including the executive branch. In spite of these factors,
all of the Jacksonian presidents were consistently aggressive and
unrestrained in their use of the executive appointment, removal, and
law enforcement powers under the Constitution.
III. THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE DURING THE
CIVIL WAR, 1861-1869
Buchanan’s refusal to oppose the rebellion of the Southern states
set the stage for the climactic event of the first century of our nation’s
history: the Civil War. The intractability and the morality of the
slavery issue tore the country apart, at terrible cost. As is so often the
case, the ensuing peace in many ways proved even more divisive than
the war itself. The debates surrounding Reconstruction proved just as
politically explosive and were in many ways even more vindictive
than were the debates leading up to secession.
Although the states and citizens that remained part of the republic
were unified in their support for prosecuting the war, it would be a
mistake to assume that relations between the various branches of

273. WHITE, supra note 6, at 85 (footnote omitted).
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government remained harmonious. Struggles over the balance of
power between the president and Congress emerged as an important
undercurrent that ran throughout the war. The desperation of the times
led Abraham Lincoln to assert and Congress to tolerate an
unprecedented degree of concentration of power in the chief
executive. The result was that Lincoln led and Andrew Johnson
inherited perhaps the strongest presidency in our nation’s history.
In fact, the unique nature of the civil war presidencies gave rise to a
paradox of sorts. The fact that Lincoln wielded more raw power than
any of his predecessors simultaneously appears to have led him to
tolerate limitations to the devices needed to superintend the execution
of the law that would otherwise be regarded as quite problematic. In
addition, Johnson’s personal limitations as a politician and his neartotal lack of a political power base allowed Congress to emasculate
the presidency in ways that were never before possible. In the end,
this confrontation between the executive and legislative branches
culminated somewhat inconclusively with Johnson’s impeachment
and the Senate’s ultimate refusal to convict him of those charges.
That said, we believe that it would be dangerous to read too much
into these developments. The extraordinariness of the times limit their
precedential significance, and their implications are muted still further
when viewed in the context of Lincoln’s extraordinary efforts to
ensure the faithful execution of the laws of the land. But most
importantly for the purposes of this article, it becomes clear that in
many cases these presidents did not suffer these indignations in
silence and under no circumstances did they affirmatively acquiesce
to them. As a result, whatever deviations from the unitary executive
that occurred during this period are too minor and too sporadic to
represent the type of established historical pattern needed to settle an
issue under the methodology of departmental or coordinate
construction.
A. Abraham Lincoln
If James Buchanan was the nation’s worst president, then Abraham
Lincoln was one of its best. Lincoln’s administration clearly
represented the zenith of presidential power during the first century
under the Constitution. The exigencies of the Civil War demanded
that Lincoln wield a range of powers the like of which the country
had never before witnessed, and many of his enemies accused him of
taking on dictatorial or tyrannical powers. Lincoln’s strong
presidency is ironic because he began his political career as a Whig

No. 3]

The Unitary Executive

719

and, like most Whigs in the 1840s and 1850s, he began his political
career opposed to a strong Jacksonian presidency. Lincoln biographer
Phillip Shaw Paludan reports: “Lincoln’s roots were in a world where
warnings against unrestrained executive authority were party
274
gospel.”
However, Lincoln’s private communications during the 1840’s and
1850’s demonstrate a more thoughtful view of presidential power and
a realization of the practical necessity of strength and unitariness in
the presidency. Leonard White notes that Lincoln objected to
President Zachary Taylor’s policy of delegating responsibility for
appointments to the departments and, during the Taylor
administration, Lincoln wrote in a private letter, “This . . . must be
arrested, or it will damn us all . . . . The appointments need be no
better . . . but the public must . . . understand . . . they are the
275
President’s appointments.” Lincoln thus appreciated the fact that
the president must pick and remove his own men to control his
administration.
During the Lincoln-Douglas debates in 1858, Lincoln addressed the
issue of the unitary executive, advocating the position that
congressmen and presidents have a co-equal power with the courts to
engage in constitutional review. Lincoln believed in the legitimacy of
coordinate or departmental review, and he expressed that view as
eloquently and forcefully as anyone who has ever occupied the
presidential office. In a debate against Stephen Douglas in
Springfield, Illinois on July 17, 1858, Lincoln said:
Now, as to the Dred Scott decision; for upon that [Douglas]
makes his last point at me. He boldly takes ground in favor of that
decision.
This is one-half the onslaught, and one-third of the entire plan of
the campaign. I am opposed to that decision in a certain sense, but
not in the sense which he puts on it. I say that in so far as it decided
in favor of Dred Scott’s master and against Dred Scott and his
family, I do not propose to disturb or resist the decision.
I never have proposed to do any such thing. I think, that in
respect for judicial authority, my humble history would not suffer
in a comparison with that of Judge Douglas. He would have the
citizen conform his vote to that decision; the member of Congress,

274. PALUDAN, supra note 238, at 27.
275. WHITE, supra note 6, at 75 (citing HOLMAN HAMILTON, ZACHARY TAYLOR 217
(1951)).
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his; the President, his use of the veto power. He would make it a
rule of political action for the people and all the departments of the
government. I would not. By resisting it as a political rule,
I disturb
276
no right of property, create no disorder, excite no mobs.

Lincoln reiterated his departmentalist opposition to Dred Scott in
his first inaugural address:
I do not forget the position assumed by some, that constitutional
questions are to be decided by the Supreme Court; nor do I deny
that such decisions must be binding in any case, upon the parties to
a suit, as to the object of that suit, while they are also entitled to
very high respect and consideration in all parallel cases by all other
departments of the government. And while it is obviously possible
that such decision may be erroneous in any given case, still the evil
effect following it, being limited to that particular case, with the
chance that it may be over-ruled, and never become a precedent for
other cases, can better be borne than could the evils of a different
practice. At the same time the candid citizen must confess that if
the policy of the government, upon vital questions, affecting the
whole people, is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the
Supreme Court, the instant they are made, in ordinary litigation
between parties, in personal actions, the people will have ceased,
to be their own rulers, having to that extent, practically resigned
their government, into the hands of that eminent tribunal. Nor is
there, in this view, any assault upon the court or the judges. It is a
duty, from which they may not shrink, to decide cases properly
brought before them; and it is no fault 277
of theirs if others seek to
turn their decisions to political purposes.

Lincoln was clearly a committed departmentalist in the mold of
278
Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson.
In November 1860, Lincoln won the presidency, and the country
wondered what to expect from him. After all,
Lincoln lacked administrative experience. He had held no
significant military command, no leading position in industry, or
business. He had been a legislator, not a governor. Unlike his
Southern counterpart, Jefferson Davis, he had not administered any
government department. Most notably he had not been trained to
command, as Davis had been at West Point. He was an outsider to
Washington and its political culture His last visit to the city had

276. 2 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 516 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953),
reprinted in WHO SPEAKS FOR THE CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER INTERPRETIVE
AUTHORITY 71 (1992).
277. Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), in 4 MESSAGES &
PAPERS, supra note 57, at 3206, 3210-11, reprinted in WHO SPEAKS FOR THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 276, at 77-78.
278. See Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 1, at 1500-02 (Jefferson), 1529-31 (Jackson).
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been twelve years
earlier when he had served one two-year term as
279
congressman.

President-elect Lincoln was lucky in one regard. He came into office
with large Republican majorities in both houses of Congress,
especially after the Southern states seceded and their members gave
280
up their congressional seats.
President-elect Lincoln picked an exceptionally able cabinet with
281
the increasingly cautious William Seward as Secretary of State and
282
the more radical Salmon P. Chase as Secretary of the Treasury.
Unlike Buchanan’s cabinet, Lincoln’s was filled with men of first-rate
283
ability, and it was politically and geographically balanced.
Lincoln’s willingness to pick men who rivaled him in national stature
helped him to fulfill his obligation to “take care that the laws be
faithfully executed.”
Lincoln’s first inaugural address laid out a sophisticated argument
284
as to why secession was unconstitutional, an argument eventually
285
endorsed by the Supreme Court in Texas v. White. Lincoln believed
that the Union was “perpetual” and “could not lawfully be
286
divided,” and he swore that “I shall take care, as the Constitution
itself expressly enjoins upon me that the laws of the Union be
287
faithfully executed in all the States.” The natural concomitant of
these commitments was to make it “the declared purpose of the Union
288
that it will constitutionally defend and maintain itself.” At the same
time, Lincoln urged that it would be “much safer of all” if he were to
enforce “all those acts which stand unrepealed,” even those, such as
the Fugitive Slave Act, whose constitutionality had been
289
questioned. With the “momentous issue of civil war” before them,
Lincoln closed by maintaining that the government would not “assail”
the South if the Union was not assailed, but that both sides needed to
note that he had taken the most solemn oath “registered in Heaven” to

279. PALUDAN, supra note 238, at 24.
280. Id. at 27.
281. Seward had been a major party rival of Lincoln’s and had hoped for the
Republican presidential nomination in 1860. Id. at 37.
282. Id. at 39.
283. Id. at 41.
284. See id. at 53-55.
285. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1868).
286. Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, supra note 277, at 3208.
287. Id. at 3208.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 3207.
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preserve, protect, and defend the Union. Lincoln was not going to
stand aside, as James Buchanan did, while the Union was coming
apart.
After his inauguration on March 4, 1861, Lincoln was able to cast
off the cautious, quiet, reassuring pose he had assumed as presidentelect. Between March 4, 1861, and July 4, 1861, Lincoln unleashed
the most extraordinary period of unilateral executive action that the
Republic has ever witnessed. Suffice it to say that had the
circumstances that Lincoln faced been any less threatening, he could
not be excused for taking some of the steps that he did without
congressional approval. Only the extraordinary emergency he faced
provides any justification for the sweeping character of his actions.
One of Lincoln’s first major decisions was when to call Congress
back for an emergency session. “[C]learing a wide space for executive
initiative, he set the date for congressmen to return over two-and-ahalf months away—4 July 1861. For almost its first three months the
291
Civil War was the president’s war.” Could Lincoln have safely
reconvened Congress earlier? It is plausible that he could not have.
The State of Maryland was in total chaos, as Southern sympathizers
292
rioted and sought to get Maryland to join Virginia in seceding. Had
they been successful, Washington would have been behind enemy
lines and members of Congress meeting there would have been in
grave danger. Congress could have convened in a city other than
Washington, but that would have humiliated the government and
given Southerners great hope that secession was going to succeed,
while debilitating Northern public opinion. Arguably, the most
prudent thing to do was to secure Maryland before calling Congress
back into session in Washington. The delay in calling Congress also
gave Lincoln the opportunity to take important unilateral actions to
293
cope with the secession crisis.
First, Lincoln ordered that Union forts and other national outposts

290. Id. at 3212.
291. PALUDAN, supra note 238, at 70. For the proclamation calling Congress into
special session, see Abraham Lincoln, Proclamation (Apr. 15, 1861), in 4 MESSAGES &
PAPERS, supra note 57, at 3214.
292. JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 289
(1988); DONALD, supra note 261, at 298-99.
293. See EDWIN S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787-1984, at 264
(Randall W. Bland et al. eds., 5th rev. ed. 1984); LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL
CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 260 (4th ed. rev., 1997); HAROLD
M. HYMAN & WILLIAM M. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL
DEVELOPMENT 1835-1875, at 233 (1982); PALUDAN, supra note 238, at 64-71.
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and property be defended from any attacks or confiscation by
Southern states. This required mobilizing troops and supplies without
congressional consent and sometimes without constitutional
294
authority. To protect Fort Sumter specifically, Lincoln dispatched
the strongest federal war ship available, the Powhatan. “Confusion in
orders, and perhaps Seward’s deception, sent the ship toward [another
embattled fort] but Lincoln was in charge now” and military force
295
was going to be used to defend Union property.
Second, there were dramatic increases in the size of the army and
296
navy, all accomplished by presidential decree. This was arguably
contrary to the clearly expressed congressional power “to raise and
297
support armies.” However, the president has unilateral authority to
federalize the state militias when he believes a crisis calls for this.
Lincoln thus took a legitimate step when on April 15 he declared the
existence of a sufficient state of emergency and called up 75,000
298
members of state militias into national service.
299
Third, Lincoln ordered a naval blockade of all Southern ports.
This was a highly effective unilateral deployment of ships that helped
greatly in the eventual crushing of the South. As commander in chief,
Lincoln had the authority to deploy federal warships as he saw fit—as
the Supreme Court would eventually recognize in its five-to-four
300
decision in The Prize Cases —but surely their use without
congressional approval with respect to a domestic insurrection was
extraordinary.
Fourth, and most strikingly, Lincoln unilaterally suspended the writ
of habeas corpus between Philadelphia and Washington in order to
301
deal with riots and disorder in Maryland. The Constitution is silent

294. 2 GOLDSMITH, supra note 20, at 958.
295. PALUDAN, supra note 238, at 64.
296. Abraham Lincoln, Proclamation (May 3, 1861), in 4 MESSAGES & PAPERS, supra
note 57, at 3216.
297. BINKLEY, supra note 70, at 115-16 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12).
298. Abraham Lincoln, Proclamation (Apr. 15, 1861), in 4 MESSAGES & PAPERS, supra
note 57, at 3214; see also PALUDAN, supra note 238, at 70-71; MCPHERSON, supra note
292, at 274.
299. Abraham Lincoln, Proclamation (May 3, 1861), in 4 MESSAGES & PAPERS, supra
note 57, at 3216; Abraham Lincoln, Proclamation (Apr. 19, 1861), in 4 MESSAGES &
PAPERS, supra note 57, at 3215; see also PALUDAN, supra note 238, at 70.
300. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862).
301. Abraham Lincoln, Executive Order to the Commanding General of the Army of
the United States (Apr. 27, 1861), in 4 MESSAGES & PAPERS, supra note 57, at 3219; see
also HERMAN BELZ, LINCOLN AND THE CONSTITUTION 2 (1984); TUGWELL, supra note 7,
at 158-59; PALUDAN, supra note 238, at 71. Lincoln later expanded the geographic scope
of this order. Abraham Lincoln, Proclamation (May 10, 1861), in 4 MESSAGES & PAPERS,
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on whether Congress or the president has the authority to suspend the
writ of habeas corpus in times of emergency, but the better argument
is surely that this is normally a congressional prerogative. In response
to Lincoln’s suspension of the writ, “[t]he Whig attitude toward the
presidency, born of the attack on Jackson as ‘King Andrew,’ faded so
rapidly that within weeks Lincoln was being called a dictator and his
302
government a despotism.”
Fifth, Lincoln “closed the mails to ‘disloyal’ publications; he told
generals to begin raising new armies; he paid $2 million out of the
Treasury to private citizens in New York to expedite recruiting; he
pledged government credit for $250,000 million. He had no authority
303
to do these things; Congress clearly did.” Lincoln also issued a
general order embodying the rules applicable to federal armies in the
field. This order was arguably in violation of the Constitution’s
assignment to Congress of the duty “to make Rules for the
304
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.”
Sixth, and finally, Secretary of State Seward was made the “hub of
early internal security actions. He set up a special bureau in his
department with three clerks assigned to handle the filing and
305
recording of internal security activities.”
Seward used “federal
marshals and attorneys and judges” to gather information; “[o]nce it
was known he was interested he attracted grievances and warnings
306
from crackpots as well as from serious citizens.” “Policemen and
postmasters opened letters with Southern addresses and sent suspect
307
material to Seward. Some letters clearly revealed treason.” Even
newspapers “were targets for strict surveillance,” and one editor “was
supra note 57, at 3217, 3218; Abraham Lincoln, Executive Order to the Commanding
General of the Army of the United States (July 2, 1861), in 4 MESSAGES & PAPERS, supra
note 57, at 3220 (authorizing the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus as far north as
New York); Abraham Lincoln, Executive Order to the Lieutenant-General Winfield Scott
(Oct. 14, 1861), in 4 MESSAGES & PAPERS, supra note 57, at 3240 (extending the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus as far north as Bangor, Maine).
302. PALUDAN, supra note 238, at 71. For an analysis of the controversy surrounding
Lincoln’s decision to suspend the writ, see infra notes 318-326 and accompanying text.
303. PALUDAN, supra note 238, at 71. Funding military expenses without congressional
authorization violates the constitutional provision that “No Money shall be drawn from the
Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by law.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.
7. See BINKLEY, supra note 70, at 118-19; BELZ, supra note 301, at 2. Lincoln later
disclosed many of these actions to Congress in order to defend his former Secretary of
War against accusations of malfeasance. Abraham Lincoln, Message to the Senate and
House of Representatives (May 26, 1862), in 4 MESSAGES & PAPERS, supra note 57, at
3278.
304. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 14; BINKLEY, supra note 70, at 118.
305. PALUDAN, supra note 238, at 73.
306. Id.
307. Id.
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thrown in jail” and his paper “was expelled from the mails.”
In sum, Lincoln unilaterally took a whole variety of measures in the
spring of 1861 to repel the Southern attack. Lincoln defended his
actions by arguing that the Commander in Chief Clause, when read in
conjunction with the Take Care Clause, conveyed upon him the “war
power,” which empowered him to take the sweeping actions that he
309
did. Although he expressed the “deepest regret” at having the “war
power in defense of the Government forced upon him,” he submitted
that he had no choice “but to call out the war power of the
Government and so to resist force employed for its destruction by
310
force for its preservation.”
Lincoln did not waste time fleshing out the finer points of his
theory of presidential power. Like Jefferson, Lincoln simply took it
for granted that his duty to defend the Constitution and to faithfully
execute the laws implicitly authorized him to take whatever steps
were necessary to preserve the Republic, even if those steps were not
311
specifically authorized by any particular constitutional provision.
Lincoln noted:
I understood that my oath to preserve the Constitution to the best
of my ability, imposed upon me the duty of preserving, by every
indispensable means, that government, that Nation of which that
Constitution was the organic law. Was it possible to lose the
Nation and yet to preserve the Constitution? . . . I felt that
measures, otherwise unconstitutional, might become lawful, by
becoming indispensable to the preservation of the
Union. Right or
312
wrong, I assumed this ground, and now avow it.

308. Id. at 74.
309. Abraham Lincoln, Special Session Message (July 4, 1861), in 4 MESSAGES &
PAPERS, supra note 57, at 3221, 3224-25, 3232; see also CORWIN, supra note 293, at 23,
264; WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS: THE HISTORIC IMPEACHMENTS OF
JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE AND PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON 189 (1992); MARTIN S.
SHEFFER, PRESIDENTIAL POWER: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF THE OPINIONS OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL 1 (1991); HYMAN & WIECEK, supra note 293, at 233. Lincoln’s
arguments were bolstered by antisecessionist legal scholars, including Timothy Farrar,
Horace Binney, James Russell Lowell, Theophilus Parsons, and William Whiting. HYMAN
& WIECEK, supra note 293, at 234.
310. Lincoln, Special Session Message, supra note 309, at 3224-25.
311. See FISHER, supra note 293, at 260-61; NORMAN J. SMALL, SOME PRESIDENTIAL
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE PRESIDENCY 33-35 (1932); cf. Frank B. Cross, Executive
Orders 12,291 and 12,498: A Test Case in Presidential Control of Executive Agencies, 4
J.L. & POL. 483, 488-89 (1988).
312. SMALL, supra note 311, at 35. As Lincoln similarly noted in a letter to Samuel
Chase, “I will violate the Constitution, if necessary, to save the Union; and I suspect,
Chase, that our Constitution is going to have a rough time of it before we get done with
this row.” PETER M. SHANE & HAROLD M. BRUFF, SEPARATION OF POWERS LAW 18
(1996) (citing WARD H. LEMON, RECOLLECTIONS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 221 (1911)).
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In short, constitutional necessity provided its own justification.
Whether his actions were legal or not, Lincoln undertook them,
seemingly backed by the populace and the impetus of public
exigency. He trusted that Congress would later vindicate his
313
decisions. Further constitutional controversy was averted when, as
Lincoln predicted, Congress and a sharply divided Supreme Court
314
ratified all of Lincoln’s actions after the fact. The only unilateral
action Lincoln undertook that was not immediately authorized by
Congress was his suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and even
315
that was later ratified by Congress.
Upon taking office, Lincoln also put into effect the departmentalist
rejection of Dred Scott that he had discussed in his debates with
316
Douglas and in his first inaugural address. Lincoln directed his
subordinates to conduct governmental affairs in a manner contrary to
Dred Scott by ordering them to issue patents and visas to African317
American citizens.
This departmentalist approach assumed new
significance for Lincoln when the constitutionality of his suspension
of the writ of habeas corpus was challenged in the famous case of Ex
318
parte Merryman, which arose when an officer in the Maryland
militia was placed in military custody for allegedly using his position
to recruit and train Confederate sympathizers. He filed for a writ of
habeas corpus before Chief Justice Roger Taney himself, and Taney
313. Lincoln, Special Session Message, supra note 309, at 3225, quoted in FISHER,
supra note 293, at 260-61.
314. For Congress’s ratification of Lincoln’s actions, see Act of Aug. 6, 1861, ch. 63,
12 Stat. 326 (1863) (“[A]ll the acts, proclamations, and orders of the President of the
United States after [March 4, 1861], respecting the army and navy of the United States,
and calling out or relating to the militia or volunteers from the States, are hereby approved
and in all respects legalized and made valid, to the same intent and with the same effect as
if they had been issued and done under the previous express authority and direction of the
Congress of the United States.”); Act of July 31, 1861, ch. 34, 12 Stat. 284-85 (1863)
(authorizing payment of volunteers called up by the President, and authorizing the
President to “accept the service of such volunteers without previous proclamation.”). For
the Supreme Court’s ratification of Lincoln’s actions, see The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2
Black) 635 (1862) (5-4 decision). As is discussed further in the text below, Chief Justice
Taney expressed some misgivings about Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus in Ex
parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487). See infra notes 319-320
and accompanying text.
315. Act of. Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 81, 12 Stat. 755 (1863); see also PALUDAN, supra note
238, at 191; J.G. RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN 130 (rev. ed.
1963).
316. See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
317. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Merryman Power and the Dilemma of Autonomous
Executive Branch Interpretation, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 81, 88 (1993).
318. 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487). For interesting discussions of
Merryman, see FISHER, supra note 293, at 261-62; HYMAN & WIECEK, supra note 293, at
241, 259-60; PALUDAN, supra note 238, at 75-77; Paulsen, supra note 317.
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granted the writ. Taney held that Lincoln’s unilateral suspension of
the writ was an unconstitutional usurpation of the power of Congress
and that Merryman was “[e]ntitled to be set at liberty and discharged
319
immediately from imprisonment.” However, complaining that he
was “resisted by a force too strong for [him] to overcome,” Taney left
it for the President, “in fulfillment of his constitutional obligation to
‘take care that the laws be faithfully executed,’ to determine what
measures he will take to cause the civil process of the United States to
320
be respected and enforced.”
Rather than enforce this order from the Chief Justice, Lincoln
ignored it and appealed directly to the American people and to the
legislature in his message to the special session of Congress on July
321
4. Lincoln believed that “the president could define the meaning of
the Constitution and that the people themselves, in electing the
president, also made constitutional law. There was too much at stake
to leave the meaning of the Constitution and the polity it helped
322
define to nine justices.”
Taney had claimed that Lincoln had
violated his oath to “[f]aithfully execute” the laws by ignoring
Merryman’s writ of habeas corpus. Without ever acknowledging that
his unilateral suspension of habeas corpus was illegal, Lincoln argued
that regardless of legality, the national situation was so dire that it
justified his actions:
The whole of the laws which were required to be faithfully
executed, were being resisted, and failing of execution, in nearly
one-third of the States. Must they be allowed to finally fail of
execution, even had it been perfectly clear, that by the use of the
means necessary to their execution, some single law, made in such
extreme tenderness of the citizen’s liberty, that, practically, it
relieves more of the guilty, than of the innocent, should, to a very
limited extent, be violated? To state the question more directly, are
all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and 323
the government itself
go to pieces, lest that one should be violated?

Attorney General Edward Bates followed up Lincoln’s July 4
324
address with a legal opinion further justifying Lincoln’s position.

319. Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 147.
320. Id. at 153.
321. Lincoln, Special Session Message, supra note 309, at 3225-26. See generally
PALUDAN, supra note 238, at 77; SHEFFER, supra note 309, at 13.
322. PALUDAN, supra note 238, at 77.
323. Lincoln, Special Session Message, supra note 309, at 3226, reprinted in 2
GOLDSMITH, supra note 20, at 959.
324. 10 Op. Att’y Gen. 74 (1861); see also Paulsen, supra note 317, at 95.
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Bates said the three branches of government “are co-ordinate and
coequal—that is, neither being sovereign, each is independent in its
sphere, and not subordinate to the others, either of them or both of
them together . . . . [I]f we allow one of the three to determine the
extent of its own powers, and also the extent of the powers of the
other two, that one can control the whole government, and has in fact
325
achieved the sovereignty.” Thus, Attorney General Bates applied
departmentalism to the question of whether a president is obligated to
follow court judgments. This is arguably the most sweeping
326
departmentalist argument ever made by a high government officer.
By September 1861, military commissions had been established to
address disloyalty, but the Union government exercised remarkable
restraint and arrested few orators and editors for their critiques of
327
Lincoln. Paludan denies that “Lincoln was a ‘dictator,’” but others
328
have debated the question. Notably, in the middle of the greatest
war in the nation’s history, Lincoln held the 1862 and 1864 elections
right on schedule, something no tyrant or dictator would ever do. In
fact, although at several points in his 1864 re-election campaign it
appeared that Lincoln could lose and the war end in stalemate,
Lincoln nevertheless refused to cancel the presidential election.
Lincoln paid close attention to the details of the Civil War, as the
theory of the unitary executive suggests he should. James M.
McPherson notes that Lincoln personally picked a series of generals
to manage the war, especially in the East, before he settled on Ulysses
S. Grant as the man he wanted to command his most important
329
army. McPherson writes:
The task of conducting [the Civil War] would stay in [Lincoln’s]
hands in the most compelling and terrible sense—the war would go
on as long as he wanted it to go on; it would stop when he said it
had stopped. And every day as the casualties mounted and the boys
died and the families agonized, he would decide to continue or to

325. 10 Op. Att’y Gen. at 76.
326. For a critique of the use of departmentalism in this context, which nonetheless
defends the extraordinary decision in the Merryman case, see Steven G. Calabresi,
Caesarism, Departmentalism, and Professor Paulsen, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1421 (1999).
327. PALUDAN, supra note 238, at 79.
328. BELZ, supra note 301; RANDALL, supra note 315, at 34-41; CLINTON L.
ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP: CRISIS GOVERNMENT IN THE MODERN
DEMOCRACIES 224-39 (1948).
329. See James M. McPherson, Abraham Lincoln, in TO THE BEST OF MY ABILITY 118,
123 (James M. McPherson & David Rubel eds., 2000); see also PALUDAN, supra note
238, at 215-16 (noting how Lincoln frequently replaced military leaders, in contrast with
Jefferson Davis).
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end it. This was his war. He kept close watch
on the warmaking
330
that he was asking Union generals to direct.

At times, Lincoln delved into the most minute details of military
strategy, and he told his generals very specifically what he wanted
331
them to do. On one occasion he encouraged General Hooker to
speak directly with him rather than report to Hooker’s superiors, and
when he later became exasperated with Hooker, Lincoln personally
332
told Secretary of the Army Stanton to accept Hooker’s resignation.
On another occasion after the Union victory at Gettysburg, Lincoln
became furious with General Meade for failing to pursue the
333
retreating Confederate troops. Lincoln’s General in Chief, Henry
Halleck, complained “that Lincoln’s ‘fingers itch to be into
334
This may have been fortunate because,
everything going on.’”
although “Lincoln’s tactical understanding remained flawed, his
335
larger strategic ideas were sound.” Lincoln held “the same strategic
ideas that Grant held: Union superiority in numbers meant that
pressure all along the Confederate front would wear out and break
336
down Southern resistance.” By the middle of the war, Lincoln
withdrew somewhat and left the day-to-day command of the armies to
Halleck, Stanton, and the increasingly able generals he had working
337
for him, among them Grant. Overall, however, Lincoln was a very
active and involved commander in chief who took full charge of the
faithful execution of the war effort and the fight to defend the
Constitution.
Lincoln’s management of his cabinet was less direct than his
supervision of the armies, in that Lincoln was willing to delegate
authority to the very able men he had picked to advise him. Cabinet
meetings were held regularly on Tuesdays and Fridays, at Salmon
Chase’s urging, but “Seward and Stanton often met individually with
Lincoln . . . generating resentment within the cabinet that lasted
338
throughout the war.” A major cabinet crisis erupted in December
1862 when thirty-one of thirty-two Republican senators voted in
caucus that Secretary of State Seward should be removed, in part
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.

PALUDAN, supra note 238, at 100.
Id. at 203.
Id. at 204-05.
Id. at 206.
Id. at 208.
Id. at 207.
Id. at 261.
Id. at 217-18.
Id. at 123.
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because Treasury Secretary Chase had been criticizing Seward on
339
Capitol Hill. Lincoln answered the Seward opponents with finesse,
calling upon the senators to meet with him at the White House
without telling them that the entire cabinet, minus Seward, would be
present. In the presence of the senators, Lincoln pointedly asked his
cabinet if there was any lack of unity in the government and all the
340
cabinet members swallowed hard and said no. The senators then
backed down and Lincoln refused Seward’s resignation, which had
341
been tendered. “The executive branch had established its ultimate
autonomy, and Lincoln had clearly shown himself master of it. He,
342
not Congress, would determine who his advisers would be.”
Ultimately, Lincoln put Treasury Secretary Chase on notice that he
was watching him and “still controlled the patronage and the
343
administration.” When Chase tried to appoint yet another former
Democrat to a Treasury patronage post, Lincoln enthusiastically
accepted Chase’s resignation, saying “you and I have reached a point
of mutual embarrassment in our official relations which it seems
344
cannot be overcome.”
In the wake of the Seward crisis, Lincoln tried to show his devotion
to cabinet government by ostentatiously asking every cabinet member
for a written opinion on the legality of the various extraordinary
345
events that had made West Virginia a new state. Lincoln thought it
important to do this because he was fighting a war to defend the
Constitution and laws, and he wanted everyone to see that he took the
laws seriously with respect to West Virginia statehood. Paludan
writes:
An increasingly independent presidency was emerging, however,
and the circumstances of war were validating it. A former Whig
and a former Democrat, Bates and Blair, said that the president
could ask for as many opinions or as few as he wished; he need not
consult with them unless he wanted to. The president himself was
accountable for his administration and by implication the only
point at which congressmen could challenge a cabinet member was
at confirmation hearings. There could be no such thing as a “plural
339. Id. at 171.
340. MCPHERSON, supra note 292, at 575.
341. 2 HAYNES, supra note 75, at 812-15.
342. PALUDAN, supra note 238, at 181.
343. Id. at 268.
344. See id. at 286-87; DONALD, supra note 261, at 508.
345. PALUDAN, supra note 238, at 178. For a magnificent discussion of the
constitutional issues involved, see Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, Is West
Virginia Unconstitutional?, 90 CAL. L. REV. 291 (2002).
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In the summer of 1862, Lincoln took another momentous step in
affirming unilateral presidential power when he announced his
Emancipation Proclamation, under which all slaves in areas still in
revolt on January 1, 1863, would henceforth and forever after be
347
free. This followed upon congressional action in June 1862 where
Congress, in violation of Dred Scott, outlawed slavery in the
348
territories of the United States, thus settling an historic and longdebated question. Lincoln believed that he “had authority under his
349
war powers to free slaves in places where war was being made.” He
later admitted that the Proclamation, which was criticized by former
350
Supreme Court Justice and Dred Scott dissenter Benjamin Curtis,
was without “constitutional or legal justification, except as a military
351
measure.” Lincoln “freed the slaves in the only place that he could
legally reach them—in places that he ruled under presidential war
352
powers.” Lincoln’s unilateral action in issuing the Emancipation
Proclamation may well be the most important unilateral act any
president of the United States has ever taken, and it was truly a
sweeping and extraordinary exercise of the executive power conferred
by the Constitution.
The Civil War was fought over the issue of the president’s
authority to take care that the laws be executed in the South, but there
were a number of subsidiary “take care” questions that arose during
the War that merit brief mention. First was the question of returning
fugitive slaves, an issue which remained alive as slavery survived in
some of the loyal border states. “[C]onstitutional commitment stayed
firm; the federal government [continued to] return fugitives until June
353
1864, when Congress killed the fugitive slave law.” Another “take
care” issue arose over the unpopular draft law, which Democrats,
lumping it with the habeas law, argued “gave the administration

346. PALUDAN, supra note 238, at 175.
347. See id. at 187-89.
348. Act of June 19, 1862, ch. 111, 12 Stat. 432.
349. PALUDAN, supra note 238, at 179.
350. See id. at 158.
351. ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR., WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION: ABRAHAM LINCOLN
AND FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 14 (1988) (quoting letter from Abraham Lincoln to
Salmon P. Chase (Sept. 2, 1863)).
352. PALUDAN, supra note 238, at 188.
353. Id. at 134; see also Act of June 28, 1864, ch. 166, 13 Stat. 200 (repealing the
Fugitive Slave Act of 1850).
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354

monarchical powers.” Lincoln wrote an “extended argument on the
necessity and constitutionality of the draft . . . [and he] asserted that
355
‘it is my purpose to see the draft law faithfully executed.’” From
July 13 to 17, 1863, New York City exploded with riots against the
draft law, and Lincoln was faced with a serious crisis of how to
356
execute that law. Lincoln responded discreetly, but he did station
troops in New York, thus showing his dedication to enforcing even
357
unpopular laws.
Lincoln maintained military governments in some portions of the
South that had been freed, like Louisiana, and thus he experimented
358
unilaterally with military reconstruction there. Lincoln favored a
359
quick, nonpunitive Reconstruction led by the military. Lincoln’s
control of Louisiana reconstruction “rested almost entirely on his
360
authority as commander in chief” and on the pardon power.
Members of Congress fretted that they should have some say over
361
Louisiana, and they “worried about executive lawmaking.” Lincoln
362
worked to bring Louisiana “quickly back into the Union,” while
Congress eventually came to assert its own more radical
363
reconstruction plans. The conflict came to a head when Lincoln
refused to sign the second Confiscation Act until Congress had made
certain changes to correspond with his view of executive and
legislative authority. In response, Congress refused to seat the
representatives elected by states that had complied with Lincoln’s
Reconstruction plan. Finally, on July 2, 1864, relations between the
President and Congress broke down completely with the embodiment
of Congress’ Radical Reconstruction policies in the Wade-Davis bill.
Objecting to the stiff Reconstruction policies represented in the bill,
Lincoln pocket vetoed it. Congress in turn adopted the Wade-Davis
Manifesto, reiterating its vision of Reconstruction and denouncing
Lincoln’s action as an unconstitutional usurpation of legislative
354. PALUDAN, supra note 238, at 192.
355. Id. at 195.
356. See id. at 213.
357. Id. at 214; DONALD, supra note 261, at 448.
358. PALUDAN, supra note 238. at 240-41.
359. See, e.g., Abraham Lincoln, Third Annual Message (Dec. 8, 1863), in 5 MESSAGES
& PAPERS, supra note 57, at 3380, 3390-91; REHNQUIST, supra note 309, at 193; HYMAN
& WIECEK, supra note 293, at 268-69, 271.
360. See CORWIN, supra note 293, at 370 n.58; HYMAN & WIECEK, supra note 293, at
268-69, 271; PALUDAN, supra note 238, at 237.
361. PALUDAN, supra note 238, at 244.
362. Id. at 251.
363. See id. at 264-65.
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364

authority. Lincoln’s battles with Congress over Reconstruction thus
represent another extraordinary exercise of the executive power. It is
no wonder that on some occasions Lincoln’s Democratic opponents
called him “King Lincoln” and charged him with “executive
365
tyranny.”
Lincoln’s unusually strong commitment to the unilateral exercise of
executive power, which led critics to accuse him of being tyrannical
and monarchical, may also underlie a few of his more unfortunate
positions on the unitary executive. Somewhat paradoxically, though
Lincoln wielded more raw power than any of his predecessors or
successors, he at times tolerated congressional efforts to limit his
exercise of executive authority.
On the one hand, Lincoln dominated his cabinet, on one occasion
retracting the decision of his first Secretary of War Simon Cameron to
arm fugitive slaves for the Union army and ultimately dismissing
366
Cameron for insubordination. Lincoln also made wider use of the
presidential removal power than any president before him, paying
great attention to the details of patronage matters even during the
367
crisis over Fort Sumter and removing 1457 out of a total of 1639
368
presidential officers. In so doing, as Edwin Corwin notes, Lincoln
369
“far surpassed” even Jackson’s “record as a spoilsman” Although
Lincoln made many of these removals in order to ensure the loyalty of
government officials, he did not hesitate to remove an official on
370
purely partisan grounds.
In fact, so partisan were Lincoln’s
removals that a noted commentator observed, “If Lincoln had made
appointments for merit only, the war might have been shortened; on
the other hand, he might not have preserved a united North to carry on
371
the war.” The importance of patronage only continued to swell, as

364. CORWIN, supra note 293, at 24-25; HYMAN & WIECEK, supra note 293, at 270-74;
REHNQUIST, supra note 309, at 189, 194-95.
365. See PALUDAN, supra note 238, at 199.
366. Cross, supra note 311, at 489 n.29 (citing Comment, Presidential Legislation by
Executive Order, 37 U. COLO. L. REV. 105, 108-09 (1964)).
367. See PALUDAN, supra note 238, at 35.
368. VAN RIPER, supra note 66, at 43 (citing FISH, supra note 8, at 170 n.3); see also
PALUDAN, supra note 238, at 35-36 (reporting that Lincoln removed 1195 out of 1520
presidential appointees); JOSEPH P. HARRIS, THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE
71 (1953); 2 GOLDSMITH, supra note 20, at 983.
369. CORWIN, supra note 293, at 24l.
370. See DAVID M. DEWITT, THE IMPEACHMENT AND TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON
182 (State Hist. Soc’y of Wis. 1967) (1903); 2 GOLDSMITH, supra note 20, at 983; VAN
RIPER, supra note 66, at 43.
371. FISH, supra note 8, at 172, quoted in VAN RIPER, supra note 66, at 43.
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the prosecution of the war caused an almost fivefold increase in the
372
Lincoln came to regret the
number of federal employees.
prevalence of patronage appointments. When facing a throng of
office-seekers and congressmen in his outer office, Lincoln observed
that the spoils system might in the course of time become far more
dangerous to the Republic than the Civil War. Accordingly, Lincoln
stubbornly resisted members of his own party who wanted to conduct
373
a thorough “office sweep” in the beginning of his second term.
Doing so demonstrated Lincoln’s personal control over removal
policy, a conclusion reinforced by an opinion of Attorney General
374
Bates. Lincoln’s vigorous and partisan use of the removal power, in
spite of his background as a former Whig, indicates his firm belief in
the unitariness of the executive and the importance of presidential
control throughout the executive branch.
On the other hand, Lincoln offered no objection when Congress
enacted legislation limiting Lincoln’s power to remove the
375
376
Comptroller of the Currency,
military officers,
and consular
377
clerks, or when the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War

372. Paludan notes:
In 1861 there were 40,651 civilian jobs to fill in the federal government. Nearly
22,700 post offices led the list, but there were over 4,000 treasury jobs, nearly
9,400 Navy Department places, and around 1,900 each in the War and Interior
Departments. By 1865 the number had increased almost fivefold. Nearly 195,000
civilians worked for the federal government—most of them in the War
Department’s Quartermaster Corps.
PALUDAN, supra note 238, at 35-36.
373. 4 J.G. RANDALL, LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 275-79 (1955); see FISH, supra note 8,
at 172; VAN RIPER, supra note 66, at 44.
374. 11 Op. Att’y Gen. 14, 16 (1864).
375. See Act of Feb. 25, 1863, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665, 665-66 (1863) (the Comptroller of
the Currency was removable only “by the President, by wand with the advice and consent
of the Senate” (emphasis added)); see also HARRIS, supra note 368, at 73; GEORGE W.
PEPPER, FAMILY QUARRELS: THE PRESIDENT, THE SENATE, THE HOUSE 111 (1931). This
provision attracted little discussion when enacted. Louis Fisher, Congress and the Removal
Power, 10 CONG. & PRESIDENCY 63, 72 (1983). However, this provision was amended the
following year to provide for removal “by the President, upon reasons to be communicated
by him to the Senate” because the original provision, according to Senator Fessenden,
changed the existing rule to all other offices. Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, § 1, 13 Stat. 99,
100; see also 2 HAYNES, supra note 75, at 810 n.1.
376. See Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 79, 13 Stat. 487, 489 (1865) (providing that military
officers “dismissed by authority of the President” may “make an application in writing for
a trial.” Upon such application, “the President shall, as soon as the necessities of the public
service may permit, convene a court-martial . . . [a]nd if such court-martial shall not award
dismissal or death as the punishment of such officer, the order of such dismissal shall not
be void”).
377. See Act of June 20, 1864, ch. 136, 13 Stat. 137, 140 (1864) (providing that “no
clerk . . . shall be removed from office except for cause stated in writing, which shall be
submitted to congress at the session first following such removal”); see also HARRIS,
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delved far into the conduct of the military, examining past and future
battle plans, the conduct of generals, and even demanding dismissals
378
of certain generals on political grounds. This committee, formed
largely because of “Old Republican” (i.e., Whig) dismay over
Lincoln’s executive assertiveness and Radical Republican fear that
Lincoln’s approach to the war was insufficiently abolitionist,
conducted wide-ranging investigations into the conduct of the war by
the executive branch. Lincoln tolerated the committee and allowed it
a success when the committee was able to play a role in forcing the
resignation of Lincoln’s first Secretary of War, the corrupt Simon
379
Cameron, and suggest Edwin M. Stanton as Cameron’s successor.
Lincoln never directly responded to these attempted congressional
incursions upon presidential power. Publicly, Lincoln preferred to
pacify the Committee on the Conduct of the War when possible. In
private, Lincoln complained, “Powers of the Government are
unquestionably enlarged by a state of war but is Congress the
government? I think not . . . . All the powers that Congress possess
380
are those granted in the Constitution.”
Lincoln’s official
unwillingness to confront the committee was probably more evidence
of a desire to maintain wartime political consensus than an abdication
of presidential power. As Binkley notes, Lincoln’s strategy in dealing
with Congress was “[n]o longer a question of constitutional
assignments of power but a matter of maneuvering to preserve the
prestige and prerogatives of the executive office which he considers
not only constitutionally his but highly essential for the prosecution of
381
the war and the salvation of the Union.”
Lincoln thus chose
pragmatism over dogmatism in dealing with Congress; he picked his
constitutional battles with Congress carefully, with an eye towards
382
gradual expansion of his overall power to administer the war. This
desire to maintain wartime unity, especially within Republican Party
ranks, was particularly important for Lincoln in the days leading up to
383
the wartime election of 1864.
supra note 368, at 73, 416 n.30 (citing FISH, supra note 8, at 187).
378. JAMES HAMILTON, THE POWER TO PROBE 5 (1976). Interestingly, Attorney
General Bates adopted the intermediate position on presidential review first advanced by
Attorney General Crittenden and opined that the president may direct the heads of
departments, but should not direct subordinate executive officials. 11 Op. Att’y Gen. 14,
16-19 (1864); 10 Op. Att’y Gen. 527 (1863).
379. RANDALL, supra note 315, at 62; see PALUDAN, supra note 238, at 105.
380. BINKLEY, supra note 70, at 122.
381. Id. at 123.
382. See id. at 123-29.
383. See BELZ, supra note 301, at 16.
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Thus, it seems reasonably certain that Lincoln’s tolerance of some
incursions upon the powers of the unitary executive can be explained
on purely political grounds. If it was expected to concede to Lincoln
the extraordinary powers that he was asserting, Congress surely
needed something from which to draw some comfort. Fortunately for
Lincoln and the nation, Lincoln possessed the political skills to avoid
the worst of Congress’s challenges without alienating the legislature,
and he was pragmatic enough to respond to situations flexibly without
provoking unnecessary fights with Congress. For the purposes of this
article, it is sufficient to acknowledge that the Lincoln
administration’s failure to object to instances of congressional
interference with the unitariness of the executive branch occurred
when the nation was riven by civil war. Even so, without more
explicit presidential concessions, mere silence provides only a weak
basis for finding the existence of an established historical pattern of
presidential acquiescence, particularly in light of the extraordinary
powers Lincoln asserted in an unprecedented effort to see to it that the
laws of the land were faithfully executed.
Lincoln ran for re-election in 1864 with a unified party behind him.
Safe from challenge on the left, Lincoln then looked to appease the
border states by choosing as his running mate Andrew Johnson, the
384
military governor of Tennessee. Although the “Tennessean had
spoken of hanging traitors and had favored both emancipation and the
385
use of black troops,” Johnson was to prove a fatefully bad choice.
During the campaign, Secretary of War Stanton furloughed loyal
troops so they could go home to vote for Lincoln, and he “dismissed
quartermaster officials who campaigned for McClellan [Lincoln’s
Democratic opponent]. [Stanton and Holt] carefully checked to see
that anti-Lincoln newspapers and their editors did not get patronage
386
jobs or government contracts.”
Lincoln himself asked General
Sherman to let loyal troops go home to vote in the important October
387
elections in Indiana. Lincoln won easily with fifty-five percent of
the popular vote.
Lincoln’s party platform in 1864 called for a constitutional
amendment abolishing slavery, and in the winter of 1864 to 1865 such
388
an amendment was passed by Congress with Lincoln’s help.
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.

PALUDAN, supra note 238, at 273.
Id.
Id. at 286.
Id.
See id. at 302.
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Lincoln noted in his annual message to Congress on December 6,
1864 that “[t]he Executive power itself would be greatly diminished
389
A few months later, Lincoln
by the cessation of actual war.”
became the first president in American history to be assassinated
when a Southern traitor fired a fatal shot, shouting “Sic Semper
390
Tyrannis”—thus always to tyrants. Lincoln’s successor, Andrew
Johnson, abandoned Lincoln’s commitment to equal rights for all
citizens, which in turn set the stage for the epic battle between the
391
President and Congress over the Tenure of Office Act.
Lincoln wielded more raw, unilateral power than any president in
American history before or since. He wielded that power specifically
to uphold his oath to defend the Constitution and to see to it that the
laws would be faithfully executed in all of the states. He remained
silent on a few occasions when Congress transgressed the rights
accorded to him as the unitary executive, but he always kept his eye
on what was important, which was winning what should justly be
called the War of the Rebellion. No president ever did more to take
care that the laws be faithfully executed than Lincoln, and that makes
him a hero of this history of the unitary executive, his occasional
lapses notwithstanding.
B. Andrew Johnson
Abraham Lincoln was succeeded by one of our worst presidents,
Andrew Johnson of Tennessee. Johnson was one of only two
presidents to be impeached, and, as we indicate below, his attempts to
sabotage congressional Reconstruction might well have represented a
sufficient failure to execute the law to justify it. However, Johnson’s
actual impeachment was based on his violation of the unconstitutional
Tenure of Office Act, which illegally sought to limit the president’s
removal power. Johnson’s acquittal (by one vote) on this charge was
due to his strong defense of the unitary executive and to several
senators who agreed with Johnson’s defense. Importantly, Johnson
promised key senators that, if acquitted, he would stop sabotaging
Reconstruction during the balance of his term and that he would
henceforth faithfully execute all of the laws, even those with which he
disagreed.

389. Id. at 306.
390. DONALD, supra note 261, at 597. Sic semper tyrannis was the motto of the
Commonwealth of Virginia.
391. PALUDAN, supra note 238, at 318.
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Johnson began his political career as a Jacksonian Democrat, and
he served as a Democrat in the House of Representatives, as governor
392
of Tennessee, and as a U.S. Senator. As Hans Trefousse writes,
“Andrew Johnson held three strong prejudices: a bias favoring
yeoman farmers over the planter elite, the certainty that blacks were
inferior to whites ‘in point of intellect,’ and a reverence for the
393
Constitution, which he believed should be strictly interpreted.”
394
Johnson regarded Jackson as a prophet of the Constitution, and he
adhered to Jackson’s views of the Nullification Crisis when Johnson
staunchly opposed secession in 1860, something he equated with
395
treason. A supporter of Southern Democrat John C. Breckinridge in
1860, Johnson was the only senator from a rebel state to remain in
396
Congress. After Grant drove the Confederates out of Tennessee in
1862, Johnson became military governor of Tennessee at Lincoln’s
397
request.
Johnson was added to the Republican ticket in 1864, when the
Republican Party temporarily renamed itself the Union Party in order
to attract support from Northern Democrats and border state
398
Unionists. After Lincoln was assassinated, Johnson tried to assume
Jackson’s presidential swagger, though “‘common sense’ dictated
399
[that he should proceed] with caution and restraint.” As Albert
Castel writes, “Andrew Jackson was [Johnson’s] hero and model,”
and it did not help that Johnson “inherited from Lincoln what, in
400
some respects, was an almost dictatorial presidency.” Johnson did
not understand that as an accidental president, he could not
immediately step into Jackson’s and Lincoln’s shoes.
When Johnson rose to the presidency, he faced a nearly impossible
401
task. Lincoln had quarreled with Congress over Reconstruction, and
Johnson lacked Lincoln’s finely-honed political skills. Even
Johnson’s friends described him as proud and overly serious, and
Johnson’s stubbornness and disinclination to compromise served him

392. ALBERT CASTEL, THE PRESIDENCY OF ANDREW JOHNSON 3-4 (1979).
393. Hans L. Trefousse, Andrew Johnson, in TO THE BEST OF MY ABILITY, supra note
329, at 126.
394. CASTEL, supra note 392, at 4.
395. Id. at 7.
396. Id. at 7-8.
397. Id. at 9.
398. Id.
399. Id. at 227.
400. Id.
401. See supra notes 358-365 and accompanying text.
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poorly. Johnson’s reliance on constitutional defenses rather than
political solutions also distinguished him from Lincoln.
The first signs of trouble appeared in May 1865 when Johnson
began to turn his attention to the contentious issue of Reconstruction
policy. Congress was in recess until December 1865, leaving Johnson
a window of seven months during which he could act unilaterally, if
he so chose. Following Lincoln’s example, Johnson believed that his
war power as commander in chief allowed him to set the terms of
Reconstruction, particularly because, in Johnson’s view, the Union
was indestructible and therefore the Southern states’ secession was
403
presumptively invalid. Johnson argued that, because they had not
validly seceded, the Southern states were entitled to representation in
404
Congress as soon as order could be restored and elections held.
Johnson believed his obligation to ensure faithful execution of the law
required that he shepherd the Southern states back into the Union as
quickly as possible. Johnson’s honeymoon with Congress was
405
extremely short lived,
and his presidentially-dictated
Reconstruction has been called “the most spectacular exhibition of
406
unilateral national executive authority in American history.”
Johnson opened his campaign by issuing a broad pardon to most
Southerners on May 29, 1865. He appointed a governor of North
Carolina to call a convention in that state to amend the state’s
407
constitution in preparation for its restoration to the Union. Similar

402. Fellow Tennessean and Jacksonian James K. Polk described Johnson as “very
vindictive and perverse in his temper,” while Jefferson Davis noted his “intense, almost
morbidly sensitive pride.” REHNQUIST, supra note 309, at 200 (citing 6 ABRAHAM
LINCOLN, COMPLETE WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 234 (John G. Nicolay & John Hay
eds., Lincoln Memorial University 1894)). Professor Corwin describes Johnson in the
following words:
An obstinate, ill-educated man, he took his constitutional beliefs with fearful
seriousness, and points that his predecessor would have yielded with little
compunction for a workable plan, he defended as though they had been
transmitted from Sinai. Few Presidents have surpassed Johnson in the
exorbitance of his pretensions for the office, none in his inability to make them
good.
CORWIN, supra note 293, at 25; see also HANS L. TREFOUSSE, IMPEACHMENT OF A
PRESIDENT 67 (1975) (describing Johnson as stubborn, dogmatic, and easily angered by
the suggestion of compromise).
403. See Trefousse, supra note 393, at 128.
404. Id.
405. At first, Johnson offered conciliatory gestures toward the Radical Republicans,
announcing that he would continue Lincoln’s policies and that he would retain Lincoln’s
cabinet members, including the darling of the Radical Republicans, Secretary of War
Edwin M. Stanton. REHNQUIST, supra note 309, at 200.
406. HYMAN & WIECEK, supra note 293, at 304.
407. CASTEL, supra note 392, at 26; see also RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE
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Most
proclamations for the other seceded states followed.
Northerners, accustomed to Lincoln’s unilateralism, including with
respect to Reconstruction, supported Johnson initially, and only a few
409
Radical Republicans called for a special session of Congress.
Johnson did all of this in part because he “possessed a Jacksonian
concept of the president as the tribune of all the people, whereas each
410
congressman represented merely a fragment of the people.”
Johnson’s proclamations resulted in the Southern states electing
extremely conservative legislative bodies:
[S]ome even refused to repeal their secession ordinances, much
less abolish slavery or repudiate the Confederate debt, as Johnson
had requested. Instead, [Southern state governments] passed black
codes virtually remanding the freed people to a position not far
removed from slavery and elected leading former Confederates—
including Alexander 411
H. Stephens, Jefferson Davis’s vice
president—to Congress.

Johnson responded by urging the Southern states to ratify the
412
Thirteenth Amendment,
which abolished slavery, and by
suggesting suffrage for a handful of the freedmen who owned
property and could read. He then granted hundreds of additional
413
pardons to former Confederate leaders on generous terms.
Why did Johnson, who had denounced secession as treason, do all
of this? First, he mistakenly thought it his constitutional duty to
reunite the South with the Union as quickly as possible. Second, he
wanted to transfer power in the South from the planter aristocracy,
which he justifiably hated, to a democracy of “plebians and
414
mechanics.”
He was afraid the freed African-Americans would
remain “bound economically to the big planters, who therefore would
415
be able to control them politically.” Third, Johnson was, even by
the standards of his day, a racist. Johnson once told Governor Fletcher
of Missouri that “[t]his country is for white men . . . and by God, as
416
long as I am President, it shall be governed by white men.” And
CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 254 (1973); HYMAN & WIECEK, supra note 293, at 303-04;
REHNQUIST, supra note 309, at 202-03.
408. CASTEL, supra note 392, at 44.
409. Id. at 31.
410. Id. at 30.
411. Trefousse, supra note 393, at 128.
412. CASTEL, supra note 392, at 44.
413. Id. at 49.
414. Id. at 28-29.
415. Id.
416. JEAN EDWARD SMITH, GRANT 422 (2001).
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fourth, Johnson wanted to be elected president in his own right in
417
1868, and he wanted Southern support in that effort.
Johnson was sincere in his view of his constitutional obligations,
but he was also simply wrong. He overlooked a number of points that
Lincoln might eventually have taken into account had he lived. First,
Johnson’s war power as commander in chief had ended with the
cessation of hostilities in April 1865; therefore Johnson never should
have attempted to formulate a presidential Reconstruction plan
without congressional input. Johnson’s first action should have been
to call Congress into a special session, but instead, he effectively
usurped congressional authority for seven months by planning his
own Reconstruction. Second, Johnson overlooked the fact that
although secession had been ineffectual, the Southern states lacked
Republican forms of government, leaving them unprepared for
readmission into the Union, a conclusion eventually confirmed by the
418
Supreme Court in Texas v. White.
Johnson was thus seriously
usurping congressional prerogatives when he attempted to launch
presidential Reconstruction between May and December of 1865.
Congress reconvened in December 1865 and refused to seat the
delegations from the Southern states. Congress also immediately set
up a joint committee on Reconstruction. Both actions were driven by
Northern concern over the violent mistreatment of freed AfricanAmericans in the South; revulsion at the Black Codes, which seemed
to resurrect slavery under a new name; and anger at the lack of
Southern remorse implicit in the election of officials like Alexander
Stephens to Congress. Most Northerners and Republicans had been
willing to grant Johnson and the South the benefit of the doubt, but
the adoption of the Black Codes in particular caused them to conclude
that a change in course was necessary. Republicans were also
concerned at the diminution in their hefty congressional majorities
419
that immediate Southern restoration would bring.
In February 1866, the first clash between Johnson and Congress
occurred over the Freedmen’s Bureau Bill, a moderate Republican
420
measure originated by Senator Lyman Trumbell of Illinois. The Bill
was designed to benefit the freed African-Americans in the South by
extending the life of the Freedmen’s Bureau, which had been slated to

417.
418.
419.
420.

Id. at 28-29.
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1868).
CASTEL, supra note 392, at 58.
Id. at 67-70.
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expire, increasing the number of its agents, setting aside land for loyal
African-Americans and whites, and empowering the Bureau to protect
the rights of African-Americans through military tribunals. Johnson
vetoed the Bill because he had constitutional objections to its
extension of military power in peacetime and its invasion of areas
421
reserved to civilian authorities and the courts.
In a speech on
February 22, 1866, Johnson celebrated his veto by denouncing
Representative Thaddeus Stevens and Senator Charles Sumner as
422
being as traitorous as Jefferson Davis. Northerners were outraged at
Johnson’s suggestion, and many people concluded “that [Johnson]
423
had been drunk again.”
February turned to March, and Congress, still trying to exercise its
powers under the Guarantee Clause and to enforce the newly-ratified
424
Thirteenth Amendment, passed the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
425
Again, Johnson vetoed the Bill on constitutional grounds. This
severed the final links between the moderate Republicans in Congress
and the President, and for the first time in American history, Congress
426
overrode a presidential veto. The vetoes of the moderate-backed
Freedmen’s Bureau and the Civil Rights Acts had led to a situation
such that by the middle of 1866, in the words of historian Hans
Trefousse, it was “evident to all” that “the President had finally
427
declared war on Congress.” The House of Representatives initiated
impeachment proceedings against Johnson, but the proceedings were
428
not successful. While Johnson ought to have recognized that his
understanding of Congress’s constitutional powers was seriously
flawed, he failed to reach that conclusion.
421. Andrew Johnson, Veto Message (Feb. 19, 1866), in 5 MESSAGES & PAPERS, supra
note 57, at 3596, 3597, 3598; CASTEL, supra note 392, at 67. The fact that Johnson made
his final version of his Freedmen’s Bureau Veto Message much harsher than Seward’s
initial draft attests to the extent of Johnson’s willingness to defy Congress. See
REHNQUIST, supra note 309, at 205; TREFOUSSE, supra note 402, at 14-15.
422. CASTEL, supra note 392, at 69.
423. Id. at 70.
424. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27.
425. Andrew Johnson, Veto Message (Mar. 27, 1866), in 5 MESSAGES & PAPERS,
supra note 57, at 3603.
426. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27; see also CASTEL, supra note 392, at
71.
427. TREFOUSSE, supra note 402, at 27; see also id. at 14-15; BERGER, supra note 407,
at 256; CASTEL, supra note 392, at 71; REHNQUIST, supra note 309, at 204-05.
428. HYMAN & WIECEK, supra note 293, at 448-50; JOHN R. LABOVITZ, PRESIDENTIAL
IMPEACHMENT 49 (1978); MARTIN E. MANTELL, JOHNSON, GRANT, AND THE POLITICS OF
RECONSTRUCTION 71-87 (1973); REHNQUIST, supra note 309, at 208-15; KENNETH M.
STAMPP, THE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION, 1865-1877, at 148-49 (1965); TREFOUSSE, supra
note 402, at 40, 48, 54-112.
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Jean Edward Smith, a biographer of Ulysses S. Grant, reports that
by the summer of 1866, Johnson was asking his new attorney general,
Henry Stanbery, for an opinion as to the legitimacy of the 39th
429
Congress. Smith writes:
Rumors swirled that the president contemplated recognizing a new
Congress made up of Southern representatives and cooperative
Northern Democrats. In fact, [Johnson] posed such a possibility to
Grant to gauge his reaction. The general in chief did not mince
words. “The army430will support the Congress as it now is and
disperse the other.”

By mid-October, Smith claims that Grant was afraid of a
presidential coup before the fall elections and resolved not to leave
431
Washington to attend an aide’s wedding in Illinois. Nor was Grant
the only Lincoln appointee who remained vigilant for fear of what
Johnson might attempt. Secretary of War Stanton also stayed in office
to control Johnson’s cabinet and thereby prevent the President from
doing any more mischief. In the summer of 1866, Congress was
already so distrustful of Johnson that it reduced the size of the
Supreme Court from ten to seven to ensure that Johnson would be
432
unable to make any appointments to that august body.
Johnson spent the balance of 1866 wielding the removal power
vigorously to reward his few friends and to punish his foes, backed by
additional attorney general opinions supporting his constitutional
433
right to do so. “During the last six months of 1866 Johnson . . .
replaced almost seventeen hundred postmasters, three-quarters for
political reasons. Postmasterships were the heart of the nation’s
434
patronage system and the Republicans responded with alarm.”
Johnson made such liberal use of his constitutional removal powers in
an attempt to organize a new political party around himself and his
435
conservative Reconstruction policies.
Patronage loomed as a

429. SMITH, supra note 416, at 427-28.
430. Id.
431. Id. at 428.
432. Id. at 506.
433. See 12 Op. Att’y Gen. 421 (1868); 12 Op. Att’y Gen. 32 (1866). The opinions of
Johnson’s attorneys general also asserted the president’s constitutional right to review the
decision of the department heads. In the process, they accepted Attorney General Bates’s
position that the president cannot directly review the actions of subordinate executive
officials. See 12 Op. Att’y Gen. 32, 43 (1866).
434. SMITH, supra note 416, at 432; see also CASTEL, supra note 392, at 88.
435. MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, THE IMPEACHMENT AND TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON
47-49 (1973); see also HYMAN & WIECEK, supra note 293, at 314. But see ERIC. L.
MCKITRICK, ANDREW JOHNSON AND RECONSTRUCTION 377-94 (1960) (contending that
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particularly powerful weapon in the South, where virtually every
436
Thomas Nast depicted Johnson in one
federal job lay vacant.
cartoon as “King Andrew, sitting on a throne watching the beheading
437
of a group of well-known Radicals.”
Members of Congress took several steps to control Johnson’s use
of his removal powers. In a few cases, they attempted to pressure
Johnson into removing certain officers whom they found
438
objectionable.
In 1867, at the request of Secretary of War
439
Stanton, Congress attached a rider to the Army Appropriations Act
purporting to limit Johnson’s control over the military. In blatant
violation of the president’s removal power and his authority as
commander in chief, the rider provided that “[t]he General of the
Army shall not be removed, suspended, or relieved from command, or
assigned to duty elsewhere than at said headquarters without the
440
previous approval of the Senate.”
Johnson complained bitterly
Johnson failed to take full advantage of his patronage powers); HOWARD K. BEALE, THE
CRITICAL YEAR 117-23 (1930) (same).
436. Johnson’s aggressive use of patronage in the South had a devastating twofold
effect. First, it provided Southern whites with the foundation upon which they could
rebuild their economic and political power. See BENEDICT, supra note 435, at 49. Second,
it deprived Southern Republicans of the support they needed to drive their organizing
efforts. See HYMAN & WIECEK, supra note 293, at 314. The combination of these two
effects revitalized the Democratic party in the South while simultaneously causing the
nascent Republican movement to die aborning.
437. CASTEL, supra note 392, at 94.
438. For example, the House voted sixty-eight to thirty-seven in favor of Representative
Hulburd’s resolution providing “[t]hat it is the sense of this House that Henry A. Smythe
should be immediately removed from the office of collector of the port of New York.”
CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 1st Sess. 395 (1867). The House had initially amended
Hulburd’s resolution to provide for an impeachment investigation instead of calling upon
the President to remove Smythe. Id. at 290. However, because the Committee concluded
that “Congress having determined to adjourn, there is not sufficient time prior thereto for
the Committee on Public Expenditures to conclude its investigation,” the House passed
Hulburd’s resolution in its original form. Id. at 395; see also 2 HAYNES, supra note 75, at
815 n.5.
439. See BERGER, supra note 407, at 260; DEWITT, supra note 370, at 202; REHNQUIST,
supra note 309, at 210.
440. Army Appropriations Act, ch. 170, § 2, 14 Stat. 485, 487 (1867). The rider further
limited Johnson’s authority by requiring that “the head-quarters of the General of the army
of the United States shall be at the city of Washington,” and that “all orders and
instructions relating to military operations issued by the President or Secretary of War
shall be issued through the General of the army, and in case of his inability by the next in
rank.” Also, “any orders or instructions relating to military operations issued contrary to
the requirements of this section shall be null and void.” Congress backed up the rider’s
prohibitions with stiff penalties, deeming “any officer who shall issue orders or
instructions contrary to the provisions of this section shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor in office,” and subjecting any officers who knowingly “transmit, convey, or
obey” such orders to imprisonment for a period of two to twenty years. § 2, 14 Stat. at
486-87; see also CASTEL, supra note 392, at 113; HYMAN & WIECEK, supra note 293, at
451; REHNQUIST, supra note 309, at 210; STAMPP, supra note 428, at 147; TREFOUSSE,
supra note 402, at 45. For the congressional debates on the Army Appropriations Rider,
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about the Army Appropriations rider, protesting justifiably that its
provisions “in certain cases virtually [deprived] the President of his
constitutional functions as Commander in Chief of the Army,” and
441
thus “were out of place in an appropriation act.” However, given
the necessity of military appropriations during Reconstruction,
Johnson felt “constrained to return the bill with [his] signature, but to
accompany it with [his] protest against the sections which [he had]
442
indicated.”
Johnson was right that this provision was unconstitutional, but the
problem the legislation tried to remedy had been triggered by
Johnson’s refusal to recognize Congress’s power with respect to
Reconstruction, and its powers under Section 2 of the Thirteenth
Amendment to eliminate badges of slavery. Once Johnson and
Congress were reduced to fighting over keeping Grant in charge of
the army, the situation was beyond repair. At this point, impeachment
443
was likely inevitable.
By the winter of 1867, Congress was concerned that every
Southern state had rejected the Fourteenth Amendment. Thinking a
fresh start on Reconstruction necessary, Congress passed the First
444
Reconstruction Act, a sweeping measure that employed Congress’s
valid Guarantee Clause powers to reconstruct the South. This bill also
made adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment by Southern states a
requirement for their representation in Congress and for their freedom
445
from continued military occupation. Johnson vetoed the bill, but it
was passed over his veto. Believing the Military Reconstruction Act
see CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 1351-52 (1867); id. at 1404 (rejecting House
amendment to delete the rider by a vote of 41 to 88); id. at 1855 (rejecting Senate
amendment to delete the rider by a vote of 8 to 28); id. at 1404 (House voting to pass the
bill by a vote of 90 to 32); id. at 1855 (Senate voting to pass the bill). A bill to limit the
president’s authority to appoint and remove district commanders passed the House on
January 21, 1868, but was not acted upon by the Senate. MANTELL, supra note 428, at 78.
441. Andrew Johnson, Message to the House of Representatives (Mar. 2, 1867), in 5
MESSAGES & PAPERS, supra note 57, at 3670.
442. Id. Johnson reiterated these complaints in his fourth annual message, in which he
contended that the provisions of the Army Appropriations Act “which interfere with the
President’s constitutional functions as Commander in Chief of the Army should be at once
annulled.” Andrew Johnson, Fourth Annual Message (Dec. 9, 1868), in 5 MESSAGES &
PAPERS, supra note 57, at 3872; see also DEWITT, supra note 370, at 202; REHNQUIST,
supra note 309, at 210.
443. During this period, the Fortieth Congress convened immediately following the end
of the Thirty-ninth Congress for fear of what Johnson would do to wreck Reconstruction if
they left town. CASTEL, supra note 392, at 114.
444. Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428.
445. § 5, 14 Stat. at 429; id. at 107. For discussion of the legal issues surrounding
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, see BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:
FOUNDATIONS/TRANSFORMATIONS (1998).
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unconstitutional, Johnson proceeded to try to undermine both the
446
legislation and Reconstruction itself. This only led Congress to pass
two more Military Reconstruction Acts to deal with Johnson’s efforts
447
at sabotage.
The stage was thus set for one of the great confrontations between
the president and Congress in American history. It is arguable that
Congress should have impeached and removed Johnson from office
for failing to recognize congressional power to proceed with
Reconstruction under the Guarantee Clause and failing to ensure that
the laws dealing with Reconstruction were faithfully executed.
Though the standard for impeachment and removal of a president
must be set very high, by November 1866, Johnson was already in a
virtual war with Congress and could not be reined in by ordinary
means. The problem was that rather than remove Johnson for
unconstitutionally impeding Reconstruction and threatening
congressional authority, Congress responded by passing
unconstitutional legislation that would tie Johnson’s hands with
respect to the removal power. As we shall see, this error in focus
would ultimately prove Congress’s undoing.
C. The Tenure of Office Act and the
Impeachment of Andrew Johnson
The most sweeping limitation placed on President Johnson’s
448
removal power was the Tenure of Office Act. Passed during the
winter of 1867 along with the First Military Reconstruction Act, the
Tenure of Office Act specifically provided that all civil officers
appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate would hold office
449
until their successors were confirmed by the Senate. If the Senate
was in recess, the president was permitted to suspend an executive
officer so long as he reported the reasons for the suspension to the
Senate within twenty days of its return to session. If the Senate failed

446. Though there were some valid constitutional criticisms of the Military
Reconstruction Act, Johnson, as usual, ventured way beyond them, denouncing the whole
Act as unconstitutional, which, in our opinion, it was not. Concern over the
constitutionality of aspects of the Act led congressional Republicans to take extreme
measures to prevent it from being tested in the courts. See, e.g., Ex parte McCardle, 74
U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868).
447. Act of March 23, 1867 (Second Reconstruction Act), ch. 6, 15 Stat. 2; Act of July
19, 1867 (Third Reconstruction Act), ch. 30, 15 Stat. 14.
448. See Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 154, 14 Stat. 430 (1867); see also TREFOUSSE, supra
note 402, at 43-45; REHNQUIST, supra note 309, at 210; STAMPP, supra note 428, at 147.
449. § 1, 14 Stat. at 430.
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to concur in the suspension, the officer would be restored to his
450
position. With an eye towards impeachment, the statute specifically
451
designated violations of the Act as “high misdemeanor[s].”
While the House and the Senate agreed that the Act should apply to
inferior executive officers, the two chambers split sharply over the
applicability of the Act to the heads of the departments. The Senate
believed that the president should have a cabinet of his own choosing,
and it specifically included a provision excluding cabinet members
from coverage under the Act and twice rejected amendments to delete
452
this exception. Senators in favor of the exception emphasized that
the department heads were the president’s confidential advisers and
453
thus should be in harmony with the president’s basic policies.
Representative Thomas Williams, the primary sponsor of the Tenure
of Office Act in the House, disagreed, arguing that including the
heads of departments within the scope of the Act was “essential to the
symmetry of the bill,” since the policies which underlay the bill in the
first place applied with even greater force to the heads of
454
departments. The majority of the House acceded to Representative
Williams’s position and struck the Senate’s exception for cabinet
455
members.
450. § 2, 14 Stat. at 430. Congress also tried to stem the abuse of recess appointments
by providing that if the Senate did not confirm a recess appointment by the end of the
following session, that office “shall remain in abeyance, without any salary, fees, or
emoluments” until properly filled with the advice and consent of the Senate. § 3, 14 Stat.
at 431.
451. § 9, 14 Stat. at 432; see also STAMPP, supra note 428, at 150.
452. The Senate bill, as originally reported by the Joint Committee on Retrenchment,
contained an exception for “the Secretaries of State, of the Treasury, of War, of the Navy,
and of the Interior, the Postmaster General, and the Attorney General.” CONG. GLOBE,
39th Cong., 2d Sess. 382 (1867). The Senate rejected an amendment by a vote of thirteen
to twenty-seven that would have eliminated the exception for Cabinet members. Id. at 548.
After the House of Representatives had returned the bill without this provision, the Senate
voted seventeen to twenty-eight to reject the House’s amendment and to insist on its
original version of the bill. Id. at 1047.
453. Id. at 382-84 (statements of Senators George F. Edmunds, Charles R. Buckalew,
George H. Williams, and William Pitt Fessenden); id. at 388 (statement of Sen. Reverdy
Johnson); id. at 1045-46 (statement of Sen. John Sherman).
454. Id. at 937. Williams offered similar arguments during the debate on an early House
version of the bill, warning that excluding the heads of departments “would destroy the
very essence of the bill.” Id. at 71 (debating H.R. 664, 39th Cong. (1866)).
455. The House passed the amendment deleting the Senate’s exception for Cabinet
members by a vote of 82 to 63. Id. at 969-70. Representative Williams’s victory did not
come easily, as he was defeated in his first three attempts to have this amendment
approved. Just two months earlier, the House had ignored Williams’s objections and voted
fifty-seven to forty-six to include an exception for Cabinet members in the House’s
version of this bill. Id. at 73. The next day, the House voted seventy-seven to eighty-one to
reject Williams’s subsequent amendment to delete this exception. Id. at 94. Lastly, just the
day before the House finally accepted Representative Williams’s amendment, it rejected it
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The conference committee on the Act attempted to resolve this
disagreement by drafting compromise language. This language
dropped the Senate’s exception for cabinet members, substituting a
proviso stating that cabinet members “shall hold their offices . . . for
and during the term of the President by whom they may have been
appointed, and for one month thereafter, subject to removal by and
456
with the advice and consent of the Senate.” Senator John Sherman,
head of the Senate conferees and the author of the compromise
language, specifically informed the Senate that “its language is so
framed as not to apply to the present President” and that “it would not
prevent the present President from removing the Secretary of War, the
457
Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of State.” On the basis of
this understanding, the Senate passed the conference report by a wide
margin, and after the House did the same, the bill was sent to
458
President Johnson for his consideration.
The cabinet, having been convened by Johnson to advise him on
the bill, unanimously believed that the bill was unconstitutional and
459
recommended that the President veto it. Johnson later noted that
Secretary of War Stanton’s “condemnation of the law was the most
elaborate and emphatic”; Stanton cited constitutional provisions,
congressional debates, Supreme Court decisions and consistent
historical practice for the proposition that the Constitution vests the
460
removal power in the president. The strength of Stanton’s opinion
and his mastery of the issues led the ever-crafty Johnson to ask him to
draft the veto message, but pleading physical infirmity, Stanton
demurred, and the message was actually drafted by Secretary of State
461
Seward with Stanton’s help.
by a vote of seventy-six to seventy-eight. Id. at 943. Only after a colleague successfully
moved to reconsider this initial rejection did Representative Williams finally see his
amendment actually pass. Id. at 969.
456. Id. at 1340 (House); id. at 1514 (Senate). The conference report was endorsed by
all the conferees except Senator Buckalew. See id. at 1514-15.
457. Id. at 1516.
458. The House voted 111 to 41 in favor of the conference report. Id. at 1340. The
Senate adopted the conference report by a vote of 22 to 10. Id. at 1518.
459. DEWITT, supra note 370, at 202; REHNQUIST, supra note 309, at 210. Johnson
mentioned the Cabinet’s unanimous belief in the Act’s unconstitutionality several times.
See Andrew Johnson, Message to the Senate (Dec. 12, 1867), in 5 MESSAGES & PAPERS,
supra note 57, at 3781, 3785 [hereinafter Johnson, Stanton Suspension]; Andrew Johnson,
Message to the Senate (Feb. 22, 1868), in 5 MESSAGES & PAPERS, supra note 57, supra
note 59, at 3820, 3823, 3825 [hereinafter Johnson, Senate Resolution Protest].
460. Johnson, Stanton Suspension, supra note 459, at 3785.
461. DEWITT, supra note 370, at 202-03; REHNQUIST, supra note 309, at 210. See
Andrew Johnson, Veto Message to the Senate (Mar. 2, 1867), in 5 MESSAGES & PAPERS,
supra note 57, at 3690 [hereinafter Tenure of Office Act Veto]. See also CASTEL, supra
note 392, at 113 (stating that “Seward and Stanton’s collaboration produced a veto
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The Veto Message relied heavily on the fact that since 1789, it had
been the unbroken practice of both Congress and the president to
construe the Constitution as conferring the removal power on the
president, much as this article has suggested. The Message stated:
“That the power of removal is constitutionally vested in the President
of the United States is a principle which has been not more distinctly
declared by judicial authority and judicial commentators than it has
been uniformly practiced upon by the legislative and executive
462
departments of the government.” Johnson noted that the Decision
of 1789 had settled the constitutional basis of the president’s power to
remove and that this resolution had thereafter been accepted by both
463
the Supreme Court and learned legal commentators. Thus “[a] trial
of nearly eighty years, through the vicissitudes of foreign conflicts
and of civil war” and a renewed challenge during the administration
of Andrew Jackson had proven the propriety of the Decision of
464
1789.
Johnson also defended his veto on structural grounds:
It can not be doubted that the triumphant success of the
Constitution is due to the wonderful wisdom with which the
functions of government were distributed between the three
principal departments—the legislative, the executive, and the
judicial—and to the fidelity with which each has confined
itself or
465
been confined . . . within its peculiar and proper sphere.

Since the preservation of such a system depended on
“maintain[ing] the integrity of each of the three great departments
while preserving harmony among them all,” it was “indispensable”
that the executive branch be “capable . . . of executing the laws and,
within the sphere of executive action, of preserving, protecting, and
466
defending the Constitution of the United States.” Johnson therefore
concluded:
Having at an early period accepted the Constitution in regard to the
Executive office in the sense in which it was interpreted with the
concurrence of its founders, I have found no sufficient grounds in
message filled with arguments and precedents that convinced most constitutional
observers then (and since) that the tenure bill was a rape of presidential powers”). Hans
Trefousse, however, has suggested that Stanton’s support for the veto was insincere and
that President Johnson, aware of this duplicity, only asked Stanton to write the veto
message to embarrass him. TREFOUSSE, supra note 402, at 79.
462. Johnson, Tenure of Office Act Veto, supra note 461, at 3691.
463. Id. at 3693-95.
464. Id. at 3693, 3695.
465. Id. at 3695.
466. Id. at 3695-96.
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the arguments now opposed to that construction or467in any assumed
necessity of the times for changing those opinions.

Notwithstanding these objections, Congress summarily overrode
468
Johnson’s veto, and the Tenure of Office Act became law.
The conflict between the legislative and executive branches over
the Tenure of Office Act reached full boil when Johnson removed
Stanton as Secretary of War. A holdover from the Lincoln
administration who had stayed on long after the other Republican
cabinet members had resigned in protest of Johnson’s policies,
Stanton had close ties to many of the Republicans in Congress and
469
often acted as their spy. Given the War Department’s central role in
Reconstruction, Johnson could not long tolerate Stanton’s Republican
470
and congressional sympathies. After a series of events underscored
471
Johnson
Stanton’s estrangement from the administration,
467. Id. at 3696. Johnson also criticized the Tenure of Office Act in his Third Annual
Message, in which he declared:
The President may be thoroughly convinced that an officer is incapable,
dishonest, or unfaithful to the Constitution, but under [the Tenure of Office Act]
the utmost he can do is to complain to the Senate and ask the privilege of
supplying his place with a better man . . . . I am entirely persuaded that under
such a rule the President cannot perform the great duty assigned to him of seeing
the laws faithfully executed.
Andrew Johnson, Third Annual Message (Dec. 3, 1867), in 5 MESSAGES & PAPERS, supra
note 57, at 3756, 3767-68. The effect of such a system would be “that official malfeasance
should become bold in proportion as the delinquents learn to think themselves safe,”
which would “almost destroy . . . official accountability” and “disable [the President] most
especially from enforcing that rigid accountability which is necessary to the due execution
of the . . . laws.” Id. at 3767-68. Moreover, the Senate was institutionally poorly suited to
judge removals, since unlike the President, who was “responsible to the whole people,” the
Senate is “a tribunal whose members are . . . responsible . . . to separate constituent
bodies.” Id. at 3768. Johnson concluded:
Therefore it was that the framers of the Constitution left the power of removal
unrestricted, while they gave the Senate a right to reject all appointments which
in its opinion were not fit to be made. A little reflection on this subject will
probably satisfy all who have the good of the country at heart that our best course
is to take the Constitution for our guide, walk in the path marked out by the
founders of the Republic, and obey the rules made sacred by the observance of
our great predecessors.
Id. at 3769.
468. The House voted 133 to 37 to override the president’s veto. CONG. GLOBE, 39th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1739 (1867). The Senate vote was 35 to 11. Id. at 1966. During March of
1867, while this controversy boiled, Secretary of State Seward found time to buy Alaska
from the Russians. CASTEL, supra note 392, at 120-21.
469. REHNQUIST, supra note 309, at 212; TREFOUSSE, supra note 402, at 36, 78.
470. BERGER, supra note 407, at 270-71; CORWIN, supra note 293, at 24.
471. Johnson specifically pointed to Stanton’s opposition to Johnson’s vetoes of the
D.C. suffrage bill and the Reconstruction Acts and his failure to inform Johnson about the
August 30, 1866 riots in New Orleans. Johnson, Stanton Suspension, supra note 459, at
3787-90; see also MANTELL, supra note 428, at 81; REHNQUIST, supra note 309, at 212;
TREFOUSSE, supra note 402, at 79. As further evidence of the falling out between Johnson
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suspended Stanton on August 12, 1867, and appointed Grant as
472
interim secretary. “It is a tribute to Grant’s diplomatic skill—a trait
with which he is seldom credited—that he was able to push
Reconstruction and at the same time maintain amicable relations with
473
the president.”
Stanton surrendered the office only grudgingly:
Under a sense of public duty I am compelled to deny your right
under the Constitution and laws of the United States, without the
advice and consent of the Senate and without any legal cause, to
suspend me from office as Secretary of War . . . . But inasmuch as
the General Commanding the armies of the United States has been
appointed ad interim, and has notified me that he has accepted the
appointment, I474
have no alternative but to submit, under protest, to
superior force.

Although there was considerable doubt whether the Tenure of
Office Act was constitutional and whether the Act even applied to
Stanton, the President nonetheless complied with its requirements,
submitting the reasons for Stanton’s suspension to the Senate
immediately after it resumed session in December, along with an
extended message renewing his attack on the Tenure of Office Act as
an unconstitutional infringement on the unitary power of the
475
executive. As Johnson maintained:
[T]he President is the responsible head of the Administration, and
and Stanton, historians have also pointed to Stanton’s differences with the President over
statehood for Nebraska and Colorado, TREFOUSSE, supra note 402, at 79, as well as his
failure to inform Johnson of Mary Suratt’s petition for clemency before she was executed
for conspiring in Lincoln’s assassination. Id. at 81; NOEL B. GERSON, THE TRIAL OF
ANDREW JOHNSON 84 (1977).
472. The suspension message was terse:
Sir: By virtue of the power and authority vested in me as President by the
Constitution and laws of the United States, you are hereby suspended from office
as Secretary of War, and will cease to exercise any and all functions pertaining to
the same. You will at once transfer to General Ulysses S. Grant, who has this day
been authorized and empowered to act as Secretary of War ad interim, all
records, books, and other property now in your custody and charge.
Letter from Andrew Johnson to Edwin M. Stanton (Aug. 12, 1867), reprinted in Johnson,
Stanton Suspension, supra note 459, at 3781. See generally BENEDICT, supra note 435, at
96-98; CASTEL, supra note 392, at 132-37; MANTELL, supra note 428, at 81; TREFOUSSE,
supra note 402, at 80-81.
473. SMITH, supra note 416, at 435.
474. Letter from Edwin M. Stanton to Andrew Johnson (Aug. 12, 1867), reprinted in
Johnson, Stanton Suspension, supra note 459, at 3782.
475. Johnson justified his suspension of Stanton on non-constitutional grounds as well,
noting that it was far from clear that the statute by its own terms even applied to the
current members of the cabinet. As Johnson observed, at that time “it seemed to be taken
for granted that as to those members of the cabinet who had been appointed by Mr.
Lincoln their tenure of office was not fixed by the provisions of the act.” Johnson, Stanton
Suspension, supra note 459, at 3785.
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when the opinions of a head of Department are irreconcilably
opposed to those of the President in grave matters of policy and
administration there is but one result which can 476solve the
difficulty, and that is a severance of the official relation.

Because “[i]t is the President upon whom the Constitution
devolves, as head of the executive department, the duty to see that the
laws are faithfully executed,” the president must be “allowed to select
his agents” and “ought to be left as free as possible in the matter of
477
selection and of dismissal.” Any other rule would “reverse the just
order of administration and . . . place the subordinate over the
478
superior.”
At the same time he suspended Stanton and temporarily replaced
him with Grant, Johnson also took a series of removal actions to
undercut congressional Reconstruction policies by replacing the most
479
radical of the military governors with more conservative generals.
This tactic proved to be very effective. “Stung by the reaction in the
South, Senate Republicans recognized that Johnson, by deft use of his
appointing authority, was on the verge of overturning
480
Reconstruction.” Despite his decisive actions, Johnson was put on
the defensive when Congress assembled in December, with much talk
of his being impeached and temporarily suspended from acting as
president. Jean Edward Smith reports that Johnson was determined to
find out where the army stood on this:
More precisely, where did the general in chief stand? To find out,
Johnson called on Grant at the War Department. By now, Grant
had come to detest Johnson, but his duty was clear. He told the
president he would resist any effort to depose or arrest him prior to
the conclusion of an impeachment trial. The constitutional process
would be protected. Grant then took it upon himself to inform

476. Id. at 3787.
477. Id. at 3790.
478. Id.; see also HYMAN & WIECEK, supra note 293, at 451, 453.
479. Johnson began on August 17, 1867 by recalling General Philip H. Sheridan, an
avowed Radical, from his post as military governor of Texas and Louisiana, replacing him
first with General George H. Thomas and later with Winfield S. Hancock, one of the most
conservative generals in the army. Two weeks later, he replaced General Daniel Sickles,
another well-known Radical, as military governor of the Carolinas. Johnson finally
finished his housecleaning in December, when he removed General John Pope as military
governor of Alabama, Georgia, and Florida, and General Edward O.C. Ord as military
governor of Mississippi and Arkansas. CASTEL, supra note 392, at 139-42; TREFOUSSE,
supra note 402, at 82, 116; HYMAN & WIECEK, supra note 293, at 452; MANTELL, supra
note 428, at 36, 75; STAMPP, supra note 428, at 148-49.
480. SMITH, supra note 416, at 445.
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481

congressional Republicans of his view.

At that point, the efforts by Thaddeus Stevens to suspend Johnson
were thwarted.
The Senate eventually responded sharply to Johnson’s actions,
declining to approve Stanton’s removal by a vote of thirty-five to six
on January 13, 1868, although many senators abstained because they
482
did not believe that the Tenure of Office Act applied to Stanton. To
Johnson’s dismay, Grant vacated the Department of War after the
Senate vote; Johnson had wanted him to stay there to precipitate a
483
judicial determination of the Act’s constitutionality. Johnson was
convinced that if he could just get the Tenure of Office Act dispute
484
into the courts, he would win.
Johnson and Grant quarreled
publicly, and Grant essentially called the President a liar who had set
485
out to defame Grant’s character. Stanton resumed his position in
the War Department despite physical and financial problems, because
he believed that his influence was needed to combat the President and
486
to protect democracy.
Despite this setback, Johnson remained determined to get rid of
Stanton. Ignoring his advisers’ warnings, Johnson removed Stanton
487
from office on February 21, 1868, appointing Adjutant General

481. Id. at 444.
482. S. EXEC. J., 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 129-30 (1868); see also MANTELL, supra note
428, at 83; REHNQUIST, supra note 309, at 215; TREFOUSSE, supra note 402, at 123;
BENEDICT, supra note 435, at 98-99 (noting the abstentions of Senators Sherman, Grimes,
Henderson, Ross, Sprague, and Van Winkle).
483. MANTELL, supra note 428, at 82-83; TREFOUSSE, supra note 402, at 125-26.
Historians have suggested that Grant wavered in his resolve to give Johnson the court
challenge he desired because of the potential fines and imprisonment he faced for violating
the Tenure of Office Act. Johnson’s contention that he suspended Stanton under his
constitutional powers rather than under the Tenure of Office Act was undercut by his
forwarding of his reasons for the suspension to the Senate in compliance with the Act. See
BENEDICT, supra note 435, at 97-98; HYMAN & WIECEK, supra note 293, at 453.
484. CASTEL, supra note 392, at 169.
485. SMITH, supra note 416, at 451.
486. Id. at 223.
487. The removal message was as terse as the previous suspension message:
On the 12th day of August, 1867, by virtue of the power and authority vested in
the President by the Constitution and laws of the United States, I suspended
Edwin M. Stanton from the office of Secretary War. In further exercise of the
power and authority so vested in the President, I have this day removed Mr.
Stanton from office and designated the Adjutant-General of the Army to act as
Secretary of War ad interim.
Andrew Johnson, Message to the Senate (Feb. 21, 1868), in 5 MESSAGES & PAPERS, supra
note 57, at 3819; see also STAMPP, supra note 428, at 150; TREFOUSSE, supra note 402, at
133 (noting that Attorney General Stanbery, among others, strongly urged against
Stanton’s removal and that Johnson did not consult with his cabinet before acting).
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488

Lorenzo Thomas as interim secretary. This time the high-spirited
Stanton refused to recognize the President’s action, swearing out a
complaint for Thomas’s arrest and barricading himself inside the War
489
Department. The stakes for the Radical Republicans were high, for
if Johnson were able to name an anti-Reconstruction Secretary of
War, “[i]t would mean the loss of their power in the South and
490
eventually in the nation.”
Congressional Republicans used the president’s defiance to rally
their supporters. Senator Charles Sumner sent a one-word telegram to
Stanton, advising him, “Stick,” while other senators went to the War
491
Department to encourage Stanton to defy the order. “At Stanton’s
urgent request Grant stationed extra troops at the War Department; in
addition, Senator Chandler and Representative John A. Logan posted
492
over one hundred volunteers in the basement of that building.”
Meanwhile, the Senate voted twenty-eight to six in favor of a
resolution declaring “[t]hat under the Constitution and laws of the
United States the President has no power to remove the Secretary of
War and designate any other officer to perform the duties of that
493
office ad interim.” Johnson responded the following day with a

488. Thomas was hardly Johnson’s first choice. Johnson appointed Thomas only after
General William T. Sherman rebuffed Johnson’s attempt to prepare him for the position by
establishing a new Army of the Atlantic, headquartered in Washington, D.C. and under
Sherman’s command, and by nominating him for a promotion to General of the Army.
Sherman’s reluctance at becoming embroiled in politics led him to ask his brother, Senator
John Sherman, to oppose his nomination. Disappointed, Johnson relented. BENEDICT,
supra note 435, at 99-100; HYMAN & WIECEK, supra note 293, at 455; MANTELL, supra
note 428, at 85; TREFOUSSE, supra note 402, at 128. Johnson also approached John Potts,
chief clerk of the War Department, as a possible interim Secretary, but Potts refused.
TREFOUSSE, supra note 402, at 132.
489. DEWITT, supra note 370, at 350-52, 356; STAMPP, supra note 428, at 150;
TREFOUSSE, supra note 402, at 133, 135-36. Thomas ended up being a poor choice as
interim Secretary of War. Described as “old, garrulous, and vainglorious” and having “no
influence with the army,” Thomas celebrated his elevation by attending a masked ball, at
which he offered an inebriated boast that he would oust Stanton by force if necessary. A
comical situation developed when Thomas, after being arrested and making bail,
confronted Stanton at the War Department. The two exchanged requests for the other to
leave, after which a hungover Thomas complained that he had had nothing to eat or drink
all morning. After drinking shots of whiskey together, Thomas admonished Stanton, “The
next time you have me arrested, please do not do it before I get something to eat.” Thomas
then retreated, leaving Stanton in possession of the War Department. DEWITT, supra note
370, at 354-56; TREFOUSSE, supra note 402, at 136.
490. CASTEL, supra note 392, at 156.
491. BENEDICT, supra note 435, at 101-02; DEWITT, supra note 370, at 347;
TREFOUSSE, supra note 402, at 134.
492. CASTEL, supra note 392, at 176; see also SMITH, supra note 416, at 453.
493. The resolution is reprinted in Johnson, Senate Resolution Protest, supra note 459,
at 3820, and 1 TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, BEFORE
THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES ON IMPEACHMENT BY THE HOUSE OF
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protest against the Senate’s resolution, complaining that the Decision
of 1789 had determined that Congress had no right to interfere with
the president’s constitutional power of removal. He said:
The uniform practice from the beginning of the Government, as
established by every President who has exercised the office, and
the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States have
settled the question in favor of the power of the President to
remove all officers excepting a class holding appointments of a
judicial character. No practice nor any decision has ever excepted a
Secretary of War from494this general power of the President to make
removals from office.

The Senate was disinclined to listen to such arguments, however, and
Johnson’s words fell on deaf ears.
In the House, Thaddeus Stevens rallied the president’s opposition
495
with the cry, “If you don’t kill the beast, it will kill you.” The
House immediately commenced impeachment proceedings against
Johnson, adopting on February 24, in a strict party vote of 126 to 47,
a resolution stating “[t]hat Andrew Johnson, President of the United
496
States, be impeached of high crimes and misdemeanors in office.”
The House subsequently adopted eleven somewhat impenetrable
articles of impeachment on March 2 and March 3, 1868, although the
fact that Congress chose first to impeach and later to decide the
grounds for impeachment boded ill for how well those charges would
497
stand up to legal scrutiny. Although the President was also accused
of “bringing Congress into disrepute and failing to carry out the
498
Reconstruction Acts,” the primary charges focused on Johnson’s
499
alleged violation of the Tenure of Office Act by removing Stanton.
The House appointed Stevens, John A. Bingham, George S. Boutwell,
Benjamin F. Butler, John A. Logan, Thomas Williams of

REPRESENTATIVES FOR HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 156-57 (1868); see also
BENEDICT, supra note 435, at 102-03; LABOVITZ, supra note 428, at 57; REHNQUIST,
supra note 309, at 145, 216; TREFOUSSE, supra note 402, at 135. Many Republicans
abstained from this vote perhaps in an attempt to discourage impeachment proceedings.
BENEDICT, supra note 435, at 103.
494. Johnson, Senate Resolution Protest, supra note 459, at 3820.
495. TREFOUSSE, supra note 402, at 135.
496. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 1400 (1868); see also HYMAN & WIECEK,
supra note 293, at 456; MANTELL, supra note 428, at 87; REHNQUIST, supra note 309, at
217; TREFOUSSE, supra note 402, at 137.
497. See STAMPP, supra note 428, at 150.
498. TREFOUSSE, supra note 402, at 130.
499. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 1612-18, 1642 (1868); see also HYMAN &
WIECEK, supra note 293, at 456; LABOVITZ, supra note 428, at 58-62; REHNQUIST, supra
note 309, at 218; STAMPP, supra note 428, at 150; TREFOUSSE, supra note 402, at 138-39.
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500

Pennsylvania, and James F. Wilson as managers. The President, for
his part, selected a distinguished array of counsel for his defense,
including Attorney General Henry Stanbery, who resigned in order to
represent the Johnson; former Supreme Court Justice and Dred Scott
dissenter Benjamin R. Curtis; future Attorney General and Secretary
of State William M. Evarts; and war Democrats Thomas A.R. Nelson
501
and William S. Groesbeck. The trial was on. General in Chief
Grant, who had done so much to uphold congressional Reconstruction
when Johnson was trying to kill it, came out in favor of impeachment
502
and removal.
After a drawn out trial in which grand and petty politics played as
503
important a role as legal principles, Johnson was acquitted by a
504
single vote. The following day, Stanton resigned as Secretary of
500. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 1618-19 (1868). Bingham was selected as
chairman, but not without intrigue. Initially, Stevens was tapped to chair the committee
with Butler replacing him when Stevens’s illness prevented him from so acting. Bingham
was incensed, shouting “I’ll be damned if I serve under Butler.” When the committee
turned to Boutwell as chair, Bingham again threatened to quit the committee and finally
succeeded in being named chairman. BENEDICT, supra note 435, at 113-14.
501. See 1 TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON, supra note 493, at 18-19 (1868). Groesbeck
joined the president’s defense team only after former Attorney General Jeremiah S. Black
withdrew. See HYMAN & WIECEK, supra note 293, at 457; MANTELL, supra note 428, at
89; REHNQUIST, supra note 309, at 222, 225; TREFOUSSE, supra note 402, at 150.
502. Smith notes:
Grant supported conviction because (among other things) he thought Johnson
created too much turbulence in his wake. Writing to his old friend Charles Ford,
the general allowed as how he thought the president’s removal would “give
peace to the country.” . . . But it was Senator John B. Henderson of Missouri to
whom Grant may have confided his deepest reason. Riding alongside Henderson
on a streetcar shortly before the vote, Grant said, “I would impeach him because
he is such an infernal liar.”
SMITH, supra note 416, at 454; see also CASTEL, supra note 392, at 191 (describing how
Grant urged Senators Trumbull, Fessenden, Henderson, and Frederick T. Frelinghuysen of
New Jersey—all swing Senators—to vote guilty).
503. The range of conflicts of interest involved in Johnson’s impeachment trial was
staggering. One of the triers of Johnson’s impeachment, Senator Patterson of Tennessee,
was in fact Johnson’s son-in-law, while Senator Peleg Sprague was the son-in-law of
Chief Justice (and presidential hopeful) Chase, who presided over the impeachment trial.
Moreover, the fact that Johnson’s impeachment would have elevated Senate President pro
tempore Ben Wade made a number of Senators hesitant to convict Johnson, some
objecting to Wade’s policies and others objecting out of personal enmity. The rivalry
between Wade and Chase also may have had an impact on the trial, as Chase would have
gone to great lengths to avoid doing anything which would inure to the benefit of Wade.
House Manager Benjamin Butler had long resented Grant’s having removed him from his
generalship and reportedly attempted to manipulate the trial’s timing in order to frustrate
Grant’s candidacy for president. And finally, Managers Boutwell and Bingham feuded
throughout the trial, inhibiting the prosecution from the beginning. See generally
BENEDICT, supra note 435, at 126-43 (describing the political atmosphere of the
impeachment trial); TREFOUSSE, supra note 402, at 175-79 (noting the discomfort with
Wade and its effects on the trial).
504. In the end, the Senate voted on only three of the articles. In each article, the Senate
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War. Johnson nominated in his place General John M. Schofield, a
well-known moderate whose name had been mentioned as Stanton’s
likely successor during the impeachment trial to allay the concerns of
505
certain senators about Johnson’s intentions should he be acquitted.
In the aftermath of the impeachment, both houses of Congress
launched investigations into its failure, but neither uncovered
506
anything substantial. The Senate exacted a measure of revenge on
Stanbery, refusing to reconfirm him as attorney general for his
defense of the President, although the Senate did relent in confirming
507
Evarts as attorney general. In the summer of 1868, the Fourteenth
Amendment was declared ratified, even though “Johnson had Seward
word the July 20 announcement . . . in such a way as to cast doubt on
508
the legality of the ratifying process.”
After failing to receive the Democratic presidential nomination in
1868 and registering one final challenge to the Tenure of Office
509
Act,
Johnson returned to his home in Tennessee. Strikingly,
Johnson and Grant refused to ride together in the same carriage to
exonerated the President by a vote of thirty-five to nineteen, one vote shy of the necessary
two-thirds majority. The Senate subsequently adjourned sine die without voting on the
other articles. CASTEL, supra note 392, at 192-93.
Divining the constitutional significance of Johnson’s acquittal is further complicated by
the myriad rationales underlying particular Senators’ votes. While some Senators based
their decision on the Constitution, it is clear that others based their decision on statutory
grounds. Moreover, other Senators admittedly ignored the evidence and the legal
principles and openly based their votes on purely political considerations. See BENEDICT,
supra note 435, at 110, 126, 140, 152-57, 178-79; May, supra note 243, at 915-18.
Much has been made concerning the closeness of the vote and the courage of the socalled “recusants”—the Republican Senators who voted for acquittal. See, e.g., BENEDICT,
supra note 435, at 181 (citing JOHN F. KENNEDY, PROFILES IN COURAGE 126-51 (1956)).
However, the vote may not have been as close as it seemed; as many as four senators may
have stood ready to switch their votes if needed to acquit the president. TREFOUSSE, supra
note 402, at 169. Furthermore, the Republicans’ disapprobation towards the recusants was
short lived. See, e.g., BENEDICT, supra note 435, at 181-83 (citing Ralph J. Roske, The
Seven Martyrs?, 64 AM. HIST. REV. 323, 323-30 (1959)); TREFOUSSE, supra note 402, at
167 (citing Roske, supra).
505. MANTELL, supra note 428, at 100.
506. Id.; REHNQUIST, supra note 309, at 240; TREFOUSSE, supra note 402, at 169-70.
507. MANTELL, supra note 428, at 100; TREFOUSSE, supra note 402, at 172.
508. CASTEL, supra note 392, at 205-06.
509. In his Fourth Annual Message, Johnson complained:
Under the influence of party passion and sectional prejudice . . . acts have been
passed not warranted by the Constitution . . . . Experience has proved that [the
Tenure of Office Act’s] repeal is demanded by the best interests of the country,
and that while it remains in force the President can not enjoin that rigid
accountability of public officers so essential to an honest and efficient execution
of the laws. Its revocation would enable the executive department to exercise the
power of appointment and removal in accordance with the original design of the
Federal Constitution.
Johnson, Fourth Annual Message, supra note 542, at 3871. Johnson also called for the
repeal of the Army Appropriations Act rider. Id. at 3871-72.
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Grant’s inauguration ceremony, marking only the third time in
American history that a president has declined to attend the
510
inauguration of his successor. Although Johnson was unsuccessful
in his bids for the Senate in 1871 and the House in 1872, he once
again won election to the Senate in 1874. News of his election caused
a stir and The Nation “stated that Johnson’s ‘personal integrity was
beyond question’ and that his ‘respect for the law and Constitution
[had] made his Administration a remarkable contrast to that which
511
succeeded it.’” After making one last speech criticizing Grant for
constitutional violations of federalism, Johnson died on July 31,
512
1875. He left “having contributed to keeping the South a ‘white
man’s country’ for several more generations. For this reason, from his
point of view and considering his prejudices, his administration
513
wasn’t wholly unsuccessful.”
There can be no doubt about Johnson’s constitutional position with
respect to the unitary executive. Johnson repeatedly and correctly
condemned both the Tenure of Office Act and the Army
Appropriations rider as improper invasions of the unitary executive,
marking an abrupt end to whatever limited acquiescence in a nonunitary vision of the executive branch had begun during the Lincoln
administration. Johnson prevailed in his battle with Congress,
although by but a single vote. But even had politics prevailed and
Johnson been impeached of this unjustifiable charge, it would not
alter the significance of Johnson’s opposition for the purposes of
coordinate construction. Johnson merely becomes a link in the chain
of presidents throughout this period who generally opposed almost all
congressionally-imposed infringements upon their prerogatives.
Admittedly, Lincoln remained silent in the face of a few limited
intrusions on his authority. Yet because these presidents generally
took vigorous steps to protect the unitary power of the executive
branch, minor deviations fail to undercut any inference of
acquiescence. Therefore, when the conduct of all the chief executives
of this period is taken as a whole, the leaders’ commitment to the
unitary executive is clear.

510. CASTEL, supra note 392, at 211; SMITH, supra note 416, at 466.
511. CASTEL, supra note 392, at 216.
512. See BENEDICT, supra note 435, at 183; DEWITT, supra note 370, at 627-28;
GERSON, supra note 471, at 144-45.
513. TREFOUSSE, supra note 402, at 130.
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IV. THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE DURING THE GILDED AGE, 1869-1889
The impeachment of Andrew Johnson and the passage of the
Tenure of Office Act led directly to a weakened presidency during the
period between 1869 and 1889. The presidents in office during those
years were hampered by a Congress that had gotten quite used to
functioning as the government itself during the heady years of the
Johnson presidency. Presidents Ulysses S. Grant, Rutherford B.
Hayes, James A. Garfield, Chester A. Arthur, and Grover Cleveland
fought back, and the Tenure of Office Act was ultimately repealed
during the first Cleveland administration. This marks a great victory
for the theory of the unitary executive and demarcates the period
between 1869 and 1889 as one during which presidents refused to
acquiesce in non-unitary constructions of presidential power. The
history of this period begins with the presidency of Ulysses S. Grant.
A. Ulysses S. Grant
Ulysses S. Grant was the only president to serve eight consecutive
years in the White House between the terms of Andrew Jackson and
Woodrow Wilson. He became president after having served as
General in Chief for the entire Johnson administration, a position
which allowed Grant to play a major administrative role in
determining the course of Reconstruction. Indeed, it could be said that
after Abraham Lincoln was shot in the waning days of the Civil War,
it was Grant who held things together, received the surrender of the
Confederate forces, demobilized the Union army, and presided over
Reconstruction.
Grant’s initial presidential election in 1868 against the frail and
colorless Horatio Seymour, ex-Governor of New York, was a rout.
Americans greeted Grant’s replacement of the annoying and
514
controversial Andrew Johnson with great relief. They were thrilled
to see that Grant arrived in office owing nothing to the political
powers of the day and being deeply familiar with the issues of
domestic policy from his years as Andrew Johnson’s chief military
515
officer. In a real show of independence, President-elect Grant went
about picking his initial cabinet totally on his own and in secret, “in
516
the same methodical way” he had planned his military campaigns.
Grant immediately differentiated himself from Andrew Johnson by
514. SMITH, supra note 416, at 461.
515. Id. at 464.
516. Id. at 465.
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pledging in his inaugural address, “I will always express my views to
Congress, and when I think it advisable, will exercise the
constitutional privilege of interposing a veto. But all laws will be
517
faithfully executed whether they meet my approval or not.” There
would be no massive failure to ensure faithful execution of the law
under Grant as there had been under Johnson.
Grant’s first cabinet picks were very promising. Grant selected
Hamilton Fish as Secretary of State, George Boutwell as Secretary of
the Treasury, and Ebenezer Rockwood Hoar as Attorney General, all
518
of whom served with great distinction.
His initial picks for
Secretary of the Interior and the Postmaster General were also well
received, and he surprised people by graciously appointing former
Confederate General James Longstreet to be Surveyor of Customs of
519
the port of New Orleans. Grant also stunned the nation by picking a
full-blooded Seneca Indian, Ely S. Parker, as his first commissioner
520
of Indian affairs. Succeeding in revolutionizing the government’s
Indian policy, Grant emphasized peace with the Indians and appointed
521
Quakers and religious figures to deal with Indian matters. Given
Grant’s later problems with Gilded Age corruption, it is worth
emphasizing that his initial cabinet picks were all superb; they were
522
his own men with no links or debts to party bosses.
Grant’s first big fight with Congress was to come over repeal of the
infamous Tenure of Office Act, the statute that had nearly wrecked
Andrew Johnson’s presidency. In some ways, it is surprising and
striking that Grant started out his administration with this fight over
presidential prerogatives. Grant on occasion expressed limited views
of presidential power, asserting that the president was an

517.
518.
519.
520.
521.

Id. at 467 (emphasis added).
Id. at 468-72.
See id. at 472, 522.
Id. at 472-73.
Id. at 473, 526-27; GEOFFREY PERRET, ULYSSES S. GRANT: SOLDIER &
PRESIDENT 423-25 (1997).
522. PERRET, supra note 521, at 381. After his retirement, while traveling around the
world with a journalist, a chastened Grant admitted that the president could not always
appoint his own men but had to defer sometimes to Congress. Grant said:
An Executive must consider Congress . . . . It has become the habit of Congressmen to
share with the Executive in the responsibility of appointments . . . . It is simply a
custom that has grown up, a fact that cannot be ignored. The President very rarely
appoints, he merely registers the appointments of members of Congress. In a country
as vast as ours the advice of Congressmen as to persons to be appointed is useful, and
generally for the best interests of the country.

LEONARD D. WHITE, THE REPUBLICAN ERA: 1869-1901, at 24 (1958) (quoting 2 JOHN
RUSSELL YOUNG, AROUND THE WORLD WITH GENERAL GRANT 265-66 (1879)).
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“administrative officer” who was, “except on rare occasions[,]
disposed to accept without question the work of Congress as the
523
authoritative expression of the will of the American people.” Some
in Congress might have hoped that the hero of Appomattox would
meekly accept whatever limitations on his power Congress cared to
enact. But Grant was no pushover, and he fully and vigorously
defended the unitary power of the executive. Ultimately supported by
an opinion by his Attorney General affirming his authority to review
524
the decisions of his subordinates, Grant asserted his authority over
his department heads, in one case overruling a decision made by the
525
Secretary of the Interior.
Furthermore, Grant wasted no time at all in criticizing the Tenure
of Office Act. In his first annual message, Grant challenged the Act’s
constitutionality, averring that “[i]t could not have been the intention
of the framers of the Constitution, when providing that appointments
made by the President should receive the consent of the Senate, that
the latter should have the power to retain in office persons placed
there by Federal appointment against the will of the President.”
Noting further that the Act was “inconsistent with a faithful and
efficient administration of the Government,” Grant took the occasion
526
“to earnestly recommend [its] total repeal.”
Grant’s biographer Jean Edward Smith notes:
Eighteen sixty-nine was a time of legislative supremacy in the
United States, and America’s solons were reluctant to surrender the
power they had wrested from the executive. The Republicans had
used the [Tenure of Office Act] to thwart Johnson’s power to
remove subordinates and it was now a matter of senatorial
prerogative. When Grant indicated that he wanted the statute
repealed, the Senate leadership circled the wagons. On March 2,
the next-to-the-last day of Johnson’s term, the upper house voted
down a bill to repeal the act, 35-15. Two thirds [sic] of the Senate
served notice it had no intention of yielding its authority. “I wish to
leave the President-elect free to the full and useful exercise of the

523. See BINKLEY, supra note 70, at 159; WHITE, supra note 522, at 23.
524. See 15 Op. Att’y Gen. 94, 104 (1876). Earlier opinions authored by Attorney
General George H. Williams accepted the position asserted by Wirt that the power of
direction did not apply to the decisions of accounting officers. 14 Op. Att’y Gen. 104
(1872); 14 Op. Att’y Gen. 65 (1872).
525. Cross, supra note 311, at 489 n.31 (citing MARY BURKE HINSDALE, A HISTORY
OF THE PRESIDENT’S CABINET 324 (1911)).
526. Ulysses S. Grant, First Annual Message (Dec. 6, 1869), in 5 MESSAGES & PAPERS,
supra note 57, at 3981, 3992; see also FISHER, supra note 293, at 57; 2 GOLDSMITH, supra
note 20, at 1100; WHITE, supra note 522, at 29; Fisher, supra note 375, at 72; Warren,
supra note 246, at 24.
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good judgment and good qualities which we all ascribe to him,”
said New York’s Roscoe Conkling. “At the same time, I wish . . .
to preserve the position which the Senate has maintained
in the last
527
and most dire emergency known in our jurisprudence.”

Most incoming presidents of the United States faced with a twothirds majority of the Senate opposed to a policy priority might give
up, but not Grant. To add some muscle to his request, Grant
threatened not to make any additional nominations until Congress had
528
acted on the matter. As Jean Smith writes:
When the new Congress convened following Grant’s inauguration,
another effort was made to repeal the statute. Led by Congressman
Benjamin Butler of Massachusetts, now one of Grant’s staunchest
supporters, the House voted overwhelmingly in early March to
overturn the act. Once again the Senate balked. Grant responded by
announcing that until the law was repealed he would enforce it
vigorously. He would not remove any of Johnson’s appointees and
would only fill offices that were vacant. The effect of the
president’s announcement was to deny Congress the spoils it was
expecting. There would be no new postmasters, pension clerks, or
customs collectors until the Senate acted. Grant was scarcely the
political babe in the woods sometimes depicted. By halting
patronage appointments the president was using the one weapon
the senators 529
understood. Even Roscoe Conkling now suggested
compromise.

The Senate reluctantly approved compromise legislation permitting
the president to suspend any executive officer during the recess of the
Senate without providing his reasons to the Senate, so long as the
president informed the Senate of any such suspensions. The
suspension, however, would not be fully effective until the Senate
530
confirmed the president’s choice of a successor. This meant that the
president could remove an official simply by nominating and getting
confirmation for a successor. “Grant was satisfied. Rather than fight a
protracted struggle for total repeal of the Tenure of Office Act, he
531
signed the new measure on April 6.” Partial repeal of the infamous
Tenure of Office Act thus became one of the very first new laws

527. SMITH, supra note 416, at 479. Other prominent opponents included Senator
Charles Sumner. Id. at 504.
528. 2 GOLDSMITH, supra note 20, at 1100.
529. SMITH, supra note 416, at 479.
530. Act of Apr. 5, 1869, ch. 10, § 2, 16 Stat. 6, 7. See generally BINKLEY, supra note
70, at 192; 2 GOLDSMITH, supra note 20, at 1101-05; WHITE, supra note 522, at 29-30;
TUGWELL, supra note 7, at 208; Fisher, supra note 375, at 72.
531. SMITH, supra note 416, at 480.
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enacted under the leadership of the Grant administration. Henry
Adams was to note prophetically, however, that “[t]he mere repeal of
the Tenure-of-Office Bill cannot at once restore its [presidential]
prestige, or wrest from Congress the initiative which Congress is now
accustomed to exercise. The Senate has no idea of abandoning its
532
control of power.”
Grant’s strong objections to the Tenure of Office Act represent an
incredibly important assertion of the president’s sole authority to
execute the laws. But sadly, Grant’s record with regard to the unitary
executive was not completely consistent. Somewhat curiously, Grant
failed to maintain his commitment to the principles of the unitary
executive when Congress enacted statutes modeled on the Tenure of
Office Act requiring Senate consent for removals of deputy
533
postmasters. These statutes were to be declared unconstitutional by
534
the Supreme Court in Myers v. United States, the landmark case on
the unitary executive. Perhaps Grant thought that deputy postmasters
were not policymaking officials and so the theory of the unitary
535
executive did not apply. Or maybe he just had other, bigger battles
to fight. The fairest interpretation, given Grant’s record, is that his
administration took no consistent position, either in favor of or
opposed to total presidential control of the removal power.
Grant made a brief effort to effect civil service reform. With
Grant’s encouragement, Congress passed a bill in 1871 establishing a
Civil Service Commission to which Grant named the illustrious editor
of the Chicago Tribune, Joseph Medill. Grant tried to put civil service
reform in place, but Congress cut off all appropriation for the matter
and reform died until 1883, when the Pendleton Act was finally
536
passed.
In other areas of public policy, Grant was vigorous, able, and
532. WHITE, supra note 522, at 24-25.
533. Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 2, 17 Stat. 283, 284; Act of July 12, 1876, ch. 179,
§ 6, 19 Stat. 78, 80-81; see also FISHER, supra note 293, at 57; PEPPER, supra note 375, at
121; REHNQUIST, supra note 309, at 259; SMALL, supra note 311, at 136 n.45; Fisher,
supra note 375, at 73.
534. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
535. The theory of the unitary executive requires that the president be able to remove
any policymaking official in the executive branch. It does not apply to civil service officers
who merely carry out policies made by others. This is the key insight underlying the
Supreme Court’s decision in Kendall. See supra notes 28-45 and accompanying text. It is
also why the nation’s civil service laws, which date back to the Arthur administration, do
not violate the theory of the unitary executive. See infra notes 712-714 and accompanying
text.
536. Id. at 587-89. On the enactment of the Pendleton Act, see infra notes 689-691,
699-715 and accompanying text.
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thoroughly in charge, just as he been as a general. Grant personally
broke Jay Gould’s and Jim Fisk’s effort to corner the gold market on
Black Friday, September 24, 1869, by decisively directing his
Treasury Secretary to sell government gold as soon as Grant learned
537
“Grant’s role was
of what Gould and Fisk were doing.
538
decisive . . . . [He personally] had given the crucial order.”
In the area of foreign policy, Grant worked with his exceptional
Secretary of State, Hamilton Fish, who would remain with him for all
eight years of his presidency, to conclude the Treaty of Washington
with Great Britain. “Grant’s role in American diplomacy was not
unlike that of Eisenhower almost a century later. Both . . . delegated
day-to-day operations to their secretary of state. Yet both made the
539
final decisions and set the course.” Striving to make peace with the
Indians, Grant again behaved like Eisenhower, who, as a former
540
general, was able to make peace in Korea. Grant’s empathy with
African-Americans in the South specifically carried over to the
541
Indians, and Grant persisted with his peace policy until George
Custer’s defeat at the Battle of Little Big Horn in 1876 made the
policy unsustainable.
Grant ultimately delegated matters regarding the Indians to his
secretaries of the interior and his commissioners of Indian affairs.
Grant’s military style of delegation in all matters of governance was
hailed by former General Rutherford Hayes, who noted Grant’s
emphasis on officer accountability, saying “Grant’s leadership and
542
rule is beyond question.” Senator John Sherman complained that
Grant “regarded [the] heads of departments as mere subordinates” and
lamented that “the limitation of the power of the President [over
cabinet members] is one that an army officer, accustomed to give or
receive orders, finds difficult to understand and observe when elected
543
President.”
Grant’s leadership style also led him to delegate authority over
Reconstruction to his attorneys general and secretaries of war, who
were a mixed bunch. Three of Grant’s Attorneys General—
Rockwood Hoar, Amos T. Akerman, and Alphonso Taft—were
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superb, with Akerman being the best. Akerman undertook to protect
the freedmen with gusto, and as one historian put it, “no attorney
general before or since ‘has been more vigorous in the prosecution of
544
cases designed to protect the lives and rights of black Americans.’”
Attorneys General George Williams, who left office in a scandal, and
Edward Pierrepont, who refused to protect African-Americans in the
South, were much more problematic. Fortunately for Reconstruction,
Grant took a special personal interest in the fate of the freedmen, and
he began his tenure by working “mightily to secure adoption of the
545
Fifteenth Amendment,”
which was proposed by Congress on
February 27, 1869 and ratified on March 30, 1870.
Unfortunately, the South responded to the Fifteenth Amendment
with a wave of violence—directed by the Ku Klux Klan—targeted at
the freed slaves. Grant responded immediately, and in May 1870,
Congress passed the first of three Enforcement Acts to counter
terrorist violence. In June 1870, Grant brought Akerman to
Washington to fight the Klan, and Congress took the momentous step
of establishing a Department of Justice on the same level as other
546
cabinet departments. Previously, the attorney general had been a
one-man operation and simply served as an advisor to the president.
By creating a full scale Justice Department with numerous lawyers
and for the first time a Solicitor General—the famous Benjamin
Bristow—the Grant administration greatly enhanced the president’s
ability to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. The creation
of the Department of Justice was a major step in protecting
presidential prerogatives and in enhancing the unitariness of the
547
executive, although it would take some time before the Department
was able to consolidate its control over the enforcement of the federal
548
law. Henceforth, Justice Department staff lawyers would be able to
supervise “the work of the United States attorneys and federal

544. Id. at 542.
545. Id. at 543.
546. Act of June 22, 1870, ch. 150, 16 Stat. 162; see also SMITH, supra note 416, at
544.
547. See Bell, supra note 223, at 1053 (noting that Congress created the Justice
Department “‘for the purpose of having a unity of decision, a unity of jurisprudence . . . in
the executive law of the United States’” and because of “the need to insure that the federal
government spoke with one voice in its view of and adherence to the law” (quoting CONG.
GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3036 (1870) (statement of Sen. Jenckes))).
548. See CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 223, at 486-520 (describing the
gradual evolution of the Justice Department’s role in centralizing execution of the law);
Bell, supra note 223, at 1054-57 (same).
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marshals throughout the country.”
The team of Akerman and Bristow quickly racked up a very
impressive record in battling the Ku Klux Klan, securing nearly one
thousand indictments in the early 1870s, of which fifty-five percent
550
ended in convictions. Congress passed a second Enforcement Act
in 1871, and Grant fought vigorously to prevent the Klan from, in
551
effect, reversing the decision at Appomattox. Grant suspended the
writ of habeas corpus in nine lawless counties of South Carolina and
sent military reinforcements to that state. Akerman “gave full credit to
the president. No one, he told a friend, was ‘better’ or ‘stronger’ than
552
Grant when it came to enforcing anti-terrorist measures.” By the
end of his administration, “Grant stood watch over the South almost
alone. His cabinet was uninterested, [General in Chief William T.]
Sherman was dubious, the Supreme Court had eviscerated the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and the public was more
553
interested in reconciliation than Reconstruction.” Grant said, in
retrospect, that the South should have been kept under military rule
554
longer.
The problem was that “the best chance of forcing
fundamental change on the South was in the immediate aftermath of
the war. Johnson had wasted that opportunity and, as so often in
politics, once the initial impetus has passed from an attempted reform,
555
it is virtually impossible to regenerate it.”
When the nation
repudiated Reconstruction in 1876, “Grant’s reputation suffered
556
severely.”
In the re-election campaign of 1872, Grant was opposed by liberal
Republican Horace Greeley, who was also endorsed by the
Democrats. “Grant’s treatment of the South became the central issue
557
of the campaign,” and he was re-elected with fifty-six percent of
the popular vote. The highpoint of Grant’s presidency came in 1872,
and as “happened with Franklin Roosevelt after his landslide win in
1936 and Ronald Reagan during his second term, hubris led to
mistakes, and mistakes to poor administration, corruption, and
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558

scandal.” Unfortunately and inexcusably, “Grant sat back benignly
while administration officials shamelessly exploited their positions
559
for personal gain.”
Geoffrey Perret ably summarizes Grant’s scandal problem when he
reports that “[f]ew people ever thought [Grant] was personally on the
take. On the contrary, Grant is often portrayed as a gullible, naive
man far out of his depth, taken advantage of by people a lot smarter
560
and greedier than he was.” The Credit Mobilier Affair erupted, and
stained the government’s reputation, although all the scandalous
561
Congress
transactions occurred before Grant became president.
meanwhile made a sordid effort to raise its pay retroactively, which
562
hurt its standing with the public.
Two second-term cabinet
secretaries, William Richardson at Treasury and George Williams at
563
Justice, resigned in scandal, and throughout it all “Grant’s loyalty
564
to his appointees went beyond prudence.” By November of 1874,
the Democrats recaptured the House of Representatives and gained
565
ten seats in the Senate. Grant responded to his critics in his annual
message to Congress, pledging that so long as he remained president,
“all the laws of Congress and the provision of the Constitution . . .
566
will be enforced with rigor.”
Another highlight of Grant’s second term was the elevation of the
exceptionally able reformer Benjamin Bristow as Secretary of the
Treasury. Bristow, who was very ambitious and who sought the
presidency in 1876, used his office to bust up the Whiskey Ring—a
corrupt conspiracy with tentacles reaching to Orville Babcock, one of
Grant’s closest aides. Grant broke with Bristow and unwisely
defended Babcock, who was guilty. The episode tarred Grant’s
reputation as he left office. More scandals erupted, this time involving
567
Interior Secretary Columbus Delano and Secretary of War William
568
Belknap. Although he greatly liked Belknap, whom he had known

558. Id. at 552.
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561. SMITH, supra note 416, at 552-53.
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57, at 4238, 4253.
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since his army days, Grant saw his obligation to ensure that the laws
were faithfully enforced, and he ordered the attorney general to
569
launch a criminal investigation of his own cabinet members.
Grant’s final test as president came with the disputed presidential
election of 1876, during which he remained calm and nonpartisan.
“He comes up to the mark so grandly on great occasions” wrote
Rockwood Hoar, Grant’s first attorney general, “that I wish he were
570
more careful of appearances in smaller matters.” In February 1877,
as the crisis reached its peak, “Grant’s calm visage in the White
House reassured the nation. His reputation for firmness, his
evenhandedness during the crisis, his personal honesty and respect for
the law, plus his known determination to maintain the peace,
571
contributed to a lessening of tension.” Michael Les Benedict reports
that Grant’s “reputation . . . rebounded strongly as he remained calm
and resolute [during the crisis of 1876, and as he] made clear that he
wouldn’t tolerate violence, nor would he use force to install
572
Republican candidate Rutherford B. Hayes.” In a series of informal
conversations during late February, Hayes’s men agreed to end
Reconstruction and withdraw the army from the South to smooth the
way for Hayes’s peaceful inauguration. Grant had nothing to do with
any of this. “Having wrestled with the South for sixteen years, he
573
recognized his obligation to leave the matter to his successor.”
Several features of the Grant administration were a triumph for the
unitary executive. In particular, the partial repeal of the Tenure of
Office Act and the creation for the first time in American history of a
Department of Justice were big victories. Also, Grant’s vigor in
taking care to enforce the civil rights laws in the South deserves note
and differentiates him from Andrew Johnson, his disgraced
predecessor. Finally, Grant’s supervision of policy in many fields,
including foreign affairs, civil service reform, and Indian policy,
bespeak a commitment to mastering the details of his presidential
duties. In our judgment, Grant is a wrongly maligned president;
though he made some significant mistakes, some of which led to
scandals, Grant got the big questions of his day right. His reputation
has wrongly suffered because of his failed efforts to make
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Reconstruction work one hundred years ahead of its time.
B. Rutherford B. Hayes
Rutherford B. Hayes was a strong-willed man who made a
determined effort, under exceptionally difficult circumstances, to
bolster presidential power. Hayes became president in 1877, after the
Democrats had captured the House of Representatives in the 1874
mid-term elections and maintained control in the elections of 1876.
The power of the Republican Party was at low point by 1876 because
574
of the economic depression resulting from the Panic of 1873,
because of the scandals in the second Grant administration, and
because of public ennui with Republicans after sixteen years of their
rule. This ebbing of the tide of Republican power was reflected in the
presidential election of 1876, in which Hayes decisively lost the
575
popular vote contest to Democrat Samuel Tilden. Yet Tilden was
left one vote short of victory in the Electoral College, receiving 184
electoral votes to Hayes’s 166, with nineteen votes from Southern
576
states in dispute.
To resolve the contest, a special Electoral
Commission of fifteen senators, representatives, and Supreme Court
justices was appointed with eight Republican members and seven
577
Democrats.
By a straight, party-line vote, the Commission
eventually gave all nineteen disputed electoral votes and the
presidency to Hayes. The Democratically-controlled House revolted
and refused to approve the results. Hayes finally broke the deadlock
by offering to withdraw all federal troops from the South and to end
Reconstruction in return for Democratic support for his election. The
House Democrats acceded to this “Corrupt Bargain,” and Hayes
578
assumed office.
After the Electoral Commission awarded him the presidency,
Hayes set about picking a cabinet, and astonishingly under the
circumstances, resolved to do this completely independent of
579
Congress. Hayes also decided not to offer cabinet positions to those

574. James A. Rawley, Rutherford B. Hayes, in TO THE BEST OF MY ABILITY, supra
note 329, at 141.
575. Tilden won a quarter of a million more popular votes than Hayes. See MICHAEL J.
GLENNON, WHEN NO MAJORITY RULES: THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE AND PRESIDENTIAL
SUCCESSION 16 (1992).
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who had competed with him for the Republican presidential
580
“nomination, to their satellites, or to members of Grant’s cabinet.”
He asked the able Senator John Sherman to be Secretary of the
Treasury and the superb lawyer William Evarts to be Secretary of
State. Leading Republican civil service reformer Carl Schurz got the
Interior Department, and Southerner David Key was appointed
Postmaster General to appease Southern Democrats still seething over
581
the disputed presidential election.
As Leonard White reports,
582
“Powerful Senators had expected to be consulted. They were not.”
White further notes:
The Senate oligarchy promptly accepted the challenge, declined to
confirm as a matter of courtesy, and sent the nominations to
committees, not even excepting their fellow Senator, John
Sherman. A storm of public indignation swept across the country
and shortly thereafter the Senate confirmed all the nominations.
“For the first time since the Civil War,” [historian Wilfred]
Binkley wrote, “the Senate had been vanquished on a clear-cut
issue between
it and the President. The upper House had passed its
583
zenith.”

Hayes thus came into office with a striking show of independence and
pro-reform sentiment. He was off to a good start.
Hayes’s inaugural address called for the South to have “wise,
584
honest, and peaceful local self-government,”
a euphemism for
withdrawing federal troops and abandoning the rights of AfricanAmericans. He also called for “thorough, radical, and complete” civil
585
service reform. The address, coupled with his cabinet appointments
and the fact he was not Grant, led to “[s]upport from the educated and
586
cultivated elite who thought of itself as ‘the best people.’”
Abandoning African-Americans in the South did not bother James
Russell Lowell, Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, Charles W. Eliot,
Francis James Child, and Charles Eliot Norton, who all wrote the
587
President to express their approval for the course he had set.
Hayes’s practice as president was untrue to his Whig origins, as “he
moved away from the Whig ideal of a weak president who would be
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subservient to Congress, deferential to his cabinet, and would allow
588
Historian Ari
virtual autonomy to heads of departments.”
Hoogenboom writes:
Hayes identified with John Quincy Adams in his struggles with
Congress, his patronage policies, and his desire to use national
power to foster education. Hayes, however, was a much better
politician than Adams. By working hard at being president and by
fighting a number of battles with Congress, Hayes would reverse
the ascendancy of Congress, the independence
of cabinet members,
589
and the decline of the presidency.

Hayes relied on and trusted his cabinet, meeting with them twice a
week, for two hours each time, and daily during crises. Everything—
big and small—was discussed at these cabinet meetings, but “Hayes
made the decisions, and on occasion he imposed his will upon
reluctant department heads, including Sherman, Evarts, and Schurz,
590
who were the strongest cabinet members.”
From the start of his administration, in March 1877, Hayes
confronted the question of what to do about faithfully executing the
laws in the South. He thought the federal troops who were then
upholding Republican governments in South Carolina and Louisiana
591
were counterproductive.
Hoogenboom writes, “Attracted to a
policy that would woo conservative Southerners, Hayes became
willing, if need be, to abandon white carpetbaggers and scalawags. He
rationalized that their corrupt course had forfeited their claims on the
592
Republican party and the federal government for protection . . . .”
Hayes urged education for the freed African-Americans, but Congress
would never appropriate funds for this purpose. Moreover, Hayes
dreamed of governing the South with a new coalition of resurrected
white Southern Whigs and freed African-Americans.
The key decision was whether to leave federal troops in place.
Hayes’s hands in this regard were tied by the Democratic House of
Representatives, which was refusing to appropriate money to keep the
593
army in the South. Rather than fight with the House, as Hayes
successfully did on other occasions, he capitulated. At a cabinet
meeting on March 22, 1877, Hayes confirmed his intention to pull the
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federal troops out of South Carolina. By late April, Hayes was also
withdrawing federal troops from Louisiana, and as soon as the forces
595
had departed, the Democrats took over the Statehouse. Democrats
argued to white Southerners that Hayes deserved no credit for doing
something they had made him do, and Hayes failed to receive desired
596
support from white former-Whigs in the South. Former Attorney
General Amos T. Akerman “observed that Hayes’s course amounted
to combating ‘lawlessness by letting the lawless have their own
597
way.’” William Lloyd Garrison and Benjamin Wade denounced
Hayes’s new Southern policy, but Hayes felt constrained by the
598
Democratic House’s refusal to make military appropriations.
Beacon Hill patricians had fewer qualms about the shift. In June
1877, Hayes received an honorary Doctor of Laws degree from
Harvard, where Oliver Wendell Holmes published a poem hailing him
599
as a “Healer of Strife!”
The Hayes administration also witnessed the enactment of the
600
Posse Comitatus Act of 1878. This law, which remains on the
books to the present day, limits the use of federal troops for ordinary
601
law enforcement. The Act has been interpreted to forbid “direct and
active participation [of troops] in traditional civilian law enforcement,
602
like making arrests or conducting searches.”
More “passive
assistance, like providing equipment, training and advice” is
603
allowed. The Posse Comitatus Act reflected Democratic anger over
the role federal troops played in the South during the Hayes-Tilden
election, and their guarding polling places, arresting members of the
Ku Klux Klan, disrupting illegal whiskey production, and putting
604
down labor unrest.
One hundred and twenty years after its
enactment, the administration of President George W. Bush was to
consider asking for modification of the Posse Comitatus Act to
facilitate the use of the military in anti-terrorist law enforcement

594. Id. at 63.
595. Id. at 67.
596. See id. at 68.
597. Id. at 68.
598. Id. at 68-69.
599. Id. at 69.
600. Army Appropriation Act, ch. 263, § 15, 20 Stat. 145, 152 (1878).
601. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2000).
602. Adam Liptak, Posse Comitatus Act Limits Armed Services at Home, N.Y. TIMES,
July 21, 2002, at A16.
603. Id.
604. Id.
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efforts.
Hayes hoped Southerners would honor their pledges to him that
they would observe the voting rights of African-Americans, but this
was not to be. Hayes’s own Christian outlook blinded him to the
“pervasiveness and the viciousness of racial prejudice in southern
606
politics and society.” A good man himself, Hayes’s imagination
failed him when it came time to imagine how unconstrained white
Southerners would behave. By the time of the mid-term elections of
1878, “Hayes candidly noted that despite solemn pledges to uphold
the constitutional rights of all their citizens, South Carolina and
Louisiana, by legislation, fraud, intimidation, and ‘violence of the
607
most atrocious character,’ had prevented blacks from voting.” In
part as a result, the Democrats took control of the Senate, in addition
to retaining their control of the House of Representatives. Not
surprisingly, Congress was to ignore Hayes’s pleas for money to
608
enforce the federal election laws.
Hayes’s failures with respect to sectional politics did not stop him
from strongly defending and reasserting the president’s sole authority
over the execution of the law. In fact, Hayes soon became embroiled
in two landmark battles with Congress over the unitary executive. The
first of these was the extraordinary battle of wills between Hayes and
the House of Representatives over federal election law that amounted
to Hayes’s finest moment in the White House. Southerners in control
of the House tried repeatedly to repeal Reconstruction-era legislation
that authorized the president to use federal troops to protect the rights
609
of black voters.
The Democrats attempted to accomplish this
610
objective by attaching riders to unrelated appropriations bills.
Hayes anticipated the attack, and was fully set and determined to
preserve both the civil rights laws and presidential prerogatives.
White reports that Hayes wrote in his diary on March 18, 1879:
An important struggle then begins. The Democrats will attempt
coercion of the President to secure a repeal of legislation which I
deem wise and important. This is to place the Executive “under the
coercive dictation” of a bare majority of the two Houses of
Congress . . . . It is a “measure of coercion”, a revolutionary
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See Editorial, Misusing the Military, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2002, at A18.
HOOGENBOOM, supra note 584, at 70.
Id. at 72.
Id. at 73.
See id. at 74-75.
Rawley, supra note 574, at 143.
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measure . . . . No precedent shall be established with my consent
to
611
a measure which is tantamount to coercion of the Executive.

If riders repealing the test oath and prohibiting the use of federal
troops at elections were attached, Hayes wrote “that he would not
612
even consider the merits of the bills so presented.” James Rawley
describes what followed:
On April 29, 1879, an outraged Hayes vetoed an army
appropriations measure carrying such a rider. A month later, the
Democrats passed a bill prohibiting federal troops from serving as
peacekeepers at polls unless requested to do so by a state. Hayes
hurled back another successful veto. In all, Congress passed seven
such bills, five saddled with riders repealing the elections laws and
two designed to circumvent them. With his seven vetoes, Hayes
fulfilled his oath to enforce the nation’s laws and moreover
increased unity
within the Republican party as members rallied to
613
his support.

Hayes objected to the use of the riders as an unconstitutional
attempt to force his hand on repeal of the so-called Force or
614
Enforcement Acts.
The Democrats were in a quandary as it
gradually became clear that “Hayes’s vetoes were strengthening him
and his party . . . and had helped [the Republicans] prepare for the
615
1880 presidential campaign.” Hayes was able to savor a victory
616
over Congress, but “he knew that his southern policy had failed.”
Leonard White concludes:
[The battle over the riders] was a clean-cut victory for the
President and a powerful precedent against congressional
encroachment on the executive power by means of appropriations
riders. The action was defensive and protective, but it was
important. Congress was forced to enact the long-delayed
appropriations acts without imposing its will on the President; the
integrity of the veto power was sustained; and the popularity of an

611. WHITE, supra note 522, at 36 (quoting 3 DIARY AND LETTERS OF RUTHERFORD
BIRCHARD HAYES 529 (Charles Richard Williams ed., 1924) (entry of Mar. 18, 1879)).
612. Id.
613. Rawley, supra note 574, at 143-44. This episode is also recounted in
HOOGENBOOM, supra note 584, at 74-78, and in WHITE, supra note 522, at 35-39.
614. HOOGENBOOM, supra note 584, at 75. In one veto message Hayes wrote, “The
new doctrine, if maintained, will result in a consolidation of unchecked and despotic
power in the House of Representatives. A bare majority of the House will become the
government. The Executive will no longer be what the framers of the Constitution
intended—an equal and independent branch of the Government.” Rutherford B. Hayes,
Veto Message (Apr. 29, 1879), in 6 MESSAGES & PAPERS, supra note 57, at 4475, 4483,
quoted in WHITE, supra note 522, at 36.
615. HOOGENBOOM, supra note 584, at 77.
616. Id. at 78.
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617

unpopular president was repaired.

White observes that only “the courage and stubbornness of Hayes
halted this House aggression on executive power,” and he concludes
618
that “the House lost prestige in the battle of the riders.”
Hayes’s clash with the House of Representatives over the
appropriations riders was matched by a scuffle with the Senate over
the presidential prerogatives of removal, nomination, and
appointment. Hayes came into office with civil service reform and the
619
ending of the spoils system as primary objectives. In addition to
wanting to end the congressional practice of dictating nominations to
the executive, Hayes also wanted to end the practice of
“assessments,” in which federal workers were asked to contribute two
to seven percent of their annual salary for campaign funds. As a
member of Congress, Hayes had supported legislation that would
have required that those who performed best on an open competitive
examination be appointed to the civil service. Now that as president,
he supervised a bureaucracy of 100,000 employees, Hayes was no
620
less eager to make civil service reform a reality. In April 1877,
shortly after taking office, Hayes had Treasury Secretary John
Sherman appoint a special commission to investigate the corrupt New
York Customhouse, and commissions were also appointed to
investigate corruption at the Philadelphia, New Orleans, and San
621
Francisco customhouses. The New York Commission was headed
up by John Jay, grandson of the first Chief Justice. Jay recommended
sweeping changes, and Hayes ordered the reluctant Sherman to
622
implement Jay’s recommendations. In June 1877, Hayes issued an
order prohibiting federal employees from engaging in any political
623
This sweeping
activity aside from voting and public speaking.
presidential order exacerbated the growing factionalism of the
Republican Party by irritating the so-called Stalwart wing of the
party, led by powerful New York Senator Roscoe Conkling, a close

617. WHITE, supra note 522, at 38.
618. Id.
619. HOOGENBOOM, supra note 584, at 101.
620. Id. at 102-03.
621. Id. at 127.
622. Id. at 129.
623. Rutherford B. Hayes, Executive Order (June 22, 1877), in 6 MESSAGES & PAPERS,
supra note 57, at 4402; see also Rawley, supra note 574, at 143. This order represented an
extension of a previous order banning political assessments and campaign activity by
employees of the New York Customhouse. Rutherford B. Hayes, Executive Order to John
Sherman (May 26, 1877), in 6 MESSAGES & PAPERS, supra note 57, at 4402.
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624

ally of former President Grant.
Matters came to a head when Hayes sought to replace Chester A.
Arthur, the collector of the New York Customhouse, and Alonzo
Cornell, the naval officer of the New York Customhouse, both key
Conkling allies. When Arthur and Cornell refused to resign, Hayes
“sent the names of their successors to the Senate for confirmation,
nominations which were greeted with derisive laughter and referred to
the Committee on Commerce, of which Senator Conkling was
chairman. The committee reported adversely, and the nominations
625
were rejected.” The Senate was fortified in taking these actions by
the amended Tenure of Office Act, which of course was still in place.
Hayes wrote in his diary, “I am now in a contest on the question of
the right of Senators to control nominations . . . . But I am right, and
626
will not give up the contest.” In the summer of 1878, “Hayes
summarily dismissed Arthur and Cornell, made recess appointments,
and in December again sent in his nominations for these vacant posts.
Conkling held up action for two months, but finally defeated himself
by his unrestrained attacks on the President. The Senate voted to
627
confirm on February 3, 1879.” Hayes had won as big a victory over
the Senate on presidential prerogatives of nomination and
appointment as he was to win over the House on appropriations
riders.
The key to Hayes’s victory over Conkling was his refusal to back
down on the removal of Arthur and Cornell from their posts at the
New York Customhouse. Hayes resolved that, no matter what the
Senate did with his nominees, “In no event will the old incumbents be
allowed to return to their former places, if I have power to prevent it,
628
and as to that I am not in doubt.” Thus armed with the removal
power, Hayes reclaimed presidential control over the prerogatives of
nomination and appointment. At the end of his term, Hayes described
his victory in his diary as follows:
The end I have chiefly aimed at has been to break down
congressional patronage, and especially Senatorial patronage. The
contest has been a bitter one. It has exposed me to attack,
624. Id.
625. WHITE, supra note 522, at 33.
626. Rawley, supra note 574, at 143.
627. WHITE, supra note 522, at 33. The triumph of Hayes over Conkling is also
recounted in BINKLEY, supra note 70, at 169-71; 2 GOLDSMITH, supra note 20, at 110712; HARRIS, supra note 368, at 82-84; TUGWELL, supra note 7, at 212-13; Fisher, supra
note 375, at 72-73.
628. HOOGENBOOM, supra note 584, at 142.
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opposition, misconstruction, and the actual hatred of powerful
men. But I have had great success. No member of either house now
attempts even to dictate appointments. My sole right to make
appointments is tacitly conceded. It has seemed to me that as
Executive I could advance the reform of the civil service in no way
so effectively as by rescuing the power of appointing to office
from the congressional leaders. I began with selecting a Cabinet in
opposition to their wishes, and I have gone on in that path steadily
until now I am filling the important places of collector of the port
and postmaster at Philadelphia almost
without a suggestion even
629
from Senators or Representatives!

Hayes’s removals of Arthur and Cornell would prove the exception
and not the rule. Although Hayes employed his removal power to
ensure that certain key positions were occupied by officials loyal to
him, as a long-time supporter of civil service reform, Hayes was
committed to using the removal power more sparingly than had his
immediate predecessors, observing in his first annual message that he
had “endeavored to reduce the number of changes in subordinate
places usually made upon the change of the general
630
administration.”
Hayes regarded “congressional demands for
patronage [as] not only a great evil, but also [as] a usurpation of
631
executive prerogatives.” In general, Hayes’s “reluctance to fire able
civil servants” to promote political friends “marks him as the least
partisan president between John Quincy Adams and Theodore
632
Roosevelt.” The opinions of his attorneys general underscored that
his reticence to remove was based on matters of policy and did not
mark a deviation from the position asserted by previous presidents
633
regarding the removal power’s constitutional basis.
In other areas of domestic policy, Hayes took several notable
actions to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. In the
summer of 1877, when there was great labor unrest following a
railroad workers’ strike, Hayes ordered federal troops to restore order
in West Virginia and in Pittsburgh, “where local militiamen had sided
with the strikers. Although Hayes pursued these deployments
629. WHITE, supra note 522, at 34 (quoting DIARY AND LETTERS OF RUTHERFORD
BIRCHARD HAYES, supra note 611, at 612-13 (entry of July 14, 1880)).
630. Rutherford B. Hayes, First Annual Message (Dec. 3, 1877), in 6 MESSAGES &
PAPERS, supra note 57, at 4410, 4418; see also HARRIS, supra note 368, at 82; VAN
RIPER, supra note 66, at 75.
631. WHITE, supra note 522, at 26.
632. HOOGENBOOM, supra note 584, at 144.
633. See 15 Op. Att’y Gen. 421 (1878) (concluding that the president’s constitutional
power to remove had been long established by the Decision of 1789 and subsequent
opinions of the attorneys general).
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cautiously, they nevertheless made him the first president since
Andrew Jackson to use troops in a labor dispute. The mere presence
634
of the troops quelled the violence.” Grant was critical of Hayes for
excessive caution and argued that the strike “should have been put
down with a strong hand and so summarily as to prevent a like
635
occurrence for a generation.”
Hayes also pardoned one person
prosecuted for sending pornography through the mails, but he
declined to pardon another victim because he did not think the
pardoning power should “be used to nullify or repeal statutes, nor to
636
overrule the judgments of the Courts.”
Hayes asserted the president’s power to control the executive
branch even more directly in his third annual message, in which he
strongly attacked the notion that inferior federal officials had any
executive authority which was separate and apart from that of the
637
president. In Hayes’s opinion, the sole responsibility of subordinate
638
Hayes
officers was to “their superior in official position.”
elaborated: “It is their duty to obey the legal instructions of those
upon whom that authority is devolved, and their best public service
consists in the discharge of their functions irrespective of partisan
politics. Their duties are the same whatever party is in power and
639
whatever policy prevails.”
In order to depoliticize the process, Hayes recommended that
Congress develop clear qualifications to govern the appointment and
640
removal of lower executive officials. But the earlier portions of
Hayes’s address, quoted above, made it clear that under any such
proposal, failure to follow the directions of higher-ranking executive
officials must necessarily constitute proper grounds for removal. Any
doubts in this regard were eliminated the following year in Hayes’s
fourth annual message, in which he explicitly called for the outright
641
repeal of the nefarious Tenure of Office Act. In Hayes’s opinion,
the president would be the sole judge of who should continue to serve

634. Rawley, supra note 574, at 142; see also HOOGENBOOM, supra note 584, , at 7992; 2 GOLDSMITH, supra note 20, at 1136.
635. HOOGENBOOM, supra note 584, at 90.
636. Id. at 125.
637. Rutherford B. Hayes, Third Annual Message (Dec. 1, 1879) in 6 MESSAGES &
PAPERS, supra note 57, at 4509, 4514.
638. Id.
639. Id.
640. Id.
641. Rutherford B. Hayes, Fourth Annual Message (Dec. 6, 1880), in 6 MESSAGES &
PAPERS, supra note 57, at 4557; see also HOOGENBOOM, supra note 584, at 212.
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in the executive branch without any interference from the Senate.
Hayes’s most important action in foreign affairs came with his
anticipation of the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine in a
special message of March 8, 1880, where he declared it was
American policy to build a canal connecting the Atlantic and Pacific
Oceans under American control. Like the Monroe Doctrine itself and
Washington’s Neutrality Proclamation, this was a major assertion of
642
presidential power in setting national policy. Hayes ultimately fired
Navy Secretary Thompson for collaborating with a French company
643
seeking to build such a canal.
In his fourth and final annual message to Congress, delivered on
December 8, 1880, Hayes urged Congress to investigate violations of
the Fifteenth Amendment and to appropriate funds for prosecuting
644
those who were depriving African-Americans of their voting rights.
Hayes attacked the spoils system as an unconstitutional encroachment
on the president’s appointment power, and, as noted above, he called
645
for repeal of the Tenure of Office Act.
When the 1880 election arrived, Hayes, who had declared himself
646
in favor of one six-year, non-renewable term for the president, was
not a candidate for reelection. This was a source of relief to
Republican politicians, who found Hayes’s intra-party fight with
Conkling and his pro-Southern policy not to their liking. Hayes had
never overcome the taint of his disputed election, and his final two
years in office, during which he confronted a Democratic Senate and
House, had been stormy indeed. Hayes was a great president from the
perspective of unitary executive theorists, but a lousy one from the
perspective of Republican politicos.
In sum, Hayes rose above the circumstances of his election to
become a strong president, especially when one considers that the
Democrats controlled the Senate for two years of his presidency and
the House for its entirety. The great disaster of Hayes’s presidency
was, of course, his withdrawal of federal troops from the South and
the ending of Reconstruction. But in terms of restoring the power and
prestige of the presidency, Hayes deserves praise. He beat the House
on appropriations riders and the Senate on appointments. He also laid
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the groundwork for civil service reform.
The price of restoring some presidential power that had been lost
by previous administrations was high. The removal of Arthur and
Cornell had monopolized the attention of the administration for nearly
eighteen months. It became clear that the Senate’s continued
involvement in executive removals through the amended Tenure of
Office Act would remain a significant obstacle to the president’s
control over the execution of the laws until it was repealed.
C. James A. Garfield
James A. Garfield was elected to the House of Representatives in
1862, where he served as a Radical Republican member until his
647
election to the presidency. In 1868, he favored the impeachment of
648
President Andrew Johnson.
From 1871 to 1875, Garfield was
chairman of the powerful House Appropriations Committee, a post
that taught him a great deal about the workings of the U.S.
649
government.
While in the House, Garfield exhibited an
unsurprising pro-Congress bias. He favored a proposal to give
department heads seats in Congress in order to rein in the executive
650
branch. And in 1869, when Grant pushed a bill that would have
repealed the Tenure of Office Act through the House of
Representatives, Garfield opposed it, saying “never by my vote shall
Congress give up the constitutional principle and allow to any one
man, be he an angel from Heaven, the absolute and sole control of
651
appointments to and removals from office in this country.”
At the start of the Hayes administration, the ever-fickle Garfield
changed his mind about the Tenure of Office Act, which he had
favored in 1869. Writing in 1877, Garfield said:
During the last twenty-five years, it has been understood, by the
Congress and the people, that offices are to be obtained by the aid
of senators and representatives, who thus become the dispensers,
sometimes the brokers of patronage. . . . [The Tenure of Office
Act] has virtually resulted in the usurpation, by the senate, of a
large share of the appointing power . . . has resulted in seriously
crippling the just powers of the executive, and has placed in the
647. HOOGENBOOM, supra note 584, at 150.
648. JUSTUS D. DOENECKE, THE PRESIDENCIES OF JAMES A. GARFIELD & CHESTER A.
ARTHUR 22 (1981).
649. WHITE, supra note 522, at 61.
650. Id. at 107.
651. Id. at 29 n.31 (quoting 1 THE LIFE AND LETTERS OF JAMES ABRAM GARFIELD 444
(Theodore Clark Smith ed., 1925)).
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hands of senators
and representatives a power most corrupt and
652
dangerous.’

Thus by 1877, Garfield was publicly on record as opposing the
Tenure of Office Act.
Garfield emerged as a dark horse choice for the 1880 Republican
nomination after front-running candidates John Sherman, Ulysses S.
Grant, and James G. Blaine faded. Garfield’s win was attributable to
the votes of followers of Sherman and Half-Breed Blaine, and
consequently, the Stalwarts, led by Senator Roscoe Conkling and
supporters of Grant, needed to be propitiated. Garfield accomplished
this by picking Conkling’s protégé, Chester A. Arthur, the corrupt
former Collector of the Port of New York, to be the vice presidential
653
candidate. With Garfield and Arthur on a joint ticket, both the proreform and anti-reform wings of the Republican Party were
represented. This joint representation was made necessary by the
stormy battles of the Hayes presidency, which had split the
Republican Party into two wings.
President-elect Garfield decided to make Blaine his Secretary of
State, to Conkling’s irritation, but overall he picked a cabinet that
“was remarkably balanced,” representing many “disparate wings of
654
the party.” Unlike Hayes, Garfield was quite “willing to sacrifice
some executive independence in cabinet making in order to secure
655
good relations with Congress.”
As president, the ever-malleable Garfield was besieged by office
656
seekers. He wrote in his journal: “My day is frittered away by the
personal seeking of people, when it ought to be given to the great
problems which concern the whole country. Four years of this kind of
intellectual dissipation may cripple me for the remainder of my
657
life.” On June 6, 1881, Garfield wrote in his diary that after an
absence of three days, “[t]he stream of callers which was damned up

652. James A. Garfield, A Century of Progress, 40 ATL. MONTHLY 61 (1877),
reprinted in 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES ABRAM GARFIELD 463, 483 (Burke A. Hinsdale ed.,
1883); see also REHNQUIST, supra note 309, at 259; WHITE, supra note 522, at 32;
Richard Harmond, The Presidency in the Gilded Age: From Rutherford B. Hayes to
Williams McKinley, in POWER AND THE PRESIDENCY 53, 56 (Philip C. Dolce & George H.
Skau eds., 1976).
653. DOENECKE, supra note 648, at 21.
654. Id. at 35.
655. HOOGENBOOM, supra note 584, at 214.
656. See WHITE, supra note 522, at 6.
657. Id.
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by my absence became a torrent and swept away my day.” Two
days later he noted, “My day in the office was very like its
predecessors. Once or twice I felt like crying out in the agony of my
659
soul against the greed for office and its consumption of my time.”
While in office, Garfield sent somewhat conflicting signals about
the president’s power to control the executive branch. As noted
earlier, Garfield had condemned the Tenure of Office Act during
660
Hayes’s battle with the Senate in 1877. In his inaugural address,
however, the ever-changing Garfield announced his intention to ask
Congress to place substantive limits on the removal power by
“prescrib[ing] the grounds upon which removals shall be made” in
661
order to “protect[] . . . incumbents against intrigue and wrong.” The
import of this proposal was mitigated by the fact that Garfield
specifically limited his proposed civil service tenure to “minor offices
of the Executive Departments.” The fact that policy-making offices
were not covered by Garfield’s proposal makes it consistent with the
theory of the unitary executive, which calls only for unlimited
presidential removal power over policy-making officials. It also
renders Garfield’s inaugural address consistent with his 1877
criticisms of the Tenure of Office Act. Because Garfield’s
administration was tragically cut short when he was assassinated by a
frustrated office seeker, Garfield never had the chance to expound
further on his views of the president’s power to control the executive
branch.
Garfield was a weak president, as was his successor Chester A.
Arthur. It is no accident that it was during Garfield’s and Arthur’s
tenure in office that a young Woodrow Wilson was to claim that the
legislative branch “has virtually taken into its hands all the substantial
662
powers of government.” Wilson further declared that “the President
663
is no greater than his prerogative of veto makes him.”
The major issue Garfield faced during his brief six months in office
was civil service reform, the desire for which had been growing
throughout the 1870s. By the time of his inaugural address, Garfield
658. Id. at 93-94 (citing 2 THEODORE C. SMITH, LIFE AND LETTERS OF JAMES ABRAM
GARFIELD 1151-52 (1925)).
659. Id.
660. See supra note 652 and accompanying text.
661. James A. Garfield, Inaugural Address (March 4, 1881), in 6 MESSAGES & PAPERS,
supra note 57, 4596, 4601-02.
662. WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 49 (Meridian 1973) (1885),
quoted in DOENECKE, supra note 648, at 12.
663. Id. at 173, quoted in DOENECKE, supra note 648, at 15.
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had irritated reformers by proposing much less change than had
outgoing President Hayes. Garfield proposed tenure for minor
officeholders, as noted above, while Hayes came out for “uniform
methods of appointment, the competitive system, the revival of the
Civil Service Commission, and an end to congressional interference
664
with executive officeholders.”
When the Star Route Affair, a
scandal involving contracts to deliver the U.S. mail, broke two
months into his administration and it became clear that major
Republican figures were involved, to his credit Garfield told
665
investigators, “Go ahead regardless of where and whom you hit.”
This was, however, a minor contribution in light of the overall debate
about civil service reform.
The one major contribution of the all too brief Garfield
administration suggests that he would have ardently defended the
president’s authority over the executive branch. After Garfield was
inaugurated, the Stalwart faction, led by the ubiquitous Senator
Conkling, attempted to dictate Garfield’s nominations to many minor
666
but important executive branch offices. Garfield refused and openly
defied the Stalwarts by nominating William H. Robertson, a not-soable ally of Conkling’s chief rival as collector of the port of New
667
York. To Garfield, the issue was simple: “Shall the principal port of
entry in which more than ninety percent of all our customs duties are
collected be under the control of administration or under the local
668
control of a factional senator?” Garfield wrote that the Robertson
nomination “brings on the contest at once and will settle the question
whether the President is the registering clerk of the Senate or the
Executive of the Nation. It is probable that the contest will be sharp
669
and bitter but I prefer to have the fight ended now.”
Conkling threw the entire weight of his political machine against
Garfield, but the public sided with Garfield. On May 5, Garfield
strengthened his hand by withdrawing all nominations but
Robertson’s, indicating that he “considered the power and prestige of
670
the presidency to be at stake.” Thus compromised, Conkling and
664. DOENECKE, supra note 648, at 41.
665. Id. at 46-47.
666. See Ari Hoogenboom, James A. Garfield, in TO THE BEST OF MY ABILITY, supra
note 329, at 151-52.
667. DOENECKE, supra note 648, at 45.
668. 2 THE LIFE AND LETTERS OF JAMES ABRAM GARFIELD, supra note 651, at 1109.
669. WHITE, supra note 522, at 34 (quoting GARFIELD-HINSDALE LETTERS 489 (Mary
L. Hinsdale, ed. 1949)).
670. DOENECKE, supra note 648, at 44.
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fellow New York Senator Thomas C. Platt resigned their seats in the
U.S. Senate in the hopes that the New York legislature would restore
their reputations by re-electing them. Conkling’s gambit backfired
671
when the legislature declined to re-elect either of them. Garfield’s
actions were hailed as a milestone in the revival of the power and
prestige of the presidency, and Conkling never held public office
672
again.
Garfield’s assassination on July 2, 1881, turned the feckless
politician into a martyr for the cause of civil service reform, a cause
he had supported tepidly at best while still alive. Henry Adams called
the reaction of civil service reformers to Garfield’s death “cynical
673
impudence” for this reason. Garfield’s assassin Charles Guiteau, a
deranged and disappointed office seeker, called out after he shot
Garfield that he was a Stalwart and that now Arthur would be
674
president.
The general reaction of the public was universal
indignation over the spoils system. As Senator Henry L. Dawes was
quoted as rightly saying:
“ . . . the method of appointment to office in this country has got to
be changed. It can be administered but little longer in the methods
of the past. It has outgrown those methods adapted for an old
system of things never sufficient for them; but it was never dreamt
by those who created it that it would be applied to the condition of
things now existing in this country. It can no longer be that
200,000 office-holders can be appointed in the methods that were
fit and proper for the appointment of 1,000. Two hundred thousand
in the very near future are to be appointed . . . .” And again, “ . . .
were it not for the debauchery of this service itself the necessity of
a safe administration would be so apparent that the thoughtful and
earnest statesman of675
whatever party . . . would see that this must be
changed somehow.”

Civil service reform, so long stalled, would be enacted in 1883 under
676
the administration of Garfield’s successor.
Garfield’s presidency of six months was too brief to permit many
conclusions to be drawn about it, but it is noteworthy that Garfield
arrived in office as a stated opponent of the Tenure of Office Act. The

671. Id. at 45.
672. See generally BINKLEY, supra note 70, at 172-74; DOENECKE, supra note 648, at
42-45; TUGWELL, supra note 7, at 218; WHITE, supra note 522, at 34-35.
673. Hoogenboom, supra note 666, at 152.
674. Id; see also DOENECKE, supra note 648, at 95.
675. WHITE, supra note 522, at 301 (quoting 13 CONG. REC. 467-68 (1882)).
676. Id. at 301-02.
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one great struggle of his six months in office was with Roscoe
Conkling, and it showed that Garfield was determined to wrest back
presidential control over the appointment power from the barons of
the Senate. Garfield, like Hayes, Grant, and Johnson before him, is
thus justifiably regarded as a defender of the unitary executive. There
was no acquiescence during Garfield’s tenure in any diminution of the
rightful powers of the presidency.
D. Chester A. Arthur
Vice President Chester A. Arthur had been placed on the
Republican ticket to create sectional and ideological balance in 1880.
A committed Stalwart, Arthur was to balance the more moderate
Garfield, who had gained the support of Blaine’s Half-Breeds.
Reformer Edward L. Godkin aptly described Arthur’s past
associations as “a mess of filth,” but he optimistically said “there is
no place in which [Arthur’s] powers of mischief will be as small as in
677
the Vice Presidency.” When Arthur became president because of an
assassin’s bullet, reformers were terrified at the thought of Conkling
678
being “the power behind the throne.”
Moreover, there was little in Arthur’s “background to prepare him
679
for executive leadership.” From 1871 until his dismissal in 1878,
Arthur had been the spoilsman collector of the port of New York, a
post in which he had been found by the Jay Commission to be
680
notoriously corrupt.
Worst of all, Arthur’s administration was
hamstrung by the fact that he assumed the presidency without having
been elected to it. At least two of the three previous vice presidents to
succeed to the presidency, John Tyler and Andrew Johnson, endured
rocky tenures in no small part because they repudiated the policies of
the man whose death brought them to the White House. This was an
inherent hazard in the system of picking vice presidential candidates
to balance a party ticket. Arthur, to his credit, broke this pattern and
behaved more like Millard Fillmore, an accidental president who
continued the policies of his deceased predecessor. Stalwarts did not
take over the government under Arthur. On the contrary, civil service
reform passed and the President signed it into law.

677. Bernard A. Weisberger, Chester A. Arthur, in TO THE BEST OF MY ABILITY, supra
note 329, at 154.
678. Id.
679. Id.
680. See supra notes 625-629 and accompanying text.
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The beginning of Arthur’s administration showed great promise.
Arthur at first appeared to be a good administrator, and “his conduct
681
during the assassination crisis . . . won him public sympathy.” He
began by keeping Garfield’s cabinet and as he gradually replaced its
members, he “did so responsibly, almost as if to prove that the
682
Stalwarts were not bereft of talent.” The new Secretary of State was
former New Jersey Senator Frederick Frelinghuysen, an improvement
over Blaine; the new Secretary of the Treasury was Charles Folger,
Chief Justice of the New York State Supreme Court; and the new
Attorney General was Benjamin Brewster, the former state attorney
683
general for Pennsylvania. While Stalwart cronies were welcome at
“sumptuous feasts,” Arthur so frustrated their desires for patronage
that Conkling was moved to complain that the Hayes administration
684
was “‘respectable, if not heroic’ in comparison.”
Although
thousands of patronage jobs were available in the Treasury
Department alone, “by the summer of 1882, only sixteen removals
685
had been made.” Most dramatically, Arthur resisted appeals to fire
686
Robertson from his post as collector of the port of New York.
Reacting swiftly to the Star Route scandal, Arthur ordered a series of
removals growing out of the affair, and in his first annual message, he
687
pledged to prosecute offenders “with the utmost vigor of the law.”
Doenecke notes, “As a man Arthur may have been saddened to see
his cronies indicted, but as president he wholeheartedly supported the
688
prosecuting attorneys.”
In this same message, Arthur also endorsed civil service reforms
that would include “ascertained fitness” for positions, stable tenure of
689
office, and prompt investigation of abuses. He pledged to support
any civil service reform bill that Congress might pass, and asked for
an appropriation of $25,000 to reactivate President Grant’s Civil
690
Service Commission. Ohio Democrat George Hunt Pendleton had a
civil service reform bill pending, but Congress was initially quite

681.
682.
683.
684.
685.
686.
687.

DOENECKE, supra note 648, at 75.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 76.
Id.
Id.
Chester A. Arthur, First Annual Message (Dec. 6, 1881), in 6 MESSAGES &
PAPERS, supra note 57, at 4624, 4640; see also DOENECKE, supra note 648, at 93.
688. DOENECKE, supra note 648, at 93.
689. Arthur, First Annual Message supra note 687, at 4647.
690. Id. at 4650.
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opposed to such reform and appropriated only $15,000 for the revival
of the Civil Service Commission. Harvard president Charles W. Eliot,
poet Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, psychologist William James, and
author Brooks Adams signed petitions supporting the proposal, but at
691
first, nothing happened.
Over time, however, Arthur began to show his true colors. He was
essentially a lazy man whose “apathy toward administrative tasks was
in almost inverse ratio to his love of high living. As a White House
clerk later commented, ‘President Arthur never did today what could
692
be put off until tomorrow.’” He worked six hours a day, from ten in
the morning until four in the afternoon, “after which he pursued the
693
life of a bon vivant.” “Twice a week, at noon, he met with his
694
cabinet.” Arthur’s bad relations with the press were exacerbated by
the scathing coverage given to a speech at Delmonico’s Restaurant,
where he drunkenly confessed to knowledge of vote purchasing in
695
Indiana. To top all of this off, Arthur suffered from very poor
health and was essentially dying during his tenure as president. He
suffered from Bright’s disease, a fatal kidney disorder that “leads to
696
spasmodic nausea, mental depression, and inertness.”
Arthur
learned of his illness in 1882, and he kept it secret from the public. It
undoubtedly contributed to his lethargy as president. He eventually
succumbed to the disease in 1886, shortly after leaving the White
House.
Then, in the 1882 mid-term elections, the Republicans suffered a
huge defeat, losing control of the House of Representatives and
suffering a greatly reduced margin in the Senate. Newspapers referred
697
to the election as a “Democratic Cyclone.” In the words of Mrs.
Henry Adams, Congress may have been behaving like “a pack of
whipped boys,” but it was this electoral convulsion, more than
698
anything else, that moved Congress to enact civil service reform. In
his second annual message, Arthur explicitly endorsed the Pendleton
bill, for the first time endorsing competitive examinations and a ban

691. DOENECKE, supra note 648, at 98.
692. Id. at 79 (quoting T HOMAS C. R EAVES , G ENTLEMAN B OSS : T HE L IFE OF
C HESTER A LAN A RTHUR 273 (1975)).
693. Weisberger, supra note 677, at 79.
694. DOENECKE, supra note 648, at 79.
695. Id. at 33, 80.
696. Id. at 80.
697. Id. at 99.
698. Id. at 100 (quoting ARI H OOGENBOOM , O UTLAWING THE S POILS S YSTEM : A
H ISTORY OF THE C IVIL S ERVICE R EFORM M OVEMENT , 1865-1883, at 236 (1961)).
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699

on political assessments. Arthur subsequently signed the measure
into law, even though he had only supported the measure “most
700
reluctantly.”
The Pendleton Act, as finally adopted, established a bipartisan
Civil Service Commission of three members appointed by the
president with senatorial consent but subject to removal by the
701
president. It required that open, competitive examinations be held,
702
with appointments going to those who earned the highest grades. It
703
apportioned the civil service among the states equitably. It also
provided for protection of the so-called “classified service” (i.e.,
positions covered by civil service protections) against political
assessments by explicitly providing that public servant could not be
forced to contribute to political funds or be removed for failure to
704
contribute to do so. The Act also prohibited federal officials from
705
soliciting political contributions from employees and barred anyone
from soliciting or receiving such contributions in any public
706
building.
The president was given the power to extend the
707
classified service to more employees by executive order, a power
708
The end
used to great effect by President Grover Cleveland.
product was a model law that ended the spoils system and
revolutionized the American civil service. Soon after its enactment,
commentators noted a great reduction in the level of incompetence in
the civil service, and the proceeds from assessments dropped by as
709
much as half.
During the debates on civil service reform, Arthur never clearly
stated his position on the removal power. It is important to note,
however, that a close reading of Arthur’s comments regarding an
early version of the Pendleton Act suggests that Arthur would have
opposed any congressionally imposed limits on the removal power.
The bill, as reported by the Senate, was modeled on the British civil

699. Chester A. Arthur, Second Annual Message (Dec. 4, 1882), in 6 MESSAGES &
PAPERS, supra note 57, at 4713, 4732-34.
700. DOENECKE, supra note 648, at 101-02.
701. Civil Service Act of 1883, ch. 27, § 1, 22 Stat. 403, 403.
702. § 2, 22 Stat. at 403-04 (first and second clauses).
703. § 2, 22 Stat. at 404 (third clause).
704. § 2, 22 Stat. at 404 (fifth clause).
705. § 11, 22 Stat. at 406.
706. § 12, 22 Stat. at 407.
707. § 6, 22 Stat. at 406 (third clause).
708. See infra notes 759-760 and accompanying text.
709. DOENECKE, supra note 648, at 104; WHITE, supra note 522, at 301-02.
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service system, providing for competitive examinations for entrance
into the public service, security of tenure of most civil officers, and
710
the political neutrality of the civil service. Arthur supported the bill
in principle, but complained that “there are certain features of the
English system which have not generally been received with favor in
this country,” which included limiting entry into the civil service to
people who are no older than twenty-five and granting federal
711
employees “[a] tenure of office which is substantially a life tenure.”
The final version of the Act incorporated several key changes to the
initial legislation to address some of these concerns, making the
examinations more practical in character and deleting the provision
permitting entrance into the civil service only at the lowest grade. In
addition, the bill left to the president the determination of which, if
any, officers would be covered by the Act. The result, Arthur noted, is
to limit the scope of the bill to “subordinates whose duties are purely
administrative and have no legitimate connection with the any
712
political principles.” And most importantly for the purposes of this
article, the revised act deleted all restrictions on the president’s power
713
to remove, thus preserving, as Arthur noted, a power essential for
ensuring presidential control of all officials in policymaking and
714
political positions. The bill thus cured, Arthur signed it without
reservation, although he would subsequently file a limited objection
715
His subsequent approval of the
to its appointment provisions.
legislation is thus fully consistent with the view that Arthur did not
acquiesce in any congressionally imposed limitations on the
president’s power to control the executive branch.
Arthur never specifically commented on the Tenure of Office Act
during his presidency, but he preserved presidential removal power
through the civil service reform battles of the early 1880s. This was
no mean feat. It was not until the Lloyd-La Follette Act of 1912 that

710. S. R EP . N O . 47-576, at ix-x (1882).
711. Arthur, First Annual Message, supra note 687, at 4647-48.
712. Arthur, Second Annual Message, supra note 699, at 4733.
713. VAN R IPER , supra note 66, at 99-109.
714. Arthur, Second Annual Message, supra note 699, at 4733.
715. A month and a half after signing the Act, Arthur sent a message to the Senate
objecting that the provision requiring that the chief examiner be appointed by the
Commission, § 3, 22 Stat. at 404, violated Article II, section 2, of the Constitution.
Arthur’s message closed by nominating Silas W. Burt as Chief Examiner. Chester A.
Arthur, Message to the Senate (Mar. 1, 1883), in 6 MESSAGES & PAPERS, supra note 57,
at 158. The Senate confirmed Burt and has thereafter acquiesced in the view that the Chief
Examiner had to be appointed in accordance with Article II. See May, supra note 243, at
952-53 & nn.396, 971.
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removal “was required to be made only to promote the efficiency of
716
the [civil] service.” Once appointments had to be awarded to the
winner of competitive exams, there was no incentive to make partisan
removals anymore. Removals thus decreased substantially of their
717
own accord in the classified civil service. The unitary executive
was thus alive and well when Jacksonian Democrat Grover Cleveland
became the first Democrat to be elected president since James
Buchanan in 1856.
E. Grover Cleveland
As President, Grover Cleveland was a significant improvement
718
over Arthur. He was “a doughty warrior of undeviating courage”
with an admirable commitment to civil service reform. His 1884
presidential campaign is famous for its dirtiness, with the
Republicans, led by Blaine, under attack for corruption, and with
719
Cleveland under attack for allegedly having a child out of wedlock.
Cleveland called for the president to serve only a single term, a
reform intended to eliminate presidential temptations to despoil the
720
civil service.
Cleveland pledged “public allegiance to a Whiggish version of the
presidency—the chief executive restricted to administrative duties
721
and abjuring a role in the legislative process” —but in his heart he
722
was “[n]ostalgic for the Jacksonian past.” Cleveland’s “political
723
heroes” were Jefferson and Jackson, and like Jackson, he believed
the president, with his unique national constituency, was “the
724
people’s tribune.” He particularly admired Jackson’s “presidential
independence and the authority of the righteous executive in contest
725
Cleveland’s Jacksonian pedigree
with mischievous senators.”
suggests his belief in the untrammeled importance of the presidential
removal power. His “aggressive insistence on presidential
independence led him to exercise increasing control of the executive

716. W HITE , supra note 522, at 344; see generally id. at 340-45 (describing the
evolution of protection against arbitrary removals).
717. Id. at 340-41.
718. RICHARD E. WELCH, JR., THE PRESIDENCIES OF GROVER CLEVELAND 1 (1988).
719. Id. at 32-36.
720. Id. at 35-36.
721. Id. at 9.
722. Id. at 7.
723. Id. at 12.
724. Id. at 11.
725. Id. at 16.
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branch and then to seek influence over Congress and national
726
legislation.” In the end, Cleveland was to live up to his idol in
protecting the presidential removal power from attempted
congressional incursions. Cleveland was able to declare at the end of
his first year in office that his most important contribution to the
presidency would be to insist upon the independence of the executive
727
and legislative branches.
He was accused by his critics of
728
a charge often leveled at strong and
“monarchical arrogance,”
effective presidents.
Cleveland was sworn in on March 4, 1885, and he delivered his
inaugural address “from memory,” the only time this has ever
729
happened in American history.
Cleveland was “fascinated by
detail,” and he rapidly buried himself in his work putting in long days
punctuated by only four to five hours of sleep a night. He generally
had cabinet meetings twice a week, and he exhibited “a measure of
730
administrative talent” with his cabinet. He made it “understood that
[his cabinet members] were his loyal lieutenants and were to avoid
intramural quarrels or dissent. Cabinet officers were expected to
observe the policies established by Cleveland for each executive
731
department.”
Importantly, “in cabinet meetings everyone was
encouraged to speak, but no votes were taken. Cleveland would listen
carefully to the opinion of each cabinet officer in turn, but he alone
732
would make the final decision on administration policy.” Another
noted historian asserts that in Cleveland’s cabinet meetings, “there
were no set speeches, and no votes were taken, the President’s theory
being that in a cabinet there are many voices, but one vote. Each
member was free to express his views; but when the illumination of
frank comment and informal discussion was over, it was the president
733
who must make the decision.”
The conflict between the President and Congress over control of
the executive branch and the Tenure of Office Act had been brewing
since the Grant administration, and it reached its climax during

726.
727.
728.
729.
730.
731.
732.
733.

Id.; see also WHITE, supra note 522, at 25.
WELCH, supra note 718, at 10.
Id.
Id. at 47.
Id. at 49-50.
Id. at 50.
Id. (emphasis added).
WHITE, supra note 522, at 100 (quoting 1 ROBERT MCELROY, GROVER
CLEVELAND: THE MAN AND THE STATESMAN 115 (1923)).
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Cleveland’s first term. In his first annual message, Cleveland laid
out a formalist vision of the separation of powers:
Contemplation of the grave and responsible functions assigned to
the respective branches of the Government under the Constitution
will disclose the partitions of power between our respective
departments and their necessary independence, and also the need
for the exercise of all the power intrusted [sic] to each in that spirit
of comity and cooperation which is essential to the proper
fulfillment of the patriotic obligations
which rest upon us as
735
faithful servants of the people.

Consistent with this vision, Cleveland quickly asserted the
authority to direct all executive officials, in one instance overruling a
736
decision of the Secretary of the Interior. The first Democrat elected
to the White House in a quarter-century, Cleveland also suspended
643 officials during his first ten months in office. The Republicancontrolled Senate attempted to force the new administration into
admitting that it made these removals for partisan purposes by
refusing to confirm the new appointees until Cleveland had informed
it of the reasons for the removals. After three months, only 15 of the
737
643 nominations had been approved. As Cleveland’s biographer,
Richard Welch, notes, “Senate Republicans were in a contentious
mood and were determined to demonstrate the hypocrisy of
Cleveland’s stance as a civil service reformer. They would force him
to admit that partisan animus alone dictated his appointments policy,
and in the revised Tenure of Office Act they believed they had the
738
necessary tool.”
Under the Tenure of Office Act as revised in 1869, “[n]o longer did
a president have to charge officeholders with criminal misconduct
before he could suspend them, and no longer would a president have
to provide the Senate with ‘the evidence and reasons’ for his
739
action.” The president could suspend officeholders and appoint

734. The Duskin controversy described below is recounted in Louis Fisher, Grover
Cleveland Against the Senate, 7 CONG. STUD. 11 (1979); see also BINKLEY, supra note
70, at 198-99; 2 GOLDSMITH, supra note 20, at 1113-14; HARRIS, supra note 368, at 88;
VAN RIPER, supra note 66, at 120-21; WHITE, supra note 522, at 30-31.
735. Grover Cleveland, First Annual Message (Dec. 8, 1885), in 6 MESSAGES &
PAPERS, supra note 57, at 4910.
736. Cross, supra note 311, at 489 n.31 (citing HINSDALE, supra note 525, at 324).
737. BINKLEY, supra note 70, at 198-99; 2 GOLDSMITH, supra note 20, at 1113-14;
HARRIS, supra note 368, at 88; VAN RIPER, supra note 66, at 120-21; Fisher, supra note
375, at 73; Fisher, supra note 735, at 13-14.
738. WELCH, supra note 718, at 53.
739. Id. at 53-54.
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temporary replacements, but he would have to submit “the names of
all replacements within thirty days after the Senate had
740
reconvened.” The revised Act lessened the obstructionist authority
of the Senate, “but presidential control over the dismissal of civil
officers in the executive branch was still restricted. It was the
741
intention of the Republican senators to expand that restriction.”
Senate Republicans “caucused and decided to refuse to confirm
Cleveland’s appointments unless he produced all documents bearing
on the suspension of the former officeholder, as well as the
742
nomination of his successor.” Cleveland saw this as an invasion of
presidential prerogatives and he instructed his subordinates “not to
submit any papers concerning suspensions but to continue to provide
‘official papers’ in support of nominations submitted for senatorial
743
confirmation.” Cleveland was determined to prevent the Senate
from engaging in a fishing expedition “to publicize confidential or
744
irrelevant communications.”
The dispute between Cleveland and the Republican-controlled
Senate came to a head over the case of Republican George M.
Duskin, whom Cleveland had suspended as U.S. Attorney for the
Southern District of Alabama. Cleveland nominated Democrat John
D. Burnett to replace Duskin. George F. Edmunds, the crusty
chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, believed Duskin’s
745
suspension was the ideal test case. On January 25, 1886, the Senate
passed a resolution directing the attorney general to submit all
documents relating to this suspension.
The battle was joined, and it was understood by both sides that it
was a battle over more than the installation of Duskin’s successor.
At stake was the President’s ability to assure the cooperation of
officials who would have responsibility for executing
administration policy, the proper breadth of the investigatory
powers of the Senate, and the issue of presidential
control over
746
papers deposited in executive departments.

The attorney general refused the Senate’s demand for all
documents relating to the Duskin suspension, stating that the
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Id. at 54; see supra note 523 and accompanying text.
WELCH, supra note 718, at 54.
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Id. at 54.
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President had directed him not to comply with the resolution. When
the Senate persisted with its call for the information, Cleveland
responded on March 1, 1886, with a scathing message challenging the
constitutionality of both the original and the revised versions of the
Tenure of Office Act and denying the Senate’s right to request such
information. This message was targeted to the American public as
well as the Republican Senate and placed its primary reliance on the
text of the Constitution, declaring that “the power to remove or
suspend such officials is vested in the president alone by the
Constitution, which in express terms provides that ‘the executive
power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America,’
747
and that ‘he shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed.’”
The Senate, in contrast, “belongs to the legislative branch of the
Government.” Although Cleveland conceded, “the Constitution by
express provision [had] superadded to its legislative duties the right to
advise and consent to appointments to office and to sit as a court of
impeachment,” these provisions represented an “express and special
grant of such extraordinary powers” which were “a departure from the
general plan of our Government, [and thus] should be held, under a
familiar maxim of construction, to exclude every other right of
interference with Executive functions.” Any doubts as to the propriety
of this view, Cleveland submitted, had been resolved by “the first
Congress which assembled after the adoption of the Constitution,”
747. Grover Cleveland, Message to the Senate (Mar. 1, 1886), in 6 MESSAGES &
PAPERS, supra note 57, at 4960, 4964 [hereinafter Cleveland, Duskin Message]. Cleveland
later offered similar sentiments in his book, Presidential Problems:
The Constitution declares: “The executive power shall be vested in a President
of the United States of America,” and this is followed by a recital of the specific
and distinctly declared duties with which he is charged, and the powers with
which he is invested. The members of the convention were not willing, however,
that the executive power which they had vested in the President should be
cramped and embarrassed by any implication that a specific statement of certain
granted powers and duties excluded all other executive functions; nor were they
apparently willing that the claim of such exclusion should have countenance in
the strict meaning which might be given to the words “executive power.”
Therefore we find that the Constitution supplements a recital of the specific
powers and duties of the President with this impressive and conclusive additional
requirement: “He shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed.” This I
conceive to be equivalent to a grant of all the power necessary to the
performance of his duty in the faithful execution of the laws.
...
It is therefore apparent that as the Constitution, in addition to its specification
of especial duties and powers devolving upon the President, provides that “he
shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed,” and as this was evidently
intended as a general devolution of power and imposition of obligation in respect
to any condition that might arise relating to the execution of the laws . . . .
GROVER CLEVELAND, PRESIDENTIAL PROBLEMS 14-16 (1904).
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which had similarly sustained “the independence of the Executive in
748
the matter of removals from office.”
The Senate retaliated by considering a series of four resolutions
condemning the actions of the attorney general and declaring the
Senate’s refusal to act on any of Cleveland’s nominations until the
requested information was provided. After a prolonged debate, the
Senate proceeded to pass all four of the resolutions, although the key
resolution refusing to consider any further nominations until the
749
requested information was provided passed by only a single vote.
However, after this vote was taken, it was discovered that the entire
debate concerning Duskin’s suspension was for naught, as his
appointment had already expired according to its own terms.
Cleveland’s message of March 1 had “inspired considerable support
750
from the public and the press” even though a few Mugwumps like
751
Carl Schurz sided with the Republican Senate. Having exhausted
their political resources and facing a wave of adverse public opinion,
Senate Republicans finally conceded defeat and promptly confirmed
Cleveland’s nominee to succeed Duskin. Shortly thereafter, an
exhausted Congress finally repealed the Tenure of Office Act in its
752
entirety, after Senator George Frisbie Hoar, “a devout Republican
whose allegiance to the Constitution exceeded his love for the Grand
Old Party, proposed repeal. Cleveland had the pleasure of signing the
repeal bill on March 3, 1887. With its passage, Congress formally
abrogated its claim ‘to control presidential discretion in suspending or
753
removing officials in the executive branch.’”
Years later, Cleveland wrote, “thus was an unpleasant controversy
happily followed by an expurgation of the last pretense of statutory
sanction to an encroachment upon constitutional Executive
prerogatives, and thus was a time-honored interpretation of the
754
Constitution restored to us.” Cleveland eventually settled into a
general policy of immediately replacing “corrupt and inefficient
spoilsmen,” but to allow current Republican officeholders “who had
755
not made themselves obnoxious” to finish their four year terms.
748. Cleveland, Duskin Message, supra note 747, at 4964.
749. 17 CONG. REC. 2810-14 (1886).
750. WELCH, supra note 718, at 55.
751. Id. at 56.
752. Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 353, 24 Stat. 500.
753. WELCH, supra note 718, at 56.
754. CLEVELAND, supra note 747, at 76, quoted in WHITE, THE REPUBLICAN ERA,
supra note 522, at 31.
755. WELCH, supra note 718, at 57.
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“The implication was clear that ‘offensive partisans’ would be
removed before their four years were up and that other Republicans,
upon the conclusion of their term of office, most likely would be
756
replaced by meritorious members of the Democratic party.”
Cleveland wanted to improve the efficiency of the civil service and
right the partisan imbalance in the service after twenty-four years of
unbroken Republican rule. To Cleveland’s irritation, the Mugwumps
criticized him for being too partisan in his personnel policies. By the
spring of 1886, Cleveland became worried about Democratic
757
criticism, and he accelerated the removal of Republicans. By the
end of Cleveland’s first term in March 1889, “some 75 percent of the
one hundred thousand nonclassified workers had been replaced, with
758
fourth-class postmasters furnishing a large share of the total.”
Although Cleveland was not afraid to clean house with respect to
partisan jobs through vigorous exercise of his removal power, he did
make major efforts to extend the merit system of classified appointees
created by the Pendleton Act. When it was enacted under President
Arthur, the Act initially protected eleven percent of the government’s
759
131,000 employees, but the Act allowed the president to extend the
merit system to additional employees by adding them to the classified
civil service. After Cleveland was defeated for re-election in 1888, he
extended the merit system significantly in order to limit the patronage
authority of his Republican successor and to protect Democratic
officeholders. “When Cleveland left the White House in March 1889,
the classified list had expanded from sixteen thousand to twenty760
seven thousand officeholders.” “The extension of the merit system
had a slow but incremental effect in making the federal civil service
761
less political and more professional.”
It would be a mistake to conclude that in supporting the expansion
of civil service protections, Cleveland sanctioned any interference
with the president’s power to execute the law. As president,
Cleveland opposed the creation of a Civil Service Commission rule
that required “a statement of cause of removal to be filed,” and he
never supported a requirement that removals of classified officials be
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757.
758.
759.
760.
761.

Id.
Id. at 57-58.
Id. at 57.
DOENECKE, supra note 648, at 102.
WELCH, supra note 718, at 61.
Id. at 61-62.
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made only with just cause. Such a requirement would not appear
until the McKinley administration added such a rule in 1897 and the
Lloyd-La Follette Act wrote these and other requirements into the
763
federal statute books in 1912.
Cleveland also vigorously exercised the presidential veto power,
sending 304 veto messages to Congress in his first term—more than
764
all his predecessors combined. Many of these vetoed bills were
minor private pension bills that, after painstakingly reviewing each of
them, Cleveland found lacking in merit. There was certainly no
hesitation about vetoing bills for policy reasons in the Cleveland
administration. The manner in which he wielded the veto put him at
odds with one powerful interest group, the veteran members of the
Grand Army of the Republic.
The Cleveland administration also bore witness without comment
to a development often mistakenly regarded as establishing
presidential acquiescence to a non-unitary executive: the birth of the
independent regulatory commissions. It is indisputable that under the
Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, members of the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC) were removable by the president for
inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance. However, a close
historical analysis indicates that Congress did not intend this clause to
represent a departure from the unitariness of the executive branch. It
is far from clear that these removal provisions in any way precluded
the president from removing a member of the ICC simply for
765
disagreements over policy. In fact, independence from the president
was never discussed during the debates leading up to the enactment,
and the discussions that did take place suggest that Congress was
primarily concerned with bipartisanship, not independence from
766
executive control. As an early scholar of independent regulatory
commissions has noted, Congress viewed the removal provisions
“more as a protection to the public by providing a way to get rid of
objectionable commissioners than as a limitation on Presidential
767
authority.”

762. WHITE, supra note 522, at 343-44.
763. Id. at 344.
764. WELCH, supra note 718, at 56.
765. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 110-12.
766. ROBERT E. CUSHMAN, THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 60-61
(1941); Paul R. Verkuil, The Purposes and Limits of Independent Agencies, 1988 DUKE
L.J. 257, 272 n.69.
767. CUSHMAN, supra note 766, at 62.
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Other portions of the legislative history support the same
conclusion. Throughout the decade-long debate leading up to the
Interstate Commerce Act’s passage, members of Congress
768
consistently referred to the ICC as part of the executive branch.
Consistent with this view, the ICC was initially placed within the
769
Department of Interior and thus was not independent at all. It was
not until 1889 that the ICC was removed from the Department of the
770
and even that shift was made for purely practical
Interior,
771
reasons. When one fully appreciates that Congress never indicated
768. The early committee reports proposing the establishment of the ICC recommended
that it be set up within the executive department. Id. at 41, 55 (noting that the Windom
Report, S. REP. NO. 43-307 (1874), proposed that the ICC be set up “in one of the
Executive Departments of the Government”); id. at 42, 55 (noting that the 1882 report of
the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, H.R. REP. NO. 47-1399
(1882), recommended establishing the ICC within the Department of the Interior).
Individual legislators similarly indicated that they regarded the ICC as an executive
agency during the ensuing discussion. 17 CONG. REC. 4422 (1886) (statement of Sen.
Edmunds) (referring to the ICC as exercising “executive, discretionary power”); 18 CONG.
REC. app. at 187 (1887) (statement of Sen. La Follette) (referring to the ICC’s
“supervisory and executory” powers). In fact, the Senate appeared to go out of its way to
avoid taking a position on the proper characterization of the ICC. When Senator Morgan
proposed an amendment providing that “the commissioners appointed under this act shall
be considered and regarded as being executive officers, and shall not exercise either
legislative or judicial powers,” 17 CONG. REC. 4422 (1886), Senator Maxey responded by
stating:
[I]t is not a matter of the slightest consequence to me whether the powers are
called executive, judicial, legislative, or ministerial. We have defined on the face
of the bill the powers which are to be exercised by the commissioners, and if
those powers are not constitutional, that fact ought to be pointed out. Therefore I
see no necessity whatever for the amendment proposed by the Senator from
Alabama.
Id. See generally CUSHMAN, supra note 766, at 55-58.
769. Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887). In fact, Representative
Oates even referred to “the veto power which the bill gives to the Secretary of the
Interior.” 18 CONG. REC. 849 (1887), quoted in CUSHMAN, supra note 766, at 62.
770. Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 382, 25 Stat. 855; see also LOUIS FISHER, THE POLITICS
OF SHARED POWER 124 (1981); DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS 41621 (1951), excerpted in THE INDEPENDENT FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES 109, 111
(Leon I. Salomon ed., 1959); Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 SUP. CT.
REV. 41, 75; Angel M. Moreno, Presidential Coordination of the Independent Regulatory
Process, 8 Admin. L.J. Am. U. 461, 514 n.2 (1994); Verkuil, supra note 766, at 272-73;
Paul R. Verkuil, The Status of Independent Agencies after Bowsher v. Synar, 1986 DUKE
L.J. 779, 780 n.7.
771. One noted commentator has indicated that the ICC was removed from the
Department of the Interior at the Secretary of the Interior’s request. CUSHMAN, supra note
766, at 67, 687. Other commentators have speculated that Congress removed the ICC from
the Department of the Interior because of concerns about the background of incoming
President Benjamin Harrison as a railroad lawyer. 5 Senate Comm. on Governmental
Affairs, Study on Federal Regulation, S. DOC. NO. 95-91, at 27-28 (1977); Miller, supra
note 770, at 75 (citing 5 STAFF OF SEN. COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 95TH
CONG., 1ST SESS., STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION PREPARED PURSUANT TO S. REV.
71, at 28 (1977)); Morton Rosenberg, Congress’s Prerogative Over Agencies and Agency
Decisionmakers: The Rise and Demise of the Reagan Administration’s Theory of the
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an intent for the ICC to be a structural innovation to limit presidential
772
control over the execution of the laws, it becomes less surprising
that its creation failed to evoke a presidential response.
While Cleveland did sign the Interstate Commerce Act into law, it
did not have Cleveland’s unmixed blessing; Cleveland “had doubts
about the constitutional soundness of ‘government by
773
commission.’” He “did not publicize those doubts, however, and
appointed to the new Interstate Commerce Commission respected
individuals such as Thomas M. Cooley, former dean of the University
of Michigan Law School, [who were] untainted by ties to the
774
management and financing of the nation’s railroads.”
The doubts about whether the Act placed any limits on the
president’s power to remove and the strength of Cleveland’s other
actions and pronouncements regarding the unitary executive, such as
advocating the repeal of the Tenure of Office Act, counsel against
reading too much into Cleveland’s failure to object to the removal
provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act. Properly understood, it
does not constitute so substantial and sustained a deviation from the
position adopted by his predecessors as to constitute executive
acquiescence, and the positions adopted by Cleveland fit comfortably
into the pattern of presidential insistence on the unitariness of the
executive established since the ratification of the Constitution.
One final development of note occurred during the Cleveland
years: the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in United States v.
775
Perkins. Perkins was a case involving a naval cadet engineer who
had been discharged from his position by the Secretary of the Navy
even though he appeared to be entitled by statute to the job. The issue
was whether when Congress by law vests the appointment of inferior
officers in the heads of departments, it may limit and restrict the
power of removal of those heads of departments as it deems best for
the public interest. It is of critical importance that in Perkins it was
the Secretary of the Navy and not the President who was trying to
exercise the removal power. After noting that the case did not involve
Unitary Executive, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 627, 657 n.169 (1989); Verkuil, supra note
766, at 272 n.69. In either case, it is clear that Congress enacted this change because of
political expediency and not because of any grand constitutional conception of the proper
structure of government.
772. Miller, supra note 770, at 74; Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical
Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1207-08, 1223-24 (1986).
773. WELCH, supra note 718, at 79.
774. Id.
775. 116 U.S. 483 (1886).
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a presidential removal of a Senate confirmed principal officer, the
Court said “We have no doubt that when Congress, by law, vests the
appointment of inferior officers in the heads of Departments it may
limit and restrict the power of removal as it deems best for the public
776
interest.”
This conclusion makes eminent good sense as applied to the
removal power of heads of departments. Since the Secretary of the
Navy is a creature of statute to begin with, and since he gets his
authority to appoint inferior officers from Congress, it makes sense
that Congress could restrict the Secretary of the Navy’s statutory
removal power. Importantly, the Perkins case did not involve an
effort by the President to remove such an inferior officer or to
delegate his executive power of removal to the Secretary of the Navy.
The Perkins Court thus elided over that far more interesting and
provocative question in a cursory three-page opinion that was largely
devoid of analysis. Moreover, even if Perkins were read to limit the
President’s power to remove at will inferior officers appointed by
Heads of Departments, nothing in Perkins precludes principal officers
from supervising and directing all exercises of executive power by
inferior officers. Failure to follow such supervision or direction
would, in our judgment, constitute “just cause” grounds for removal.
From the perspective of the unitary executive, Cleveland’s record is
unequivocal. His first term in office was nothing less than a great
triumph. Cleveland’s biographer Richard Welch sums up his
achievements as follows:
[T]he presidency was reestablished as a branch of the government
coordinate in authority with the Congress, and this was in large
part attributable to the labors and personality of Grover Cleveland.
The administrative reforms that he encouraged in the various
departments, his extensive use of the veto power, his fight for
executive independence during his battle with the Senate over the
Tenure of Office Act, and his leadership efforts in such areas as
Indian policy, western land policy, and tariff reform gave the
executive branch
a vigor and a morale that it had not known for
777
twenty years.

All of this was in part due to his “naturally assertive disposition”
and in part due to his desire to improve “the level of integrity in
778
American politics.” The end of the first Cleveland administration

776. Id. at 485.
777. WELCH, supra note 718, at 89.
778. Id. at 89-90.
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thus marked the close of a century of presidential administration in
which the president remained firmly in control of the executive
branch of the government.
V. CONCLUSION
Presidents throughout the period from 1837 to 1889 persisted in
opposing almost all congressional attempts to infringe upon their sole
power to execute the laws. With the exception of one loose statement
by John Tyler that was never acted upon and a few wartime laws
limiting the removal power that President Lincoln did not have the
energy to block, every president during this fifty-two-year period
vigorously defended the unitary executive. Admittedly, Presidents
Grant and Cleveland failed to enter their objections when Congress
enacted statutes purporting to limit the president’s power of removal.
In Grant’s case, a statute passed limiting his ability to remove minor
postal officials, and, in Cleveland’s case, the Interstate Commerce
Commission was created. However, in light of Grant’s vigorous
opposition to the Tenure of Office Act and Cleveland’s resolute
defense of his removal of U.S. Attorney Duskin, it is difficult to
construe these limited departures from the presidents’ uniform
espousal of the unitariness of the executive branch as sufficient to
constitute acquiescence for the purposes of coordinate construction.
On the contrary, by the end of the century, the presidency had
managed to reclaim most of the prestige and authority lost during
Andrew Johnson’s administration.
Throughout this period, presidential opposition to invasions of the
unitariness of the executive branch was so consistent and sustained
that one of the harshest critics of the unitary executive was forced to
admit that “[b]y the combined action of the three branches of
government the principle of superior control became firmly rooted in
779
the second half of the nineteenth century.” As Leonard White notes,
“the executive power was the constitutional possession of the
President, and it carried with it the practical authority to see that the
laws were enforced. The President, in short, was the constitutional
780
head of the administrative system.”

779. Itzhak Zamir, Administrative Control of Administrative Action, 57 CAL. L. REV.
866, 873 (1969).
780. WHITE, supra note 522, at 106.

